Affected: AlmaLinux:10: nodejs-docs

Node.js is a platform built on Chrome's JavaScript runtime \ for easily building fast, scalable network applications. \ Node.js uses an event-driven, non-blocking I/O model that \ makes it lightweight and efficient, perfect for data-intensive \ real-time applications that run across distributed devices.

Security Fix(es):

* brace-expansion: brace-expansion: Denial of Service via unbounded brace range expansion (CVE-2026-25547) * minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service via specially crafted glob patterns (CVE-2026-26996) * minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions (CVE-2026-27904) * undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression (CVE-2026-1526) * undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter (CVE-2026-2229) * undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers (CVE-2026-1525) * undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length (CVE-2026-1528) * nghttp2: nghttp2: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP/2 frames after session termination (CVE-2026-27135) * Node.js: Node.js: Denial of Service due to crafted HTTP `__proto__` header (CVE-2026-21710)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the Re…

Affected: Alpaquita:23: nodejs, Alpaquita:25: nodejs, Alpaquita:stream: nodejs, BellSoft Hardened Containers:23: nodejs, BellSoft Hardened Containers:25: nodejs, BellSoft Hardened Containers:stream: nodejs

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: renovate

Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the renovate package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire.

Who is impacted:

* Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization

Potential consequences:

* Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

Affected: npm: undici

### Impact

Undici allows duplicate HTTP `Content-Length` headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., `Content-Length` and `content-length`). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting `Content-Length` values on the wire.

**Who is impacted:** - Applications using `undici.request()`, `undici.Client`, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays - Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization

**Potential consequences:** - **Denial of Service**: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate `Content-Length` headers (400 Bad Request) - **HTTP Request Smuggling**: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

### Patches

Patched in the undici version v7.24.0 and v6.24.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later.

### Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

1. **Validate header names**: Ensure no duplicate `Content-Length` headers (case-insensitive) are present before passing headers to undici 2. **Use object format**: Pass headers as a plain object (`{ 'content-length': '123' }`) rather than an array, which naturally deduplicates by key 3. **Sanitize user input**: If headers originate from user inpu…

axios: Axios: Server-Side Request Forgery and proxy bypass due to improper hostname normalization python-markdown: denial of service via malformed HTML-like sequences undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter rhdh: GraphQL Injection Leading to Platform-Wide Denial of Service (DoS) in RH Developer Hub Orchestrator Plugin lodash: lodash: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input in template imports path-to-regexp: path-to-regexp: Denial of Service via crafted regular expressions Underscore.js: Underscore.js: Denial of Service via recursive data structures in flatten and isEqual functions minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions immutable-js: Immutable.js: Arbitrary code execution via Prototype Pollution svgo: SVGO: Denial of Service via XML entity expansion backstage/plugin-techdocs-node: TechDocs Mkdocs configuration key enables arbitrary code execution flatted: flatted: Unbounded recursion DoS in parse() revive phase crypto/x509: crypto/tls: golang: Go: Denial of Service vulnerability in certificate chain building golang: internal/syscall/unix: Root.Chmod can follow symlinks out…

undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter Node.js: Node.js: Denial of Service due to crafted HTTP `__proto__` header brace-expansion: brace-expansion: Denial of Service via unbounded brace range expansion minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service via specially crafted glob patterns nghttp2: nghttp2: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP/2 frames after session termination minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions

Affected: Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-undici, Ubuntu:25.10: node-undici, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-undici

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder andere nicht näher bezeichnete Angriffe durchzuführen.