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  <updated>2026-10-02T12:46:10.136199+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265612</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-265612</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T12:46:10.138840+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-265612</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265612"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22607</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-22607</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T12:46:10.138871+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's cProfile module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses cProfile.run() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling's output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22607"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p523-jq9w-64x9</id>
    <title>GHSA-p523-jq9w-64x9 — Fickling Blocklist Bypass: cProfile.run()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T12:46:10.138904+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: fickling</p>
<p># Fickling's assessment</p>
<p>`cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).</p>
<p># Original report</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.</p>
<p>If a user relies on Fickling's output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.</p>
<p>This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).</p>
<p>Incriminated source code:</p>
<p>- File: `fickling/analysis.py`
- Class: `UnsafeImports`
- Issue: The blocklist does not include `cProfile`, `cProfile.run`, or `cProfile.runctx`</p>
<p>Reference to similar fix:</p>
<p>- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for `cProfile`</p>
<p>How the bypass works:</p>
<p>1. Attacker creates a pickle using `cProfile.run()` in `__reduce__`
2. `cProfile.run()` accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)
3.…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p523-jq9w-64x9"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1371</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-1371 — Fickling Blocklist Bypass: cProfile.run()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T12:46:10.138975+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: fickling</p>
<p># Fickling's assessment</p>
<p>`cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).</p>
<p># Original report</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.</p>
<p>If a user relies on Fickling's output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.</p>
<p>This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).</p>
<p>Incriminated source code:</p>
<p>- File: `fickling/analysis.py`
- Class: `UnsafeImports`
- Issue: The blocklist does not include `cProfile`, `cProfile.run`, or `cProfile.runctx`</p>
<p>Reference to similar fix:</p>
<p>- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for `cProfile`</p>
<p>How the bypass works:</p>
<p>1. Attacker creates a pickle using `cProfile.run()` in `__reduce__`
2. `cProfile.run()` accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)
3.…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1371"/>
  </entry>
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