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  <updated>2026-11-16T21:33:52.101352+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2026-125111</id>
    <title>BREW-mailcatcher-CVE-2026-125111 — Rack: Multipart parsing allows DoS via unbounded scan buffer growth</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:33:52.104944+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: mailcatcher</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`Rack::Multipart::Parser` reads the request body in chunks of `rack.multipart.buffer_size` (1 MiB by default) into an internal scan buffer. Parsed bytes are only discarded from that buffer when a chunk ends inside a part body. A request whose parts are sized so that every chunk ends inside, or immediately after, a part's headers is never compacted, so the buffer grows to the size of the request.</p>
<p>This results in a denial of service condition through memory exhaustion for applications that parse multipart requests.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The parser appends each chunk read from the input to a `StringScanner` and advances through boundaries, headers, and bodies. In the body state, when no closing boundary is found, the consumed prefix is removed before more data is read. In the header state, and in the body state when no body bytes have been consumed yet, the parser requests more data without removing anything. Bytes skipped between parts are not counted against any limit.</p>
<p>An attacker can therefore construct parts that each fit within one chunk and align the chunk boundaries with the part headers. The existing limits on buffered non-file field data, header size, and preamble size do not apply, because each individual part remains small. With default limits the buffer can reach roughly 4 GiB (4096 parts of about 1 MiB). Ordinary file uploads aligned the same way are bounded by the file part limit at roughly 128 MiB per request.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>Any application that parses multipar…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2026-125111"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402634</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-402634</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:33:52.105015+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-402634</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402634"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125111</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-125111</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:33:52.105032+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8, Rack::Multipart::Parser can retain parsed data in its internal StringScanner buffer when reads end inside or immediately after multipart headers. An unauthenticated attacker can align many small parts with rack.multipart.buffer_size boundaries so the buffer grows with the request despite per-field, header, and preamble limits, causing a worker to exhaust memory. The attack requires only a well-formed multipart body and affects applications that parse multipart requests. This issue is fixed in versions 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125111"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5v64-555j-wjxm</id>
    <title>GHSA-5v64-555j-wjxm — Rack: Multipart parsing allows DoS via unbounded scan buffer growth</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:33:52.105056+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: rack</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`Rack::Multipart::Parser` reads the request body in chunks of `rack.multipart.buffer_size` (1 MiB by default) into an internal scan buffer. Parsed bytes are only discarded from that buffer when a chunk ends inside a part body. A request whose parts are sized so that every chunk ends inside, or immediately after, a part's headers is never compacted, so the buffer grows to the size of the request.</p>
<p>This results in a denial of service condition through memory exhaustion for applications that parse multipart requests.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The parser appends each chunk read from the input to a `StringScanner` and advances through boundaries, headers, and bodies. In the body state, when no closing boundary is found, the consumed prefix is removed before more data is read. In the header state, and in the body state when no body bytes have been consumed yet, the parser requests more data without removing anything. Bytes skipped between parts are not counted against any limit.</p>
<p>An attacker can therefore construct parts that each fit within one chunk and align the chunk boundaries with the part headers. The existing limits on buffered non-file field data, header size, and preamble size do not apply, because each individual part remains small. With default limits the buffer can reach roughly 4 GiB (4096 parts of about 1 MiB). Ordinary file uploads aligned the same way are bounded by the file part limit at roughly 128 MiB per request.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>Any application that parses multipar…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5v64-555j-wjxm"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-125111</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-125111</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:33:52.105094+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:26.10: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ruby-rack</p>
<p>Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8, Rack::Multipart::Parser can retain parsed data in its internal StringScanner buffer when reads end inside or immediately after multipart headers. An unauthenticated attacker can align many small parts with rack.multipart.buffer_size boundaries so the buffer grows with the request despite per-field, header, and preamble limits, causing a worker to exhaust memory. The attack requires only a well-formed multipart body and affects applications that parse multipart requests. This issue is fixed in versions 2.2.25, 3.1.23, and 3.2.8.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-125111"/>
  </entry>
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