Affected: AlmaLinux:8: bpftool, AlmaLinux:8: kernel, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-abi-stablelists, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-core, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-cross-headers, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-debug, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-debug-core, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-debug-devel, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-debug-modules, AlmaLinux:8: kernel-debug-modules-extra and 15 more

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.

Security Fix(es):

* kernel: vsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU (CVE-2025-38461) * kernel: do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts (CVE-2025-38498) * kernel: HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits (CVE-2025-38556)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits

Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that.

Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits

Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that.

Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does.

Affected: openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:kernel/resource: fix kfree() of bootmem memory againSince commit ebff7d8f270d ( mem hotunplug: fix kfree() of bootmemmemory ), we could get a resource allocated during boot viaalloc_resource(). And it s required to release the resource usingfree_resource(). Howerver, many people use kfree directly which willresult in kernel BUG. In order to fix this without fixing every callsite, just leak a couple of bytes in such corner case.(CVE-2022-49190)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback()There is a deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback(),which is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) | _set_timer()rtw_surveydone_event_callback()| mod_timer() spin_lock_bh() //(1) | (wait a time) ... | rtw_scan_timeout_handler() del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_bh() //(2) (wait timer to stop) | ...We hold pmlmepriv->lock in position (1) of thread 1 and usedel_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handleralso need pmlmepriv->lock in position (2) of thread 2.As a result, rtw_surveydone_event_callback() will block forever.This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection ofspin_lock_bh(), which could let timer handler to obta…

Security update for the Linux Kernel

kernel: HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits kernel: ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 cluster segment descriptors kernel: wifi: ath12k: Decrement TID on RX peer frag setup error handling

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 214 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that. Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu erzeugen oder andere nicht spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.