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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-04T05:48:44.660345+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319112</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-319112</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T05:48:44.664180+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-319112</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319112"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-64526</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2025-64526</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T05:48:44.664213+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treate…</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-64526"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw</id>
    <title>GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw — Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T05:48:44.664256+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @strapi/plugin-users-permissions</p>
<p>### Summary of CVE-2025-64526 Vulnerability Details</p>
<p>- CVE: CVE-2025-64526
- CVSS v3.1 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` (6.9 — Medium)
- Affected Versions: `@strapi/plugin-users-permissions` &lt;=5.44.0
- How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to &gt;=5.45.0</p>
<p>### Description of CVE-2025-64526</p>
<p>In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.</p>
<p>The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the valu…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1552</id>
    <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1552 — Strapi: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T05:48:44.664304+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Strapi ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, Administratorrechte zu erlangen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1552"/>
  </entry>
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