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  <updated>2026-11-17T14:12:34.430681+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407008</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-407008</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:12:34.433084+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-407008</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407008"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8cgq-x343-p74c</id>
    <title>GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c — mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:12:34.433117+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mail-parser</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop
with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment
**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that
catches only `MailParserError`.</p>
<p>That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part
first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that
a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client
intact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same
failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in
[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).</p>
<p>Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:</p>
<p>- **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** — `filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the
  filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;
- **overlong basename** — a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised
  `OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;
- **undecodable payload** — a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a
  `ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.</p>
<p>```python
import tempfile, mailparser</p>
<p>raw = ("Conten…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8cgq-x343-p74c"/>
  </entry>
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