Affected: Homebrew: aider

### Summary Static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) were vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links.

### Details The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file.

### Impact Servers with static routes that contain compressed variants as symbolic links, pointing outside the root directory, or that permit users to upload or create such links, are impacted.

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Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8653/files

aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. In versions on the 3.10 branch prior to version 3.10.2, static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) are vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links. The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing the `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file. Version 3.10.2 contains a patch for the issue.

Affected: PyPI: aiohttp

### Summary Static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) were vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links.

### Details The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file.

### Impact Servers with static routes that contain compressed variants as symbolic links, pointing outside the root directory, or that permit users to upload or create such links, are impacted.

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Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8653/files

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS: python-aiohttp

Async http client/server framework (asyncio). Security Fix(es): aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.10.2, static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) are vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links. The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing the `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file. Version 3.10.2 contains a patch for the issue.(CVE-2024-42367)

python310-aiohttp-3.10.5-1.1 on GA media

Affected: PyPI: aiohttp

### Summary Static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) were vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links.

### Details The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file.

### Impact Servers with static routes that contain compressed variants as symbolic links, pointing outside the root directory, or that permit users to upload or create such links, are impacted.

----

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8653/files

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-aiohttp, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-aiohttp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-aiohttp, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: python-aiohttp, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: python-aiohttp, Ubuntu:25.04: python-aiohttp

aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. In versions on the 3.10 branch prior to version 3.10.2, static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) are vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links. The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing the `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file. Version 3.10.2 contains a patch for the issue.

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