vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.14.0, vLLM loads Hugging Face `auto_map` dynamic modules during model resolution without gating on `trust_remote_code`, allowing attacker-controlled Python code in a model repo/path to execute at server startup. An attacker who can influence the model repo/path (local directory or remote Hugging Face repo) can achieve arbitrary code execution on the vLLM host during model load. This happens before any request handling and does not require API access. Version 0.14.0 fixes the issue.

Affected: PyPI: vllm

# Summary

vLLM loads Hugging Face `auto_map` dynamic modules during model resolution **without gating on `trust_remote_code`**, allowing attacker-controlled Python code in a model repo/path to execute at server startup.

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# Impact

An attacker who can influence the model repo/path (local directory or remote Hugging Face repo) can achieve **arbitrary code execution** on the vLLM host during model load. This happens **before any request handling** and does **not require API access**.

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# Affected Versions

All versions where `vllm/model_executor/models/registry.py` resolves `auto_map` entries with `try_get_class_from_dynamic_module` **without checking `trust_remote_code`** (at least current `main`).

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# Details

During model resolution, vLLM unconditionally iterates `auto_map` entries from the model config and calls `try_get_class_from_dynamic_module`, which delegates to Transformers’ `get_class_from_dynamic_module` and **executes the module code**.

This occurs even when `trust_remote_code` is `false`, allowing a malicious model repo to embed code in a referenced module and have it executed during initialization.

### Relevant code

- `vllm/model_executor/models/registry.py:856` — auto_map resolution - `vllm/transformers_utils/dynamic_module.py:13` — delegates to `get_class_from_dynamic_module`, which executes code

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# Fixes

* https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32194

# Credits

Reported by **bugbunny.ai**

Affected: PyPI: vllm

# Summary

vLLM loads Hugging Face `auto_map` dynamic modules during model resolution **without gating on `trust_remote_code`**, allowing attacker-controlled Python code in a model repo/path to execute at server startup.

---

# Impact

An attacker who can influence the model repo/path (local directory or remote Hugging Face repo) can achieve **arbitrary code execution** on the vLLM host during model load. This happens **before any request handling** and does **not require API access**.

---

# Affected Versions

All versions where `vllm/model_executor/models/registry.py` resolves `auto_map` entries with `try_get_class_from_dynamic_module` **without checking `trust_remote_code`** (at least current `main`).

---

# Details

During model resolution, vLLM unconditionally iterates `auto_map` entries from the model config and calls `try_get_class_from_dynamic_module`, which delegates to Transformers’ `get_class_from_dynamic_module` and **executes the module code**.

This occurs even when `trust_remote_code` is `false`, allowing a malicious model repo to embed code in a referenced module and have it executed during initialization.

### Relevant code

- `vllm/model_executor/models/registry.py:856` — auto_map resolution - `vllm/transformers_utils/dynamic_module.py:13` — delegates to `get_class_from_dynamic_module`, which executes code

---

# Fixes

* https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32194

# Credits

Reported by **bugbunny.ai**

vllm: Server Side request forgery (SSRF) in MediaConnector feast: Feast: Remote Code Execution via insecure YAML deserialization openshift-ai: Trusty AI Grants All Authenticated users to list pods in any namespace nltk: Zip Slip Vulnerability in nltk Leading to Code Execution golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url golang: archive/zip: Excessive CPU consumption when building archive index in archive/zip crypto/x509: golang: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption via crafted certificate urllib3: urllib3: Unbounded decompression chain leads to resource exhaustion urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data cbor2: cbor2: Information Disclosure via shared memory in CBORDecoder reuse aiohttp: AIOHTTP's HTTP Parser auto_decompress feature is vulnerable to zip bomb aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via specially crafted POST request aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from crafted POST request python-markdown: denial of service via malformed HTML-like sequences nltk: NLTK: Arbitrary file read via improper path validation in `filestring()` function nltk: NLTK: Arbitrary file read via path traversal vulnerability io.vertx/vertx-core: static handler component cache can be manipulated to deny the access to static files google-cloud-aiplatform: google-cloud-aiplatform: Arbitrary code execution via Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) tensorflow: TensorFlow: Local privilege escalation via…

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in vllm ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder Code auszuführen.