The FACSChorus software database can be accessed directly with the privileges of the currently logged-in user. A threat actor with physical access could potentially gain credentials, which could be used to alter or destroy data stored in the database.

The FACSChorus software database can be accessed directly with the privileges of the currently logged-in user. A threat actor with physical access could potentially gain credentials, which could be used to alter or destroy data stored in the database.

In BD FACSChorus v5.0, v5.1, v3.0, and v3.1, the respective workstation operating system does not restrict what devices can interact with its USB ports. If exploited, a threat actor with physical access to the workstation could gain access to system information and potentially exfiltrate data. In the BD FACSChorus v5.0, v5.1, v3.0, and v3.1 workstation, there is no BIOS password. A threat actor with physical access to the workstation can potentially exploit this vulnerability to access the BIOS configuration and modify the drive boot order and BIOS pre-boot authentication. In BD FACSChorus v5.0, v5.1, v3.0, and v3.1, the operating system hosting the FACSChorus application is configured to allow transmission of hashed user credentials upon user action without adequately validating the identity of the requested resource. This is possible through the use of LLMNR, MBT-NS, or MDNS and will result in NTLMv2 hashes being sent to a malicious entity position on the local network. These hashes can subsequently be attacked through brute force and cracked if a weak password is used. This attack would only apply to domain joined systems. In BD FACSChorus v5.0, v5.1, v3.0, and v3.1, the workstation does not prevent physical access to its PCI express (PCIe) slots, which could allow a threat actor to insert a PCI card designed for memory capture. A threat actor can isolate sensitive information such as a BitLocker encryption key from a dump of the workstation RAM during startup. In BD FACS…