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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-17T14:47:19.351196+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392682</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-392682</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:47:19.355326+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-392682</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392682"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115909</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-115909</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:47:19.355356+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 1.3.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract in src/read/mod.rs calls Vec::with_capacity for a symbolic link target using the attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed_size before reading entry data. A small archive can request an impossible capacity, causing the infallible allocation path to abort the process before the entry is validated. The failure cannot be contained with catch_unwind or a worker thread, allowing repeated denial of service in archive-processing applications. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115909"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q7v9-x93c-xqv3</id>
    <title>GHSA-q7v9-x93c-xqv3 — zip: Unbounded Symlink-Target Handling Can Abort Or Exhaust Memory During Extraction</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:47:19.355389+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zip</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The symbolic-link branch of `ZipArchive::extract_internal()` allocates a buffer using an attacker-declared size before reading any entry data. A 112-byte archive terminates the extracting process with `SIGABRT` through this infallible allocation.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>```rust
#[cfg(any(unix, windows))]
if file.is_symlink() {
    let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize); // @audit unbounded memory allocation
    file.read_to_end(&amp;mut target)?;
    drop(file);
    make_symlink(&amp;outpath, &amp;target, &amp;self.shared.files)?;
    continue;
}
```</p>
<p>[`src/read/mod.rs#L399-L405`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/6f09b3064ec87c3a69ea9f3413f9f9638b4aa446/src/read/mod.rs#L399-L405) (reviewed commit `6f09b306`); the same code is at [`src/read.rs#L417-L418`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/v8.6.0/src/read.rs#L417-L418) in released v8.6.0.</p>
<p>Both inputs are attacker-controlled:</p>
<p>- [`ZipFile::size()`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/6f09b3064ec87c3a69ea9f3413f9f9638b4aa446/src/read/zipfile.rs#L243-L246) returns `uncompressed_size` verbatim from the central directory record. A ZIP64 extended-information extra field widens it to a full `u64` ([`src/read/mod.rs#L619-L625`](https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/blob/6f09b3064ec87c3a69ea9f3413f9f9638b4aa446/src/read/mod.rs#L619-L625)). It is never cross-checked against the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate bound for a symlink target.
- [`ZipFile::is_symlink()`](https://github.com/zip-rs…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q7v9-x93c-xqv3"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-115909</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-115909 — zip: Unbounded Symlink-Target Handling Can Abort Or Exhaust Memory During Extraction</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:47:19.355459+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-115909</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-115909"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0429</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0429 — zip: `ZipArchive::extract` aborts the process on a symlink entry with a large declared size</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:47:19.355476+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zip</p>
<p>`ZipArchive::extract()` sizes the symlink-target buffer from the uncompressed
size declared in the central directory record, before reading a single byte of
entry data:</p>
<p>```rust
let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize);
```</p>
<p>Both inputs are attacker-controlled. `ZipFile::size()` returns
`uncompressed_size` verbatim from the central directory, widened to a full `u64`
by a ZIP64 extended-information extra field, and is never cross-checked against
the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate
bound for a symlink target. `ZipFile::is_symlink()` is decided entirely by the
`S_IFLNK` bit of the external-attributes field.</p>
<p>`Vec::with_capacity()` is infallible: when the reservation is refused it calls
`handle_alloc_error()` and aborts the process. This is not a Rust panic. It is
not caught by `catch_unwind()`, is unaffected by `panic = "unwind"`, and is not
contained by running the call on a worker thread.</p>
<p>A 112-byte archive is sufficient. One `Stored` entry flagged `S_IFLNK` with a
ZIP64 field declaring `uncompressed_size = 2^62` and a zero-byte payload makes
`extract()` fail with:</p>
<p>```
memory allocation of 4611686018427387904 bytes failed
Aborted (core dumped)          # exit 134
```</p>
<p>The declared value only needs to exceed the host's address space, not its RAM:
`Vec::with_capacity()` maps address space without touching pages, so resident
memory stays flat and the abort happens on the refused reservation itself. Under
a `ulimit -v`…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0429"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115909</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-115909</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T14:47:19.355515+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:26.10: rust-zip, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-zip</p>
<p>zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 1.3.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract in src/read/mod.rs calls Vec::with_capacity for a symbolic link target using the attacker-controlled ZIP64 uncompressed_size before reading entry data. A small archive can request an impossible capacity, causing the infallible allocation path to abort the process before the entry is validated. The failure cannot be contained with catch_unwind or a worker thread, allowing repeated denial of service in archive-processing applications. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115909"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
