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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-16T19:14:15.084927+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401968</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-401968</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T19:14:15.089758+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-401968</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401968"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123595</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-123595</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T19:14:15.089794+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC3 handler, which matches the closest encloser by hash alone without checking the type bitmap and so accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC3 records as proof of nonexistence. An attacker who delivers one response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC3 records can cause NXDOMAIN or NODATA to be cached with AD=1, denying resolution of existing names at and below the zone cut.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123595"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v96c-g4c4-84vh</id>
    <title>GHSA-v96c-g4c4-84vh</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T19:14:15.089830+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC3 handler, which matches the closest encloser by hash alone without checking the type bitmap and so accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC3 records as proof of nonexistence. An attacker who delivers one response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC3 records can cause NXDOMAIN or NODATA to be cached with AD=1, denying resolution of existing names at and below the zone cut.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v96c-g4c4-84vh"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123595</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-123595 — Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via Ancestor-Delegation NSEC3</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T19:14:15.089850+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-123595</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123595"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0532</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0532 — Parent-side NSEC3 at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto 0.25)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T19:14:15.089866+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: hickory-proto</p>
<p>In hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, NSEC3 validation picked the closest encloser by hashed owner name alone and accepted the NSEC3 record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names at or below the zone cut do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1, RFC 5155 section 8.3). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.</p>
<p>From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in hickory-proto 0.25 (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor 0.25) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0532"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123595</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-123595</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T19:14:15.089895+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-net, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto</p>
<p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC3 handler, which matches the closest encloser by hash alone without checking the type bitmap and so accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC3 records as proof of nonexistence. An attacker who delivers one response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC3 records can cause NXDOMAIN or NODATA to be cached with AD=1, denying resolution of existing names at and below the zone cut.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123595"/>
  </entry>
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