Affected: AlmaLinux:9: bpftool, AlmaLinux:9: kernel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel-matched, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-core and 53 more

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.

Security Fix(es):

* kernel: net/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump (CVE-2024-26615) * kernel: block: initialize integrity buffer to zero before writing it to media (CVE-2024-43854) * kernel: iommu: Restore lost return in iommu_report_device_fault() (CVE-2024-44994) * kernel: netfilter: flowtable: initialise extack before use (CVE-2024-45018) * kernel: selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook (CVE-2024-46695) * kernel: net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO (CVE-2024-49949) * kernel: netfilter: nft_payload: sanitize offset and length before calling skb_checksum() (CVE-2024-50251)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook

Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is exported with root squashing enabled.

The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:

* This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate * permission checks.

nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.

Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(), simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to __vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change its security label.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook

Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is exported with root squashing enabled.

The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:

* This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate * permission checks.

nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.

Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(), simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to __vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change its security label.

Affected: openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Stop parsing channels bits when all channels are found. If a usb audio device sets more bits than the amount of channels it could write outside of the map array.(CVE-2024-27436) In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix race between aio_cancel() and AIO request complete FFS based applications can utilize the aio_cancel() callback to dequeue pending USB requests submitted to the UDC. There is a scenario where the FFS application issues an AIO cancel call, while the UDC is handling a soft disconnect. For a DWC3 based implementation, the callstack looks like the following: DWC3 Gadget FFS Application dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect() ... --> dwc3_stop_active_transfers() --> dwc3_gadget_giveback(-ESHUTDOWN) --> ffs_epfile_async_io_complete() ffs_aio_cancel() --> usb_ep_free_request() --> usb_ep_dequeue() There is currently no locking implemented between the AIO completion handler and AIO cancel, so the issue occurs if the completion routine is running in parallel to an AIO cancel call coming from the FFS application. As the completion call frees the USB request (io_data->req) the FFS application is also referencing it for the usb_ep_dequeue() call. This can…

kernel: net/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump kernel: block: initialize integrity buffer to zero before writing it to media kernel: iommu: Restore lost return in iommu_report_device_fault() kernel: netfilter: flowtable: initialise extack before use kernel: selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook kernel: net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO kernel: netfilter: nft_payload: sanitize offset and length before calling skb_checksum()

kernel: selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook kernel: net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO kernel: blk-rq-qos: fix crash on rq_qos_wait vs. rq_qos_wake_function race kernel: arm64: probes: Remove broken LDR (literal) uprobe support kernel: xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping kernel: xfrm: validate new SA's prefixlen using SA family when sel.family is unset kernel: irqchip/gic-v4: Don't allow a VMOVP on a dying VPE kernel: netfilter: nf_reject_ipv6: fix potential crash in nf_send_reset6() kernel: vsock/virtio: Initialization of the dangling pointer occurring in vsk->trans

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 187 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is exported with root squashing enabled. The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states: * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate * permission checks. nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do. Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(), simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to __vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change its security label.

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder einen unspezifischen Angriff durchzuführen.