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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:57.815317+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-218878</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-218878</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:57.916273+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-218878</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-218878"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-26484</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2023-26484</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:57.916312+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In versions 0.59.0 and prior, if a malicious user has taken over a Kubernetes node where virt-handler (the KubeVirt node-daemon) is running, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs. This can be misused to lure-in system-level-privileged components which can, for instance, read all secrets on the cluster, or can exec into pods on other nodes. This way, a compromised node can be used to elevate privileges beyond the node until potentially having full privileged access to the whole cluster. The simplest way to exploit this, once a user could compromise a specific node, is to set with the virt-handler service account all other nodes to unschedulable and simply wait until system-critical components with high privileges appear on its node. No patches are available as of time of publication. As a workaround, gatekeeper users can add a webhook which will block the `virt-handler` service account to modify the spec of a node.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-26484"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cp96-jpmq-xrr2</id>
    <title>GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2 — On a compromised node, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:57.916350+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: kubevirt.io/kubevirt</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>If a malicious user has taken over a Kubernetes node where virt-handler (the KubeVirt node-daemon) is running, the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs.</p>
<p>This can be misused to lure-in system-level-privileged components (which can for instance read all secrets on the cluster, or can exec into pods on other nodes). This way a compromised node can be used to elevate privileges beyond the node until potentially having full privileged access to the whole cluster.</p>
<p>The simplest way to exploit this, once a user could compromise a specific node, is to set with the virt-handler service account all other nodes to unschedulable and simply wait until system-critical components with high privileges appear on its node.</p>
<p>Since this requires a node to be compromised first, the severity of this finding is considered Medium.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Not yet available.</p>
<p>### Workarounds
Gatekeeper users can add a webhook which will block the `virt-handler` service account to modify the spec of a node.</p>
<p>An example policy, preventing virt-handler from changing the node spec may look like this:</p>
<p>```yaml
apiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh/v1
kind: ConstraintTemplate
metadata:
  name: virthandlerrestrictions
spec:
[...]
  targets:
    - libs:
        - |         
[...]          
          is_virt_handler(username) {
              username == "system:serviceaccount:kubevirt:virt-handler"
          }
          mutates_node_in_unintended_way {
            # TODO…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cp96-jpmq-xrr2"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-26484</id>
    <title>gsd-2023-26484</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:57.916399+00:00</updated>
    <content>gsd-2023-26484</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-26484"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2023-26484</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2023-26484 — On a compromised KubeVirt node the virt-handler service account can be used to modify all node specs</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:57.916413+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2023-26484</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2023-26484"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:12792-1</id>
    <title>openSUSE-SU-2024:12792-1 — kubevirt-container-disk-0.59.0-2.1 on GA media</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:57.916430+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>kubevirt-container-disk-0.59.0-2.1 on GA media</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2024:12792-1"/>
  </entry>
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