Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().

syzbot reported the splat below. [0]

When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message.

The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc.

The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer.

struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN;

typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t;

The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send().

atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths:

1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg()

The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control.

Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg().

[0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gb…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().

syzbot reported the splat below. [0]

When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message.

The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc.

The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer.

struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN;

typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t;

The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send().

atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths:

1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg()

The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control.

Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg().

[0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gb…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Check link_res->hpo_dp_link_enc before using it [WHAT & HOW] Functions dp_enable_link_phy and dp_disable_link_phy can pass link_res without initializing hpo_dp_link_enc and it is necessary to check for null before dereferencing. This fixes 2 FORWARD_NULL issues reported by Coverity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles

Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh() method that may fail for various reasons.

The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility of failure to encode a file handle.

There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails. Relax those assertions because they are wrong.

The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit, but this is not accurate.

The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs, inotify and drop_caches.

Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlay…

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ptr_ring: do not block hard interrupts in ptr_ring_resize_multiple()

Jakub added a lockdep_assert_no_hardirq() check in __page_pool_put_page() to increase test coverage.

syzbot found a splat caused by hard irq blocking in ptr_ring_resize_multiple() [1]

As current users of ptr_ring_resize_multiple() do not require hard irqs being masked, replace it to only block BH.

Rename helpers to better reflect they are safe against BH only.

- ptr_ring_resize_multiple() to ptr_ring_resize_multiple_bh() - skb_array_resize_multiple() to skb_array_resize_multiple_bh()

[1]

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 __page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9150 Comm: syz.1.1052 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00202-gf8669d7b5f5d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 RIP: 0010:__page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline] RIP: 0010:page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780 Code: 74 0e e8 7c aa fb f7 eb 43 e8 75 aa fb f7 eb 3c 65 8b 1d 38 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 a3 ae fb f7 85 db 74 0b e8 5a aa fb f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 1d 65 8b 1d 15 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 84 ae fb f7 85 RSP:…

Security update for the Linux Kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Check link_res->hpo_dp_link_enc before using it [WHAT & HOW] Functions dp_enable_link_phy and dp_disable_link_phy can pass link_res without initializing hpo_dp_link_enc and it is necessary to check for null before dereferencing. This fixes 2 FORWARD_NULL issues reported by Coverity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles

Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh() method that may fail for various reasons.

The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility of failure to encode a file handle.

There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails. Relax those assertions because they are wrong.

The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit, but this is not accurate.

The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs, inotify and drop_caches.

Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlay…

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 215 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control(). syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer. struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN; typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths: 1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder nicht näher beschriebene Auswirkungen zu erzielen.