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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-16T20:03:16.224888+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401969</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-401969</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:03:16.229676+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-401969</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401969"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123596</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-123596</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:03:16.229712+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for the negative TTL.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123596"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88cx-p9f5-pr4w</id>
    <title>GHSA-88cx-p9f5-pr4w</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:03:16.229746+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for the negative TTL.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88cx-p9f5-pr4w"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123596</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-123596 — Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Ancestor-Delegation NSEC</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:03:16.229766+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-123596</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123596"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0530</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0530 — Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:03:16.229783+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: hickory-proto</p>
<p>Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted the NSEC record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names below the zone cut, or other types at the cut, do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.</p>
<p>From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0530"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123596</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-123596</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:03:16.229810+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-net, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto</p>
<p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for the negative TTL.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123596"/>
  </entry>
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