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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-19T18:58:56.727044+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-264178</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-264178</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T18:58:56.729750+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-264178</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-264178"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-68477</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2025-68477</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T18:58:56.729784+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-68477"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5993-7p27-66g5</id>
    <title>GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5 — Langflow vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T18:58:56.729824+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langflow</p>
<p>**Vulnerability Overview**</p>
<p>Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.</p>
<p>Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.</p>
<p>**Vulnerable Code**
 
1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.
    
    https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359
    
    ```python
    @router.post("/run/{flow_id_or_name}", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)
    async def simplified_run_flow(
        *,
        background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
        flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5993-7p27-66g5"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1522</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-1522 — Langflow vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T18:58:56.729897+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langflow</p>
<p>**Vulnerability Overview**</p>
<p>Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.</p>
<p>Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.</p>
<p>**Vulnerable Code**
 
1. When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.
    
    https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359
    
    ```python
    @router.post("/run/{flow_id_or_name}", response_model=None, response_model_exclude_none=True)
    async def simplified_run_flow(
        *,
        background_tasks: BackgroundTasks,
        flow: Annotated[FlowRead | None, Depends(get_flow…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1522"/>
  </entry>
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