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  <updated>2026-11-16T20:41:32.174401+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392635</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-392635</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:41:32.177270+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-392635</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392635"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115908</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-115908</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:41:32.177300+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 7.2.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract and ZipArchive::extract_unwrapped_root_dir use safe_prepare_path in src/read/zipfile.rs and simplified_components in src/path.rs to validate symbolic link targets with a lexical prefix comparison rather than resolving each intermediate link. An attacker who knows or can guess the absolute extraction destination can create a chain whose apparent target remains under the destination while an intermediate symlink resolves outside it, allowing attacker-controlled files to be created or overwritten with the extracting process's privileges. On Windows, discarded drive and UNC prefixes can permit a single-link escape when the process has SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, such as through administrator rights or Developer Mode. This regression is distinct from CVE-2025-29787. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115908"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hjqx-j4rw-g7xv</id>
    <title>GHSA-hjqx-j4rw-g7xv — zip: Arbitrary file write outside the extraction directory, because ZipArchive::extract validates symlink targets lexic…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:41:32.177336+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zip</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>- **Verified version:** zip `9.0.0-pre3`
- **Affected versions:** `7.2.0` and later
- **Precondition:** The attacker knows (or can guess) the absolute path of the extraction destination</p>
<p>The validation applied to symlinks is purely lexical.
As a result, an attacker can write arbitrary files outside the extraction directory through a symlink.
Exploitation requires the attacker to know (or guess) the absolute path of the destination, but this is realistic in practice: CI workspaces, `/opt/app`, a fixed Downloads path, and so on.</p>
<p>&gt; **Impact extends further on Windows (verified on real hardware for both the separate-drive and UNC-share cases)**:  
&gt; Because `simplified_components` discards the `Prefix` component, paths like `D:\&lt;same tail as dest&gt;` or a UNC path `\\attacker\share\&lt;same tail&gt;` pass the `starts_with` check.  
&gt; As a result, `outpath.push` gets replaced onto a different drive/remote share, so **a single symlink is enough — no intermediate symlink chain is required**.  
&gt; That said, creating a symlink on Windows requires `SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege` (administrator rights or Developer Mode enabled).
&gt; **Real-hardware verification (Windows 10 VM (19045.2604), `tests/poc_win.rs`)**:  
&gt; With the extraction target set to a temporary directory under `C:`, both of the following paths returned `Ok(())` from `extract()` and successfully wrote outside the extraction target.  
&gt; In both cases `extract()` returned no error (`Ok(())`), and it was confirmed that…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hjqx-j4rw-g7xv"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115908</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-115908</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:41:32.177528+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:26.10: rust-zip, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-zip</p>
<p>zip is a zip library for Rust that supports reading and writing simple ZIP files. From 7.2.0 until 9.0.0, ZipArchive::extract and ZipArchive::extract_unwrapped_root_dir use safe_prepare_path in src/read/zipfile.rs and simplified_components in src/path.rs to validate symbolic link targets with a lexical prefix comparison rather than resolving each intermediate link. An attacker who knows or can guess the absolute extraction destination can create a chain whose apparent target remains under the destination while an intermediate symlink resolves outside it, allowing attacker-controlled files to be created or overwritten with the extracting process's privileges. On Windows, discarded drive and UNC prefixes can permit a single-link escape when the process has SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, such as through administrator rights or Developer Mode. This regression is distinct from CVE-2025-29787. This issue is fixed in version 9.0.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115908"/>
  </entry>
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