Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/skx_common: Fix general protection fault
After loading i10nm_edac (which automatically loads skx_edac_common), if unload only i10nm_edac, then reload it and perform error injection testing, a general protection fault may occur:
mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged Oops: general protection fault ... ... Workqueue: events mce_gen_pool_process RIP: 0010:string+0x53/0xe0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x37/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x1e7/0x3f0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? string+0x53/0xe0 vsnprintf+0x23e/0x4c0 snprintf+0x4d/0x70 skx_adxl_decode+0x16a/0x330 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error.part.0+0xf8/0x220 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error+0x17/0x20 [skx_edac_common] ...
The issue arose was because the variable 'adxl_component_count' (inside skx_edac_common), which counts the ADXL components, was not reset. During the reloading of i10nm_edac, the count was incremented by the actual number of ADXL components again, resulting in a count that was double the real number of ADXL components. This led to an out-of-bounds reference to the ADXL component array, causing the general protection fault above.
Fix this issue by resetting the 'adxl_component_count' in adxl_put(), which is called during the unloading of {skx,i10nm}_edac.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/skx_common: Fix general protection fault
After loading i10nm_edac (which automatically loads skx_edac_common), if unload only i10nm_edac, then reload it and perform error injection testing, a general protection fault may occur:
mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged Oops: general protection fault ... ... Workqueue: events mce_gen_pool_process RIP: 0010:string+0x53/0xe0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x37/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x1e7/0x3f0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? string+0x53/0xe0 vsnprintf+0x23e/0x4c0 snprintf+0x4d/0x70 skx_adxl_decode+0x16a/0x330 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error.part.0+0xf8/0x220 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error+0x17/0x20 [skx_edac_common] ...
The issue arose was because the variable 'adxl_component_count' (inside skx_edac_common), which counts the ADXL components, was not reset. During the reloading of i10nm_edac, the count was incremented by the actual number of ADXL components again, resulting in a count that was double the real number of ADXL components. This led to an out-of-bounds reference to the ADXL component array, causing the general protection fault above.
Fix this issue by resetting the 'adxl_component_count' in adxl_put(), which is called during the unloading of {skx,i10nm}_edac.
Affected: openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3: kernel
The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do mark_chain_precision for ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO
Precision markers need to be propagated whenever we have an ARG_CONST_* style argument, as the verifier cannot consider imprecise scalars to be equivalent for the purposes of states_equal check when such arguments refine the return value (in this case, set mem_size for PTR_TO_MEM). The resultant mem_size for the R0 is derived from the constant value, and if the verifier incorrectly prunes states considering them equivalent where such arguments exist (by seeing that both registers have reg->precise as false in regsafe), we can end up with invalid programs passing the verifier which can do access beyond what should have been the correct mem_size in that explored state.
To show a concrete example of the problem:
0000000000000000 <prog>: 0: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) 1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76) 2: r3 = r1 3: r3 += 4 4: if r3 > r2 goto +18 <LBB5_5> 5: w2 = 0 6: *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r2 7: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) 8: r2 = 1 9: if w1 == 0 goto +1 <LBB5_3> 10: r2 = -1
0000000000000058 <LBB5_3>: 11: r1 = 0 ll 13: r3 = 0 14: call bpf_ringbuf_reserve 15: if r0 == 0 goto +7 <…
Security update for the Linux Kernel
Security update for the Linux Kernel
Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 177 more
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EDAC/skx_common: Fix general protection fault After loading i10nm_edac (which automatically loads skx_edac_common), if unload only i10nm_edac, then reload it and perform error injection testing, a general protection fault may occur: mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged Oops: general protection fault ... ... Workqueue: events mce_gen_pool_process RIP: 0010:string+0x53/0xe0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x37/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x1e7/0x3f0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? string+0x53/0xe0 vsnprintf+0x23e/0x4c0 snprintf+0x4d/0x70 skx_adxl_decode+0x16a/0x330 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error.part.0+0xf8/0x220 [skx_edac_common] skx_mce_check_error+0x17/0x20 [skx_edac_common] ... The issue arose was because the variable 'adxl_component_count' (inside skx_edac_common), which counts the ADXL components, was not reset. During the reloading of i10nm_edac, the count was incremented by the actual number of ADXL components again, resulting in a count that was double the real number of ADXL components. This led to an out-of-bounds reference to the ADXL component array, causing the general protection fault above. Fix this issue by resetting the 'adxl_component_count' in adxl_put(), which is called during the unloading of {skx,i10nm}_edac.
Ein entfernter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder nicht spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu verursachen.