OPC Foundation UA .NET Standard ConditionRefresh Resource Exhaustion Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to create a denial-of-service condition on affected installations of OPC Foundation UA .NET Standard. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the handling of OPC UA ConditionRefresh requests. By sending a large number of requests, an attacker can consume all available resources on the server. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to create a denial-of-service condition on the system. Was ZDI-CAN-20505.

Affected: NuGet: OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua.Server

This security update resolves a vulnerability in the OPC UA .NET Standard Reference Server that allows remote attackers to send malicious requests that consume all memory available to the server.

https://files.opcfoundation.org/SecurityBulletins/OPC%20Foundation%20Security%20Bulletin%20CVE-2023-27321.pdf

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: core: Avoid smp_processor_id() in preemptible code. A flaw was found in the Linux kernel in linux/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c of the netfilter subsystem. This flaw allows a local user to cause an out-of-bounds write issue. A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection. The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data" arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant…