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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-04T02:55:28.370077+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-232835</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-232835</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:55:28.465648+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-232835</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-232835"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-32842</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2021-32842</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:55:28.465770+00:00</updated>
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        <p>SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2021-32842"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mm6g-mmq6-53ff</id>
    <title>GHSA-mm6g-mmq6-53ff — Path Traversal in SharpZipLib</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:55:28.465948+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> NuGet: SharpZipLib</p>
<p>SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mm6g-mmq6-53ff"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-32842</id>
    <title>gsd-2021-32842</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:55:28.466032+00:00</updated>
    <content>gsd-2021-32842</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2021-32842"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2021-32842</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2021-32842</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:55:28.466056+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: mono, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: mono, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: mono, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: mono, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: mono, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: mono, Ubuntu:25.10: mono, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: mono</p>
<p>SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2021-32842"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/vde-2022-007</id>
    <title>VDE-2022-007 — PHOENIX CONTACT: Path Traversal in Library of PLCnext Technology Toolchain and FL Network Manager</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T02:55:28.466156+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Prior to version 1.3.3, a TAR file entry ../evil.txt may be extracted in the parent directory of destFolder. This leads to arbitrary file write that may lead to code execution. The vulnerability was fixed in SharpZipLib version 1.3.3.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/vde-2022-007"/>
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