Affected: Bitnami: oras

ORAS is open source software which enables a way to push OCI Artifacts to OCI Conformant registries. ORAS is both a CLI for initial testing and a Go Module. In ORAS from version 0.4.0 and before version 0.9.0, there is a "zip-slip" vulnerability. The directory support feature allows the downloaded gzipped tarballs to be automatically extracted to the user-specified directory where the tarball can have symbolic links and hard links. A well-crafted tarball or tarballs allow malicious artifact providers linking, writing, or overwriting specific files on the host filesystem outside of the user-specified directory unexpectedly with the same permissions as the user who runs `oras pull`. Users of the affected versions are impacted if they are `oras` CLI users who runs `oras pull`, or if they are Go programs, which invoke `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`. The problem has been fixed in version 0.9.0. For `oras` CLI users, there is no workarounds other than pulling from a trusted artifact provider. For `oras` package users, the workaround is to not use `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`, and use other content stores instead, or pull from a trusted artifact provider.

ORAS is open source software which enables a way to push OCI Artifacts to OCI Conformant registries. ORAS is both a CLI for initial testing and a Go Module. In ORAS from version 0.4.0 and before version 0.9.0, there is a "zip-slip" vulnerability. The directory support feature allows the downloaded gzipped tarballs to be automatically extracted to the user-specified directory where the tarball can have symbolic links and hard links. A well-crafted tarball or tarballs allow malicious artifact providers linking, writing, or overwriting specific files on the host filesystem outside of the user-specified directory unexpectedly with the same permissions as the user who runs `oras pull`. Users of the affected versions are impacted if they are `oras` CLI users who runs `oras pull`, or if they are Go programs, which invoke `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`. The problem has been fixed in version 0.9.0. For `oras` CLI users, there is no workarounds other than pulling from a trusted artifact provider. For `oras` package users, the workaround is to not use `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`, and use other content stores instead, or pull from a trusted artifact provider.

Affected: Go: github.com/deislabs/oras

### Impact The directory support (#55) allows the downloaded gzipped tarballs to be automatically extracted to the user-specified directory where the tarball can have symbolic links and hard links.

A well-crafted tarball or tarballs allow malicious artifact providers linking, writing, or overwriting specific files on the host filesystem outside of the user-specified directory unexpectedly with the same permissions as the user who runs `oras pull`.

Precisely, the following users of the affected versions are impacted - `oras` CLI users who runs `oras pull`. - Go programs, which invokes `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`.

### Patches The problem has been patched by the PR linked with this advisory. Users should upgrade their `oras` CLI and packages to `0.9.0`.

### Workarounds For `oras` CLI users, there is no workarounds other than pulling from a trusted artifact provider.

For `oras` package users, the workaround is to not use `github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore`, and use other content stores instead, or pull from a trusted artifact provider.

### References - [Zip Slip](https://github.com/snyk/zip-slip-vulnerability)

### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue on the [GitHub repo](https://github.com/deislabs/oras) * Email the [list of maintainers](https://github.com/deislabs/oras/blob/main/MAINTAINERS)

helm-3.9.4-3.1 on GA media