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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-16T20:25:35.566818+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401967</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-401967</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:25:35.704908+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-401967</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401967"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123594</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-123594</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:25:35.704945+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123594"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg2p-gxqh-hm83</id>
    <title>GHSA-fg2p-gxqh-hm83</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:25:35.704981+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg2p-gxqh-hm83"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123594</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-123594 — Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC NSEC Validation Bypass for Empty Non-Terminals</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:25:35.705000+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-123594</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123594"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0511</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0511 — NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:25:35.705018+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: hickory-proto</p>
<p>Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.</p>
<p>From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0511"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123594</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-123594</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:25:35.705045+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-net, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto</p>
<p>Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123594"/>
  </entry>
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