Affected: Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases

Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a weakness related to transient execution as described in the SLAM paper[1]. Unless Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is enabled this weakness may be exploitable.

Until kernel adds support for LASS[2], only allow LAM for COMPILE_TEST, or when speculation mitigations have been disabled at compile time, otherwise keep LAM disabled.

There are no processors in market that support LAM yet, so currently nobody is affected by this issue.

[1] SLAM: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf [2] LASS: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/

[ dhansen: update SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS -> CPU_MITIGATIONS ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases

Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a weakness related to transient execution as described in the SLAM paper[1]. Unless Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is enabled this weakness may be exploitable.

Until kernel adds support for LASS[2], only allow LAM for COMPILE_TEST, or when speculation mitigations have been disabled at compile time, otherwise keep LAM disabled.

There are no processors in market that support LAM yet, so currently nobody is affected by this issue.

[1] SLAM: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf [2] LASS: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/

[ dhansen: update SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS -> CPU_MITIGATIONS ]

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: Handle TD clearing for multiple streams case When multiple streams are in use, multiple TDs might be in flight when an endpoint is stopped. We need to issue a Set TR Dequeue Pointer for each, to ensure everything is reset properly and the caches cleared. Change the logic so that any N>1 TDs found active for different streams are deferred until after the first one is processed, calling xhci_invalidate_cancelled_tds() again from xhci_handle_cmd_set_deq() to queue another command until we are done with all of them. Also change the error/"should never happen" paths to ensure we at least clear any affected TDs, even if we can't issue a command to clear the hardware cache, and complain loudly with an xhci_warn() if this ever happens. This problem case dates back to commit e9df17eb1408 ("USB: xhci: Correct assumptions about number of rings per endpoint.") early on in the XHCI driver's life, when stream support was first added. It was then identified but not fixed nor made into a warning in commit 674f8438c121 ("xhci: split handling halted endpoints into two steps"), which added a FIXME comment for the problem case (without materially changing the behavior as far as I can tell, though the new logic made the problem more obvious). Then later, in commit 94f339147fc3 ("xhci: Fix failure…

kernel-devel-6.11.8-1.1 on GA media

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 196 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a weakness related to transient execution as described in the SLAM paper[1]. Unless Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is enabled this weakness may be exploitable. Until kernel adds support for LASS[2], only allow LAM for COMPILE_TEST, or when speculation mitigations have been disabled at compile time, otherwise keep LAM disabled. There are no processors in market that support LAM yet, so currently nobody is affected by this issue. [1] SLAM: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf [2] LASS: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ [ dhansen: update SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS -> CPU_MITIGATIONS ]

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.