<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-16T20:28:43.611192+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404644</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-404644</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:28:43.614462+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-404644</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404644"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126085</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-126085</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:28:43.614502+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and #headers_for_direct_upload returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the byte_size it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126085"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hfr4-8rjc-97m2</id>
    <title>GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 — Active Storage: Possible circumvention of file size limits in Active Storage direct uploads to Google Cloud Storage</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:28:43.614548+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: activestorage</p>
<p>### Impact
`ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload` does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and `#headers_for_direct_upload` returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the `byte_size` it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service.</p>
<p>Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected.</p>
<p>### Details
The fixed releases sign an `x-goog-content-length-range` header that matches the blob's declared `byte_size` and return it from `headers_for_direct_upload`, so Cloud Storage rejects an upload body of any other size. Browsers send this header with the direct upload, so a bucket's CORS configuration must list `x-goog-content-length-range` in `responseHeader`, or browser direct uploads fail after the upgrade. The Active Storage CHANGELOG and the CORS example in the Active Storage guide show the change.</p>
<p>### Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.</p>
<p>Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/e19916cea31cbfb0030b165ae853b741f8dd57a7.patch
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/7fe85a72a789eae5ee070ce3ee1dad10a8a5f70c.patch</p>
<p>### Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne r…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hfr4-8rjc-97m2"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126085</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-126085</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:28:43.614614+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:26.10: rails, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rails</p>
<p>Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and #headers_for_direct_upload returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the byte_size it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126085"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
