Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Overview OpenClaw embedded the current working directory (workspace path) into the agent system prompt without sanitization. If an attacker can cause OpenClaw to run inside a directory whose name contains control/format characters (for example newlines or Unicode bidi/zero-width markers), those characters could break the prompt structure and inject attacker-controlled instructions.

## Impact Prompt injection may alter agent behavior and could lead to unintended tool use or disclosure of sensitive information.

## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Vulnerable versions: `< 2026.2.15` (latest published vulnerable version as of 2026-02-16: `2026.2.14`) - Patched versions: `>= 2026.2.15`

## Fix The workspace path is now sanitized before it is embedded into any LLM prompt output, stripping Unicode control/format characters and explicit line/paragraph separators. Workspace path resolution also applies the same sanitization as defense-in-depth.

## Fix Commit(s) - `6254e96acf16e70ceccc8f9b2abecee44d606f79`

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, OpenClaw embedded the current working directory (workspace path) into the agent system prompt without sanitization. If an attacker can cause OpenClaw to run inside a directory whose name contains control/format characters (for example newlines or Unicode bidi/zero-width markers), those characters could break the prompt structure and inject attacker-controlled instructions. Starting in version 2026.2.15, the workspace path is sanitized before it is embedded into any LLM prompt output, stripping Unicode control/format characters and explicit line/paragraph separators. Workspace path resolution also applies the same sanitization as defense-in-depth.

Affected: npm: openclaw

## Overview OpenClaw embedded the current working directory (workspace path) into the agent system prompt without sanitization. If an attacker can cause OpenClaw to run inside a directory whose name contains control/format characters (for example newlines or Unicode bidi/zero-width markers), those characters could break the prompt structure and inject attacker-controlled instructions.

## Impact Prompt injection may alter agent behavior and could lead to unintended tool use or disclosure of sensitive information.

## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Vulnerable versions: `< 2026.2.15` (latest published vulnerable version as of 2026-02-16: `2026.2.14`) - Patched versions: `>= 2026.2.15`

## Fix The workspace path is now sanitized before it is embedded into any LLM prompt output, stripping Unicode control/format characters and explicit line/paragraph separators. Workspace path resolution also applies the same sanitization as defense-in-depth.

## Fix Commit(s) - `6254e96acf16e70ceccc8f9b2abecee44d606f79`

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Rechte zu erweitern, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.