Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: containerd

Security vulnerability affects the containerd package. The OCI Distribution Spec project defines an API protocol to facilitate and standardize the distribution of content.

The OCI Distribution Spec project defines an API protocol to facilitate and standardize the distribution of content. In the OCI Distribution Specification version 1.0.0 and prior, the Content-Type header alone was used to determine the type of document during push and pull operations. Documents that contain both “manifests” and “layers” fields could be interpreted as either a manifest or an index in the absence of an accompanying Content-Type header. If a Content-Type header changed between two pulls of the same digest, a client may interpret the resulting content differently. The OCI Distribution Specification has been updated to require that a mediaType value present in a manifest or index match the Content-Type header used during the push and pull operations. Clients pulling from a registry may distrust the Content-Type header and reject an ambiguous document that contains both “manifests” and “layers” fields or “manifests” and “config” fields if they are unable to update to version 1.0.1 of the spec.

Affected: Go: github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec

### Impact In the OCI Distribution Specification version 1.0.0 and prior, the Content-Type header alone was used to determine the type of document during push and pull operations. Documents that contain both “manifests” and “layers” fields could be interpreted as either a manifest or an index in the absence of an accompanying Content-Type header. If a Content-Type header changed between two pulls of the same digest, a client may interpret the resulting content differently.

### Patches The OCI Distribution Specification will be updated to require that a `mediaType` value present in a manifest or index match the Content-Type header used during the push and pull operations.

### Workarounds Clients pulling from a registry may distrust the Content-Type header and reject an ambiguous document that contains both “manifests” and “layers” fields or “manifests” and “config” fields.

### References https://github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/security/advisories/GHSA-77vh-xpmg-72qh

### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/ * Email us at security@opencontainers.org

Security update for singularity

CXF: SSL hostname verification bypass, incomplete CVE-2012-6153 fix coreos-installer: incorrect signature verification on gzip-compressed install images jenkins-2-plugins/git: stored XSS vulnerability jenkins: FilePath#mkdirs does not check permission to create parent directories jenkins: File path filters do not canonicalize paths, allowing operations to follow symbolic links to outside allowed directories jenkins: FilePath#untar does not check permission to create symbolic links when unarchiving a symbolic link jenkins: FilePath#reading(FileVisitor) does not reject any operations allowing users to have unrestricted read access jenkins: FilePath#unzip and FilePath#untar were not subject to any access control jenkins: Agent processes are able to completely bypass file path filtering by wrapping the file operation in an agent file path jenkins: Creating symbolic links is possible without the symlink permission jenkins: The operations FilePath#renameTo and FilePath#moveAllChildrenTo only check read permission on the source path jenkins: When creating temporary files, permission to create files is only checked after they’ve been created. jenkins: FilePath#toURI, FilePath#hasSymlink, FilePath#absolutize, FilePath#isDescendant, and FilePath#get*DiskSpace do not check any permissions jenkins: FilePath#listFiles lists files outside directories with agent read access when following symbolic links. jenkins: Agent-to-controller access control allowed writing to sensitive directory use…

Security update for containerd, docker

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: containerd, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: containerd, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: containerd, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: containerd

The OCI Distribution Spec project defines an API protocol to facilitate and standardize the distribution of content. In the OCI Distribution Specification version 1.0.0 and prior, the Content-Type header alone was used to determine the type of document during push and pull operations. Documents that contain both “manifests” and “layers” fields could be interpreted as either a manifest or an index in the absence of an accompanying Content-Type header. If a Content-Type header changed between two pulls of the same digest, a client may interpret the resulting content differently. The OCI Distribution Specification has been updated to require that a mediaType value present in a manifest or index match the Content-Type header used during the push and pull operations. Clients pulling from a registry may distrust the Content-Type header and reject an ambiguous document that contains both “manifests” and “layers” fields or “manifests” and “config” fields if they are unable to update to version 1.0.1 of the spec.

Ein entfernter, anonymer, authentisierter oder lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM DB2 ausnutzen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen, willkürlichen Code mit erhöhten Rechten auszuführen, Informationen falsch darzustellen und beliebigen Code auszuführen.