Affected: AlmaLinux:9: bpftool, AlmaLinux:9: kernel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel-matched, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-core and 52 more

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.

Security Fix(es):

* kernel: Local information disclosure on Intel(R) Atom(R) processors (CVE-2023-28746) * kernel: netfilter: nft_flow_offload: reset dst in route object after setting up flow (CVE-2024-27403) * kernel: Revert "net/mlx5: Block entering switchdev mode with ns inconsistency" (CVE-2023-52658) * kernel: dmaengine: idxd: Fix oops during rmmod on single-CPU platforms (CVE-2024-35989) * kernel: hwmon: (w83792d) Fix NULL pointer dereference by removing unnecessary structure field (CVE-2021-47385) * kernel: mptcp: ensure snd_nxt is properly initialized on connect (CVE-2024-36889) * kernel: net: sched: sch_multiq: fix possible OOB write in multiq_tune() (CVE-2024-36978) * kernel: net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore (CVE-2024-38556) * kernel: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked (CVE-2024-39483) * kernel: ionic: fix use after netif_napi_del() (CVE-2024-39502) * kernel: xfrm6: check ip6_dst_idev() return value in xfrm6_get_saddr() (CVE-2024-40959) * kernel: gfs2: Fix NULL pointer dereference in gfs2_log_flush (CVE-2024-42079) * kernel: sched: act_ct: take care of padding in struct zones_ht_key (CVE-2024-42272) * kernel: tipc: Return non-zero value from tipc_udp_addr2str() on error (CVE-2024-42284)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgm…

Affected: Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked

When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).

However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).

Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small).

That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed simultaneous NMIs with GI…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked

When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).

However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).

Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small).

That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed simultaneous NMIs with GI…

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small). That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for…

kernel: hwmon: (w83792d) Fix NULL pointer dereference by removing unnecessary structure field kernel: Local information disclosure on Intel(R) Atom(R) processors kernel: Revert "net/mlx5: Block entering switchdev mode with ns inconsistency" kernel: netfilter: nft_flow_offload: reset dst in route object after setting up flow kernel: dmaengine: idxd: Fix oops during rmmod on single-CPU platforms kernel: mptcp: ensure snd_nxt is properly initialized on connect kernel: net: sched: sch_multiq: fix possible OOB write in multiq_tune() kernel: net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore kernel: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked kernel: ionic: fix use after netif_napi_del() kernel: xfrm6: check ip6_dst_idev() return value in xfrm6_get_saddr() kernel: gfs2: Fix NULL pointer dereference in gfs2_log_flush kernel: sched: act_ct: take care of padding in struct zones_ht_key kernel: tipc: Return non-zero value from tipc_udp_addr2str() on error

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 88 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger in bare metal (though still small). That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed simultaneous NMIs with GIF=0 f…

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu erzeugen oder einen unspezifischen Angriff durchzuführen.