jsPDF is a library to generate PDFs in JavaScript. Prior to version 4.0.0, user control of the first argument of the loadFile method in the node.js build allows local file inclusion/path traversal. If given the possibility to pass unsanitized paths to the loadFile method, a user can retrieve file contents of arbitrary files in the local file system the node process is running in. The file contents are included verbatim in the generated PDFs. Other affected methods are `addImage`, `html`, and `addFont`. Only the node.js builds of the library are affected, namely the `dist/jspdf.node.js` and `dist/jspdf.node.min.js` files. The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.0.0. This version restricts file system access per default. This semver-major update does not introduce other breaking changes. Some workarounds areavailable. With recent node versions, jsPDF recommends using the `--permission` flag in production. The feature was introduced experimentally in v20.0.0 and is stable since v22.13.0/v23.5.0/v24.0.0. For older node versions, sanitize user-provided paths before passing them to jsPDF.

Affected: npm: jspdf

### Impact User control of the first argument of the loadFile method in the node.js build allows local file inclusion/path traversal.

If given the possibility to pass unsanitized paths to the loadFile method, a user can retrieve file contents of arbitrary files in the local file system the node process is running in. The file contents are included verbatim in the generated PDFs.

Other affected methods are: `addImage`, `html`, `addFont`.

Only the node.js builds of the library are affected, namely the `dist/jspdf.node.js` and `dist/jspdf.node.min.js` files.

Example attack vector:

```js import { jsPDF } from "./dist/jspdf.node.js";

const doc = new jsPDF();

doc.addImage("./secret.txt", "JPEG", 0, 0, 10, 10); doc.save("test.pdf"); // the generated PDF will contain the "secret.txt" file ```

### Patches The vulnerability has been fixed in jsPDF@4.0.0. This version restricts file system access per default. This semver-major update does not introduce other breaking changes.

### Workarounds With recent node versions, jsPDF recommends using the `--permission` flag in production. The feature was introduced experimentally in v20.0.0 and is stable since v22.13.0/v23.5.0/v24.0.0. See the [node documentation](https://nodejs.org/api/permissions.html) for details.

For older node versions, sanitize user-provided paths before passing them to jsPDF.

### Credits Researcher: kilkat (Kwangwoon Kim)

node-forge: node-forge: Interpretation conflict vulnerability allows bypassing cryptographic verifications qs: qs: Denial of Service via improper input validation in array parsing golang: archive/tar: Unbounded allocation when parsing GNU sparse map crypto/x509: golang: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption via crafted certificate node-forge: node-forge ASN.1 Unbounded Recursion github.com/sigstore/fulcio: Fulcio: Denial of Service via crafted OpenID Connect (OIDC) token github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority: Sigstore Timestamp Authority: Denial of Service via excessive OID or Content-Type header parsing jspdf: jsPDF Local File Inclusion/Path Traversal vulnerability GnuPG: GnuPG: Information disclosure and potential arbitrary code execution via out-of-bounds write @remix-run/router: react-router: React Router vulnerable to XSS via Open Redirects

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in HCL BigFix ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, und um Dateien zu manipulieren.