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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.736641+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-115586</id>
    <title>BIT-virtualenv-2026-115586 — virtualenv: Bash activator leaves the --prompt value unescaped in PS1 when promptvars is off, so prompt expansion later…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.969514+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: virtualenv</p>
<p>virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 21.14.9 until 21.14.13, the bash bin/activate script can copy an attacker-controlled --prompt value into PS1 without escaping dollar signs or backticks when both promptvars and POSIX mode are disabled during activation. Re-enabling promptvars, running set -o posix, or starting an interactive child bash that inherits the exported PS1 can then expand command substitution in the stored VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT value and execute commands as the user who activates the environment. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.13.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-115586"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-hatch-cve-2026-115586</id>
    <title>BREW-hatch-CVE-2026-115586 — virtualenv: Bash activator leaves the --prompt value unescaped in PS1 when promptvars is off, so prompt expansion later…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.969647+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: hatch</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The bash activator puts the caller-supplied prompt value into `PS1` unescaped whenever `promptvars` is off at activation time, and assumes prompt expansion can never run afterwards. `promptvars` and posix mode are runtime shell state, not a property of the activation moment: re-enabling prompt expansion in the same shell (`shopt -s promptvars`, `set -o posix`) or starting an interactive child bash that inherits the exported `PS1` makes bash expand the stored value and run the command substitution in it. An attacker who controls the prompt value gets command execution as the user who sources `bin/activate`.</p>
<p>This is a regression. 21.14.8 escaped `$` and the backtick unconditionally and stays inert under the same sequence. The 21.14.9 fix for GHSA-6w3r-xr62-4xcp (#3418) rewrote that block and left bash with a path that stores the raw value whenever `promptvars` is off.</p>
<p>## Affected area</p>
<p>Activation scripts (activate, activate.bat, activate.csh, activate.fish, activate.nu, Activate.ps1, activate.xsh) — specifically the bash `bin/activate`.</p>
<p>## Attacker-controlled input</p>
<p>The `--prompt` value, which the security policy already lists as a value that may come from project metadata the user did not write. It reaches `virtualenv` as `--prompt` on the command line or as the `prompt` argument of the API, is written into `bin/activate` as the literal `VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT` assignment (correctly quoted, the value arrives there as data), and the script then copies it into `PS1`…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-hatch-cve-2026-115586"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-391778</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-391778</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.969724+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-391778</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-391778"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115586</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-115586</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.969740+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 21.14.9 until 21.14.13, the bash bin/activate script can copy an attacker-controlled --prompt value into PS1 without escaping dollar signs or backticks when both promptvars and POSIX mode are disabled during activation. Re-enabling promptvars, running set -o posix, or starting an interactive child bash that inherits the exported PS1 can then expand command substitution in the stored VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT value and execute commands as the user who activates the environment. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.13.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115586"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cx6f-vjhg-g3cc</id>
    <title>GHSA-cx6f-vjhg-g3cc — virtualenv: Bash activator leaves the --prompt value unescaped in PS1 when promptvars is off, so prompt expansion later…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.969764+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: virtualenv</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The bash activator puts the caller-supplied prompt value into `PS1` unescaped whenever `promptvars` is off at activation time, and assumes prompt expansion can never run afterwards. `promptvars` and posix mode are runtime shell state, not a property of the activation moment: re-enabling prompt expansion in the same shell (`shopt -s promptvars`, `set -o posix`) or starting an interactive child bash that inherits the exported `PS1` makes bash expand the stored value and run the command substitution in it. An attacker who controls the prompt value gets command execution as the user who sources `bin/activate`.</p>
<p>This is a regression. 21.14.8 escaped `$` and the backtick unconditionally and stays inert under the same sequence. The 21.14.9 fix for GHSA-6w3r-xr62-4xcp (#3418) rewrote that block and left bash with a path that stores the raw value whenever `promptvars` is off.</p>
<p>## Affected area</p>
<p>Activation scripts (activate, activate.bat, activate.csh, activate.fish, activate.nu, Activate.ps1, activate.xsh) — specifically the bash `bin/activate`.</p>
<p>## Attacker-controlled input</p>
<p>The `--prompt` value, which the security policy already lists as a value that may come from project metadata the user did not write. It reaches `virtualenv` as `--prompt` on the command line or as the `prompt` argument of the API, is written into `bin/activate` as the literal `VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT` assignment (correctly quoted, the value arrives there as data), and the script then copies it into `PS1`…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cx6f-vjhg-g3cc"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95659</id>
    <title>RHSA-2026:95659 — Red Hat Security Advisory: General availability of the satellite/iop-yuptoo-rhel9 container image</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.969832+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>confluent-kafka: confluent-kafka: Information disclosure via improper TLS certificate validation in HashiCorp Vault integration virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via crafted paths in activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unverified downloaded seed wheels virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unescaped prompt in Windows activation script virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via configuration injection in prompt values virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via improper quoting in xonsh activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via improperly quoted interpreter paths in script launchers virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via malicious prompt text virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via crafted environment name virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary command execution via unescaped prompt variables in zsh virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via improperly quoted Fish activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary command execution via sequential placeholder substitution in activation templates virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unescaped prompt in bash activation script</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95659"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115586</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-115586</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T20:01:35.969874+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:26.10: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-virtualenv</p>
<p>virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 21.14.9 until 21.14.13, the bash bin/activate script can copy an attacker-controlled --prompt value into PS1 without escaping dollar signs or backticks when both promptvars and POSIX mode are disabled during activation. Re-enabling promptvars, running set -o posix, or starting an interactive child bash that inherits the exported PS1 can then expand command substitution in the stored VIRTUAL_ENV_PROMPT value and execute commands as the user who activates the environment. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.13.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115586"/>
  </entry>
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