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  <updated>2026-11-16T21:47:05.572735+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392482</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-392482</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:47:05.575718+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-392482</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392482"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115910</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-115910</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:47:05.575750+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim's unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker's browser, submit the victim's code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115910"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2r5-x5m7-3935</id>
    <title>GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935 — Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the a…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:47:05.575786+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: social-auth-core</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The generic OpenID Connect backend (`OpenIdConnectAuth` and every backend built on it) stores the `nonce` in the shared Association table, not in the user's session. When the ID token comes back, `validate_claims` only checks that the nonce exists in that table and is not expired. It does not check that the nonce was issued to the browser that is finishing the login.</p>
<p>So the nonce does not do its job. OIDC Core (section 15.5.2) and RFC 9700 (section 4.5) use the nonce to stop authorization code injection: an attacker who gets hold of a victim's unused authorization code should not be able to redeem it in the attacker's own browser. With social-auth-core, the attacker can. They start their own login to get a valid `state` for their session, then hit the callback with the victim's `code` and their own `state`. `state` passes because it belongs to the attacker's session, and the nonce in the victim's ID token passes because it is in the global table. The attacker's browser is now logged in as the victim.</p>
<p>PKCE would block this, but `OpenIdConnectAuth` sets `DEFAULT_USE_PKCE = False` (the OAuth2 base class defaults to `True`), so the nonce is the only binding in the default setup.</p>
<p>### Tested versions</p>
<p>social-auth-core 6.1.1 (latest), 6.1.0 and 5.2.0, with social-auth-app-django 7.1.0 and Django 6.1.2, Python 3.14. The same code is on master (098ef399c1).</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>`social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py` in 6.1.1:</p>
<p>- line 252: `auth_params` calls `get_and_stor…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2r5-x5m7-3935"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115910</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-115910</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T21:47:05.575866+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:26.10: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: social-auth-core</p>
<p>Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim's unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker's browser, submit the victim's code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115910"/>
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