Affected: AlmaLinux:10: openexr, AlmaLinux:10: openexr-devel, AlmaLinux:10: openexr-libs

OpenEXR is an open-source high-dynamic-range floating-point image file format for high-quality image processing and storage. This document presents a brief overview of OpenEXR and explains concepts that are specific to this format. This package containes the binaries for OpenEXR.

Security Fix(es):

* openexr: OpenEXR: Arbitrary code execution via integer overflow in EXR file processing (CVE-2026-27622)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels, per-pixel totals are accumulated in vector<unsigned int> total_sizes for attacker-controlled large counts across many parts, total_sizes[ptr] wraps modulo 2^32. overall_sample_count is then derived from wrapped totals and used in samples[channel].resize(overall_sample_count). Decode pointer setup/consumption proceeds with true sample counts, and write operations in core unpack (generic_unpack_deep_pointers) overrun the undersized composite sample buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.2.6, v3.3.8, and v3.4.6.

Affected: PyPI: OpenEXR

## Summary

Function: `CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels`, reachable from high-level multipart deep read flows (`MultiPartInputFile` + `DeepScanLineInputPart` + `CompositeDeepScanLine`).

Vulnerable lines (`src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp`): - `total_sizes[ptr] += counts[j][ptr];` (line ~511) - `overall_sample_count += total_sizes[ptr];` (line ~514) - `samples[channel].resize (overall_sample_count);` (line ~535)

Impact: 32-bit sample-count accumulation wrap leads to undersized allocation, then decode writes with true sample volume, causing heap OOB write in `generic_unpack_deep_pointers` (`src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374`) (DoS/Crash, memory corruption/RCE).

Attack scenario: - Attacker provides multipart deep EXR with many parts and very large sample counts per pixel. - Uses compression (RLE/ZIPS) to keep file size relatively small vs decode pressure. - The overflow happens in composite sample accounting (`unsigned int`), while pointer progression for decode uses larger counters and reaches out-of-bounds.

Tested on: `OpenEXR 4.0.0-dev` (commit 83449669402080874b25ff1fa740649a9e6ea064) but this code has existed since v2.3.0

## Steps to reproduce

[composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25383205/composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch)

PoC files used: - Writer/generator: `poc/composite_deep_scanline_e2e_compressed_poc.cpp` - Minimal high-level reader harness: `poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp`

The reader harness intenti…

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS: OpenEXR

OpenEXR is a high dynamic-range (HDR) image file format originally developed by Industrial Light &amp;amp; Magic for use in computer imaging applications. Security Fix(es):

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels, per-pixel totals are accumulated in vector&lt;unsigned int&gt; total_sizes for attacker-controlled large counts across many parts, total_sizes[ptr] wraps modulo 2^32. overall_sample_count is then derived from wrapped totals and used in samples[channel].resize(overall_sample_count). Decode pointer setup/consumption proceeds with true sample counts, and write operations in core unpack (generic_unpack_deep_pointers) overrun the undersized composite sample buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.2.6, v3.3.8, and v3.4.6.(CVE-2026-27622)

libIex-3_4-33-3.4.6-1.1 on GA media

Affected: PyPI: openexr

## Summary

Function: `CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels`, reachable from high-level multipart deep read flows (`MultiPartInputFile` + `DeepScanLineInputPart` + `CompositeDeepScanLine`).

Vulnerable lines (`src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp`): - `total_sizes[ptr] += counts[j][ptr];` (line ~511) - `overall_sample_count += total_sizes[ptr];` (line ~514) - `samples[channel].resize (overall_sample_count);` (line ~535)

Impact: 32-bit sample-count accumulation wrap leads to undersized allocation, then decode writes with true sample volume, causing heap OOB write in `generic_unpack_deep_pointers` (`src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374`) (DoS/Crash, memory corruption/RCE).

Attack scenario: - Attacker provides multipart deep EXR with many parts and very large sample counts per pixel. - Uses compression (RLE/ZIPS) to keep file size relatively small vs decode pressure. - The overflow happens in composite sample accounting (`unsigned int`), while pointer progression for decode uses larger counters and reaches out-of-bounds.

Tested on: `OpenEXR 4.0.0-dev` (commit 83449669402080874b25ff1fa740649a9e6ea064) but this code has existed since v2.3.0

## Steps to reproduce

[composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25383205/composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch)

PoC files used: - Writer/generator: `poc/composite_deep_scanline_e2e_compressed_poc.cpp` - Minimal high-level reader harness: `poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp`

The reader harness intenti…

openexr: OpenEXR: Arbitrary code execution via integer overflow in EXR file processing

Security update for openexr

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:25.10: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: openexr

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels, per-pixel totals are accumulated in vector<unsigned int> total_sizes for attacker-controlled large counts across many parts, total_sizes[ptr] wraps modulo 2^32. overall_sample_count is then derived from wrapped totals and used in samples[channel].resize(overall_sample_count). Decode pointer setup/consumption proceeds with true sample counts, and write operations in core unpack (generic_unpack_deep_pointers) overrun the undersized composite sample buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.2.6, v3.3.8, and v3.4.6.

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Red Hat Enterprise Linux ausnutzen, um möglicherweise beliebigen Code auszuführen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.