<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-04T02:26:00.785434+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-161063</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-161063</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:26:00.851479+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-161063</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-161063"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-47122</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2023-47122</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:26:00.851519+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Gitsign is software for keyless Git signing using Sigstore. In versions of gitsign starting with 0.6.0 and prior to 0.8.0, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures. There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unaffected. This issue was fixed in v0.8.0. No known workarounds are available.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-47122"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xvrc-2wvh-49vc</id>
    <title>GHSA-xvrc-2wvh-49vc — Gitsign's Rekor public keys fetched from upstream API instead of local TUF client.</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:26:00.851554+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/sigstore/gitsign</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>In certain versions of gitsign, Rekor public keys were fetched via the Rekor API, instead of through the local TUF client. If the upstream Rekor server happened to be compromised, gitsign clients could potentially be tricked into trusting incorrect signatures.</p>
<p>There is no known compromise the default public good instance (`rekor.sigstore.dev`) - anyone using this instance is unlikely to be affected.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>This was fixed in v0.8.0 via https://github.com/sigstore/gitsign/pull/399</p>
<p>### Workarounds</p>
<p>n/a</p>
<p>### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_</p>
<p>https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/threat-model/#sigstore-threat-model</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xvrc-2wvh-49vc"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-47122</id>
    <title>gsd-2023-47122</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:26:00.851587+00:00</updated>
    <content>gsd-2023-47122</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-47122"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
