The Motorola MDLC protocol through 2022-05-02 mishandles message integrity. It supports three security modes: Plain, Legacy Encryption, and New Encryption. In Legacy Encryption mode, traffic is encrypted via the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) block-cipher in ECB mode. This mode of operation does not offer message integrity and offers reduced confidentiality above the block level, as demonstrated by an ECB Penguin attack against any block ciphers.

The Motorola MDLC protocol through 2022-05-02 mishandles message integrity. It supports three security modes: Plain, Legacy Encryption, and New Encryption. In Legacy Encryption mode, traffic is encrypted via the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) block-cipher in ECB mode. This mode of operation does not offer message integrity and offers reduced confidentiality above the block level, as demonstrated by an ECB Penguin attack against any block ciphers.

The MDLC protocol has a legacy encryption mode that encrypts traffic using the tiny encryption algorithm (TEA) block-cipher in ECB mode, which offers no message integrity and reduced confidentiality. An attacker could craft messages with ciphertext blocks inserted at certain positions resulting in known plaintext at a given offset. This could either lead to message manipulation or exposure of the attack surface of the MDLC protocol parser to memory corruption attacks.CVE-2022-30273 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 5.9 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N). The affected product utilizes an MDLC driver that has a password stored in plaintext in the wmdlcdrv.ini driver configuration file.CVE-2022-30275 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).