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  <updated>2026-11-21T20:04:19.674791+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407361</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-407361</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T20:04:19.677355+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-407361</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407361"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-110782</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-110782</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T20:04:19.677414+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related functionality. From 6.2.2 until 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2, HTTPArtifact::receive() in src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php verifies a signed outer ArtifactResponse but returns an unsigned embedded SAML Response before calling verifyMessageSignature(). The signed path verifies with the artifact issuer's metadata keys without requiring the embedded Response issuer to match that artifact issuer. In a multi-IdP federation, an attacker controlling one trusted IdP can therefore return a validly signed outer ArtifactResponse containing an unsigned Response that claims a different IdP, bypassing the binding's embedded-message authentication. End-to-end impersonation requires a service provider using HTTP-Artifact and a downstream consumer that relies on the binding to authenticate the embedded Response rather than independently requiring a signature. This issue is fixed in versions 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-110782"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7hw-jx6r-756g</id>
    <title>GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g — SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Artifact signature verification (no e…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T20:04:19.677453+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: simplesamlphp/saml2</p>
<p>## Summary
CVE-2026-49283 / GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx ("HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass") was fixed so that `HTTPArtifact::receive()` verifies the embedded SAML `Response` using the IdP metadata signing keys. The current implementation (master `31c72c1d`, released **v6.2.3**) reaches that verification **only when the embedded Response is signed**:</p>
<p>```php
// src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php  (receive())
if (!$samlResponse-&gt;isSigned()) {
    return $samlResponse;                         // ← unsigned embedded Response returned UNVERIFIED
}
return $this-&gt;verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata);   // only runs when signed
```</p>
<p>An attacker who controls one trusted-federation IdP therefore returns a **validly-signed outer `ArtifactResponse`** (signed with their own real key, which passes the mandatory outer check) that **wraps an *unsigned* `&lt;samlp:Response&gt;` whose `&lt;Issuer&gt;` names a *different* IdP**. `isSigned()` is false, so `verifyMessageSignature()` never runs and the forged Response is returned as successfully received. Additionally, even on the signed path `verifyMessageSignature()` verifies against the **artifact issuer's** metadata keys but **never asserts that the embedded Response's `&lt;Issuer&gt;` equals the artifact issuer** — the same cross-IdP confusion the CVE was assigned for is not closed by identity binding.</p>
<p>This is an incomplete implementation of the fix's own stated goal ("verify signatures using IdP metadata signing…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7hw-jx6r-756g"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-110782</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-110782</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T20:04:19.677579+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:26.10: simplesamlphp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: simplesamlphp</p>
<p>(The SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library is a PHP library for SAML2 related fun ...)</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-110782"/>
  </entry>
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