Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Vulnerability

In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.

In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.

## Typical Use Case Context

Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.

## Impact

- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. - Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited. - Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: npm `openclaw` - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.14` - Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)

## Remediation

- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`. - Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility. - Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.

## Fix Commit(s)

- `c6c…

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.

Affected: npm: openclaw

## Vulnerability

In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.

In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured.

## Typical Use Case Context

Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.

## Impact

- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. - Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited. - Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: npm `openclaw` - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.14` - Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release)

## Remediation

- Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`. - Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility. - Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.

## Fix Commit(s)

- `c6c…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen und Daten zu manipulieren.