https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-02T14:11:09.907888+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-262291 EUVD-2026-262291 2026-10-02T14:11:10.011077+00:00 EUVD-2026-262291 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-13353 fkie_cve-2025-13353 2026-10-02T14:11:10.011116+00:00

In gokey versions <0.2.0, a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM authentication tag of the key seed.

This issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets.

Impact This vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is also not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). Specific impact includes:

* keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it was expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 bytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was used

* a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated from a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without the knowledge of the seed master password

Patches The code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0 and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions will produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed entropy will be used now.

System secret r…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-69jw-4jj8-fcxm GHSA-69jw-4jj8-fcxm — gokey allows secret recovery from a seed file without the master password 2026-10-02T14:11:10.011179+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/cloudflare/gokey

In gokey versions `<0.2.0`, a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM authentication tag of the key seed.

This issue has been fixed in gokey version `0.2.0`. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the `-s` option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version `0.2.0` gokey will generate different secrets.

### Impact

This vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the `-s` option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the `-s` option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is also not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). Specific impact includes:

* keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it was expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 bytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was used * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated from a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without the knowledge of the seed master password

### Patches

The code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version `0.2.0` and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions will produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed entropy will be used now.

### System secret…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-13353 UBUNTU-CVE-2025-13353 2026-10-02T14:11:10.011285+00:00

Affected: Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: gokey, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: gokey, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: gokey, Ubuntu:25.10: gokey, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: gokey

In gokey versions <0.2.0, a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM authentication tag of the key seed. This issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed file stays the same, version 0.2.0 gokey will generate different secrets. Impact This vulnerability impacts generated keys/secrets using a seed file as an entropy input (using the -s option). Keys/secrets generated just from the master password (without the -s option) are not impacted. The confidentiality of the seed itself is also not impacted (it is not required to regenerate the seed itself). Specific impact includes: * keys/secrets generated from a seed file may have lower entropy: it was expected that the whole seed would be used to generate keys (240 bytes of entropy input), where in vulnerable versions only 28 bytes was used * a malicious entity could have recovered all passwords, generated from a particular seed, having only the seed file in possession without the knowledge of the seed master password Patches The code logic bug has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0 and above. Due to the deterministic nature of gokey, fixed versions will produce different passwords/secrets using seed files, as all seed entropy will be used now. System secret rotation guidance It is ad…