In Apache Ignite 2.3 or earlier, the serialization mechanism does not have a list of classes allowed for serialization/deserialization, which makes it possible to run arbitrary code when 3-rd party vulnerable classes are present in Ignite classpath. The vulnerability can be exploited if the one sends a specially prepared form of a serialized object to one of the deserialization endpoints of some Ignite components - discovery SPI, Ignite persistence, Memcached endpoint, socket steamer.

Affected: Maven: org.apache.ignite:ignite-core

In Apache Ignite 2.3 or earlier, the serialization mechanism does not have a list of classes allowed for serialization/deserialization, which makes it possible to run arbitrary code when 3-rd party vulnerable classes are present in Ignite classpath. The vulnerability can be exploited if the one sends a specially prepared form of a serialized object to one of the deserialization endpoints of some Ignite components - discovery SPI, Ignite persistence, Memcached endpoint, socket steamer.

spring-boot: Malicious PATCH requests submitted to servers can use specially crafted JSON data to run arbitrary Java code undertow: Client can use bogus uri in Digest authentication spring-framework: Improper URL path validation allows for bypassing of security checks on static resources ignite: Possible Execution of Arbitrary Code Within Deserialization Endpoints spark: Absolute and relative pathnames allow for unintended static file disclosure