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  <updated>2026-11-16T22:56:28.779964+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395619</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-395619</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T22:56:28.782700+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-395619</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395619"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118776</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-118776</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T22:56:28.782731+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used decipher.finish(), CBC and ECB modes, PKCS#7 padding to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge validated only the final byte of PKCS#7 padding during CBC and ECB decryption and accepted zero, oversized, or mismatched padding bytes. Malformed ciphertext could consequently be accepted and up to four plaintext blocks could be silently removed, causing an integrity failure in applications that treated successful decryption as proof of valid padding. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118776"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2vgq-wchc-25w7</id>
    <title>GHSA-2vgq-wchc-25w7 — Forge: Incomplete PKCS#7 padding validation in AES/DES CBC and ECB decryption</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T22:56:28.782763+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: node-forge</p>
<p>### Summary
`decipher.finish()` in CBC and ECB mode accepted malformed PKCS#7 padding: only the last byte was checked, against a limit of four blocks, so mismatched padding bytes, a zero count and oversized counts were accepted and up to four blocks of plaintext could be silently removed. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.</p>
<p>### Details
`modes.cbc.prototype.unpad()` and `modes.ecb.prototype.unpad()` in `lib/cipherModes.js` read the last decrypted byte as the PKCS#7 padding count, rejected it only if it was larger than `blockSize &lt;&lt; 2` (64 for AES, 32 for DES), and then removed that many bytes. They did not reject a count of 0 or a count larger than one block, and did not check that every padding byte equals the count, as PKCS#7 (RFC 5652 section 6.3) requires. On the Wycheproof AES-CBC-PKCS5 test vectors, 69 of 144 invalid vectors decrypted successfully.</p>
<p>CBC and ECB without a MAC do not provide integrity: an attacker who can modify ciphertext can already make the final block decrypt to any padding. The effect of this bug is that malformed ciphertext is accepted as valid and that oversized counts silently truncate up to four blocks of plaintext. The fix does not protect against padding oracle attacks; applications that decrypt untrusted CBC data need to authenticate it (for example with an HMAC) or use AES-GCM.</p>
<p>The fix requires a count from 1 to the block size and checks every padding byte. Data with other padding schemes that only use the last byte as the count (ANSI X.923, ISO 101…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2vgq-wchc-25w7"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-118776</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-118776 — Forge: Incomplete PKCS#7 padding validation in AES/DES CBC and ECB decryption</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T22:56:28.782811+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-118776</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-118776"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-118776</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-118776</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T22:56:28.782828+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-node-forge, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-node-forge</p>
<p>Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used decipher.finish(), CBC and ECB modes, PKCS#7 padding to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge validated only the final byte of PKCS#7 padding during CBC and ECB decryption and accepted zero, oversized, or mismatched padding bytes. Malformed ciphertext could consequently be accepted and up to four plaintext blocks could be silently removed, causing an integrity failure in applications that treated successful decryption as proof of valid padding. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-118776"/>
  </entry>
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