Affected: AlmaLinux:8: pcs, AlmaLinux:8: pcs-snmp

The pcs packages provide a command-line configuration system for the Pacemaker and Corosync utilities.

Security Fix(es):

* rubygem-rack: Rack QueryParser has an unsafe default allowing params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters (CVE-2025-59830) * rack: Rack's unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion) (CVE-2025-61770) * rack: Rack's multipart parser buffers large non?file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion) (CVE-2025-61771) * rack: Rack memory exhaustion denial of service (CVE-2025-61772) * rubygem-rack: Unbounded read in `Rack::Request` form parsing can lead to memory exhaustion (CVE-2025-61919)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Affected: Homebrew: mailcatcher

## Summary

`Rack::QueryParser` in version `< 2.2.18` enforces its `params_limit` only for parameters separated by `&`, while still splitting on both `&` and `;`. As a result, attackers could use `;` separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.

## Details

The issue arises because `Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string` counts only `&` characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex `DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n` splits on both `&` and `;`. This mismatch means that queries using `;` separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing `params_limit` to be bypassed.

Other safeguards (`bytesize_limit` and `key_space_limit`) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.

## Impact

Applications or middleware that directly invoke `Rack::QueryParser` with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.

`Rack::Request`, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses `QueryParser` in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered **low**, with the impact limited to edge cases where `QueryParser` is used directly.

## Mitigation

* Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both `&` and `;` are counted consistently toward `params_limit`. * If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure `QueryParser` with an…

Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to version 2.2.18, Rack::QueryParser enforces its params_limit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended. Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.18.

Affected: RubyGems: rack

## Summary

`Rack::QueryParser` in version `< 2.2.18` enforces its `params_limit` only for parameters separated by `&`, while still splitting on both `&` and `;`. As a result, attackers could use `;` separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.

## Details

The issue arises because `Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string` counts only `&` characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex `DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n` splits on both `&` and `;`. This mismatch means that queries using `;` separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing `params_limit` to be bypassed.

Other safeguards (`bytesize_limit` and `key_space_limit`) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.

## Impact

Applications or middleware that directly invoke `Rack::QueryParser` with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.

`Rack::Request`, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses `QueryParser` in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered **low**, with the impact limited to edge cases where `QueryParser` is used directly.

## Mitigation

* Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both `&` and `;` are counted consistently toward `params_limit`. * If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure `QueryParser` with an…

ruby3.4-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.18-1.1 on GA media

rubygem-rack: Rack QueryParser has an unsafe default allowing params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters rack: Rack's unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion) rack: Rack's multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion) rack: Rack memory exhaustion denial of service rubygem-rack: Unbounded read in `Rack::Request` form parsing can lead to memory exhaustion

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack

Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to version 2.2.18, Rack::QueryParser enforces its params_limit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended. Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.18.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Enterprise Linux ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.