Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary A command injection vulnerability existed in Windows Scheduled Task script generation for OpenClaw. Environment values were written into `gateway.cmd` using unquoted `set KEY=VALUE`, which allowed Windows shell metacharacters in config-provided environment variables to break out of assignment context.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.17` - Patched version: `>= 2026.2.19` - Latest published vulnerable version at review time (2026-02-19): `2026.2.17`

### Practical Risk Context For a single-user, localhost-only setup on a personally controlled machine, practical risk is typically low.

This issue becomes materially relevant when configuration or environment values are sourced from less-trusted inputs, for example: - shared/team config templates, - copied config snippets, - setup scripts, automation, or repos that write config, - any workflow where another party can influence env values before `gateway install`/reinstall.

In those scenarios, it provides a reliable config-to-command-execution path when the scheduled task script is generated and run.

### Details On Windows, gateway service installation writes a helper batch script and then registers it via Scheduled Task (`schtasks`). Before the fix, env lines were rendered as `set KEY=VALUE` in `src/daemon/schtasks.ts`, so values containing metacharacters (for example `&`, `|`, `^`, `%`, `!`) could alter command behavior in `cmd.exe`.

The fix now renders…

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.19 contain a command injection vulnerability in Windows Scheduled Task script generation where environment variables are written to gateway.cmd using unquoted set KEY=VALUE assignments, allowing shell metacharacters to break out of assignment context. Attackers can inject arbitrary commands through environment variable values containing metacharacters like &, |, ^, %, or ! to achieve command execution when the scheduled task script is generated and executed.

Affected: npm: openclaw

### Summary A command injection vulnerability existed in Windows Scheduled Task script generation for OpenClaw. Environment values were written into `gateway.cmd` using unquoted `set KEY=VALUE`, which allowed Windows shell metacharacters in config-provided environment variables to break out of assignment context.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.17` - Patched version: `>= 2026.2.19` - Latest published vulnerable version at review time (2026-02-19): `2026.2.17`

### Practical Risk Context For a single-user, localhost-only setup on a personally controlled machine, practical risk is typically low.

This issue becomes materially relevant when configuration or environment values are sourced from less-trusted inputs, for example: - shared/team config templates, - copied config snippets, - setup scripts, automation, or repos that write config, - any workflow where another party can influence env values before `gateway install`/reinstall.

In those scenarios, it provides a reliable config-to-command-execution path when the scheduled task script is generated and run.

### Details On Windows, gateway service installation writes a helper batch script and then registers it via Scheduled Task (`schtasks`). Before the fix, env lines were rendered as `set KEY=VALUE` in `src/daemon/schtasks.ts`, so values containing metacharacters (for example `&`, `|`, `^`, `%`, `!`) could alter command behavior in `cmd.exe`.

The fix now renders…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, sich erhöhte Berechtigungen zu verschaffen, Daten zu manipulieren, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder andere nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.