Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to version 0.14.2, gogs api still accepts tokens in url params like token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers. This issue has been patched in version 0.14.2.

Affected: Go: gogs.io/gogs

### Summary

The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as `token` and `access_token`, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.

### Details

A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:

- internal/context/auth.go reads `c.Query("token")` - internal/context/auth.go falls back to `c.Query("access_token")` - internal/context/auth.go only checks the `Authorization` header when the query token is empty - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated

Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through `c.IsTokenAuth` checks: - internal/route/api/v1/api.go

### Impact

If tokens are sent in URLs such as `/api/v1/user?token=...`, they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.

### Recommended Fix

- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission. - Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level. - Query strings should be scrubbed from logs. - A strict referrer policy should be set.

### Remediation

A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gogs ausnutzen, um Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.