Honeywell Experion PKS Safety Manager (SM and FSC) through 2022-05-06 has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity. According to FSCT-2022-0053, there is a Honeywell Experion PKS Safety Manager insufficient logic security controls issue. The affected components are characterized as: Honeywell FSC runtime (FSC-CPU, QPP), Honeywell Safety Builder. The potential impact is: Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service. The Honeywell Experion PKS Safety Manager family of safety controllers utilize the unauthenticated Safety Builder protocol (FSCT-2022-0051) for engineering purposes, including downloading projects and control logic to the controller. Control logic is downloaded to the controller on a block-by-block basis. The logic that is downloaded consists of FLD code compiled to native machine code for the CPU module (which applies to both the Safety Manager and FSC families). Since this logic does not seem to be cryptographically authenticated, it allows an attacker capable of triggering a logic download to execute arbitrary machine code on the controller's CPU module in the context of the runtime. While the researchers could not verify this in detail, the researchers believe that the microprocessor underpinning the FSC and Safety Manager CPU modules is incapable of offering memory protection or privilege separation capabilities which would give an attacker full control of the CPU module. There is no authentication on control logic downloaded to the controller. Memory prote…

Honeywell Experion PKS Safety Manager (SM and FSC) through 2022-05-06 has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity. According to FSCT-2022-0053, there is a Honeywell Experion PKS Safety Manager insufficient logic security controls issue. The affected components are characterized as: Honeywell FSC runtime (FSC-CPU, QPP), Honeywell Safety Builder. The potential impact is: Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service. The Honeywell Experion PKS Safety Manager family of safety controllers utilize the unauthenticated Safety Builder protocol (FSCT-2022-0051) for engineering purposes, including downloading projects and control logic to the controller. Control logic is downloaded to the controller on a block-by-block basis. The logic that is downloaded consists of FLD code compiled to native machine code for the CPU module (which applies to both the Safety Manager and FSC families). Since this logic does not seem to be cryptographically authenticated, it allows an attacker capable of triggering a logic download to execute arbitrary machine code on the controller's CPU module in the context of the runtime. While the researchers could not verify this in detail, the researchers believe that the microprocessor underpinning the FSC and Safety Manager CPU modules is incapable of offering memory protection or privilege separation capabilities which would give an attacker full control of the CPU module. There is no authentication on control logic downloaded to the controller. Memory prote…

The affected product uses the unauthenticated Safety Builder protocol, which does not validate or authenticate the download logic. This could allow an attacker to preform remote code execution on the CPU module. The affected product utilizes the Safety Builder protocol, which does not have native authentication. An attacker capable of invoking the protocols' functionalities could cause configuration and system changes. The affected product access to the boot configuration is controlled by credentials hard-coded in the Safety Manger firmware. This could allow an attacker with serial interface access to control the boot process and manipulate the firmware image. The affected product firmware images are not signed and only rely on insecure checksums for regular integrity checks. This could allow an attacker with access to the serial interface to control the boot process or push malicious firmware.