The ZOLL ePCR IOS application reflects unsanitized user input into a WebView. Attacker-controlled strings placed into PCR fields (run number, incident, call sign, notes) are interpreted as HTML/JS when the app prints or renders that content. In the proof of concept (POC), injected scripts return local file content, which would allow arbitrary local file reads from the app's runtime context. These local files contain device and user data within the ePCR medical application, and if exposed, would allow an attacker to access protected health information (PHI) or device telemetry.

The ZOLL ePCR IOS application reflects unsanitized user input into a WebView. Attacker-controlled strings placed into PCR fields (run number, incident, call sign, notes) are interpreted as HTML/JS when the app prints or renders that content. In the proof of concept (POC), injected scripts return local file content, which would allow arbitrary local file reads from the app's runtime context. These local files contain device and user data within the ePCR medical application, and if exposed, would allow an attacker to access protected health information (PHI) or device telemetry.

The ZOLL ePCR IOS application reflects unsanitized user input into a WebView. Attacker-controlled strings placed into PCR fields (run number, incident, call sign, notes) are interpreted as HTML/JS when the app prints or renders that content. In the proof of concept (POC), injected scripts return local file content, which would allow arbitrary local file reads from the app's runtime context. These local files contain device and user data within the ePCR medical application, and if exposed, would allow an attacker to access protected health information (PHI) or device telemetry.