vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.11.1, vllm has a critical remote code execution vector in a config class named Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config. When vllm loads a model config that contains an auto_map entry, the config class resolves that mapping with get_class_from_dynamic_module(...) and immediately instantiates the returned class. This fetches and executes Python from the remote repository referenced in the auto_map string. Crucially, this happens even when the caller explicitly sets trust_remote_code=False in vllm.transformers_utils.config.get_config. In practice, an attacker can publish a benign-looking frontend repo whose config.json points via auto_map to a separate malicious backend repo; loading the frontend will silently run the backend’s code on the victim host. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.11.1.

Affected: PyPI: vllm

### Summary

`vllm` has a critical remote code execution vector in a config class named `Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config`. When `vllm` loads a model config that contains an `auto_map` entry, the config class resolves that mapping with `get_class_from_dynamic_module(...)` and immediately instantiates the returned class. This fetches and executes Python from the remote repository referenced in the `auto_map` string. Crucially, this happens even when the caller explicitly sets `trust_remote_code=False` in `vllm.transformers_utils.config.get_config`. In practice, an attacker can publish a benign-looking frontend repo whose `config.json` points via `auto_map` to a separate malicious backend repo; loading the frontend will silently run the backend’s code on the victim host.

### Details

The vulnerable code resolves and instantiates classes from `auto_map` entries without checking whether those entries point to a different repo or whether remote code execution is allowed.

```python class Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config(PretrainedConfig): model_type = 'Llama_Nemotron_Nano_VL'

def __init__(self, **kwargs): super().__init__(**kwargs)

if vision_config is not None: assert "auto_map" in vision_config and "AutoConfig" in vision_config["auto_map"] # <-- vulnerable dynamic resolution + instantiation happens here vision_auto_config = get_class_from_dynamic_module(*vision_config["auto_map"]["AutoConfig"].split("--")[::-1]) self.visio…

Affected: PyPI: vllm

### Summary

`vllm` has a critical remote code execution vector in a config class named `Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config`. When `vllm` loads a model config that contains an `auto_map` entry, the config class resolves that mapping with `get_class_from_dynamic_module(...)` and immediately instantiates the returned class. This fetches and executes Python from the remote repository referenced in the `auto_map` string. Crucially, this happens even when the caller explicitly sets `trust_remote_code=False` in `vllm.transformers_utils.config.get_config`. In practice, an attacker can publish a benign-looking frontend repo whose `config.json` points via `auto_map` to a separate malicious backend repo; loading the frontend will silently run the backend’s code on the victim host.

### Details

The vulnerable code resolves and instantiates classes from `auto_map` entries without checking whether those entries point to a different repo or whether remote code execution is allowed.

```python class Nemotron_Nano_VL_Config(PretrainedConfig): model_type = 'Llama_Nemotron_Nano_VL'

def __init__(self, **kwargs): super().__init__(**kwargs)

if vision_config is not None: assert "auto_map" in vision_config and "AutoConfig" in vision_config["auto_map"] # <-- vulnerable dynamic resolution + instantiation happens here vision_auto_config = get_class_from_dynamic_module(*vision_config["auto_map"]["AutoConfig"].split("--")[::-1]) self.visio…

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