CWE-93
AllowedImproper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product uses CRLF (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CRLF sequences from inputs.
520 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PQFR-846F-JH32
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-20 09:31ArmorX Spam developed by ArmorX Global Technology has a Command Injection vulnerability. Authenticated remote attackers can inject crafted commands into a specific parameter, thereby uploading malicious code to the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113403"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T07:17:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ArmorX Spam developed by ArmorX Global Technology has a Command Injection vulnerability. Authenticated remote attackers can inject crafted commands into a specific parameter, thereby uploading malicious code to the server.",
"id": "GHSA-pqfr-846f-jh32",
"modified": "2026-10-20T09:31:04Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T09:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-11295-f2efd-2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-11294-4e5d8-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-PRJC-XC24-CV4P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-18 18:32 – Updated: 2025-11-18 18:32An improper neutralization of crlf sequences ('crlf injection') in Fortinet FortiMail 7.6.0 through 7.6.3, FortiMail 7.4.0 through 7.4.5, FortiMail 7.2 all versions, FortiMail 7.0 all versions may allow an attacker to inject headers in the response via convincing a user to click on a specifically crafted link
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54972"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-18T17:16:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper neutralization of crlf sequences (\u0027crlf injection\u0027) in Fortinet FortiMail 7.6.0 through 7.6.3, FortiMail 7.4.0 through 7.4.5, FortiMail 7.2 all versions, FortiMail 7.0 all versions may allow an attacker to inject headers in the response via convincing a user to click on a specifically crafted link",
"id": "GHSA-prjc-xc24-cv4p",
"modified": "2025-11-18T18:32:54Z",
"published": "2025-11-18T18:32:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54972"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-25-634"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PRPW-WWV7-XJJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 20:37 – Updated: 2026-10-06 20:37Root Cause
File: internal/auditlog/formats.go — multiple sites write attacker-influenced bytes into the Native audit-log stream without escaping \r or \n:
// Part B — request headers (lines 72–80)
for k, vv := range al.Transaction().Request().Headers() {
for _, v := range vv {
res.WriteByte('\n')
res.WriteString(k)
res.WriteString(": ")
res.WriteString(v) // ← raw
}
}
// Part C — request body (lines 85–86)
if body := al.Transaction().Request().Body(); body != "" {
res.WriteString(body) // ← raw
res.WriteByte('\n')
}
// Part E — response body (lines 93–94) raw
// Part F — response headers (lines 111–118) raw
// Part H — error messages (line 125) raw
// Part K — matched-rule raw data (line 151) raw
The Native format's section structure is line-based: sections are delimited by lines of the form --<10-char-random-prefix>-<Part>--, and line-based log parsers / SIEM rules rely on that structure. Any attacker-controlled bytes containing \n break the structural invariant and allow the attacker to inject lines that look like genuine audit content.
The other two Native-format implementations in Coraza are not affected: the JSON formatter (formats_json.go) and the OCSF formatter both round-trip values through json.Marshal, which escapes \r and \n.
Impact
An attacker who can land bytes into any of the listed audit-log fields can inject arbitrary lines — including lines that visually resemble new log entries — into the audit log file of a defender running the default SecAuditLogFormat Native configuration. Realistic consequences:
- Forging entries to shift attribution. An injected line such as
[client "9.9.9.9"] Coraza: Warning. ...sits alongside genuine matches in Part H, and a human operator (or simple SIEM rule) reading the log cannot tell them apart. - Confusing SIEM correlation. Any ingestion pipeline that splits on
--...-[A-Z]--boundaries or on[client "..."]patterns without validating the session prefix will treat the forged lines as separate records. - Breaking log-parsing tooling. Grep/awk pipelines, log tailers, and log-rotation tools with line-based assumptions can be poisoned with crafted binary sequences.
- Hiding genuine incidents. An attacker who can also trigger a rule match on the same transaction (trivial — send any request that matches any audit-logged rule) can bury the real match under noise they control.
The forged lines cannot trivially impersonate an entire separate session: the 10-char random prefix in the real boundaries (boundaryPrefix := "--" + utils.RandomString(10) + "-", line 42) is not predictable from outside, and each transaction uses a fresh prefix. But the integrity of a single record is fully compromised, which is enough for the SIEM-confusion and attribution-shifting attacks.
Proof of Concept
Server with coraza.conf-recommended-style defaults:
SecRuleEngine On
SecAuditEngine On
SecAuditLogParts ABCFHZ
SecAuditLogType Serial
SecAuditLog /tmp/audit.log
SecAuditLogFormat Native
SecRequestBodyAccess On
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@rx ." \
"id:1001,phase:1,pass,log,auditlog,msg:'trigger'"
Body vector — reachable via stock coraza/v3/http + net/http
Send an ordinary urlencoded POST whose body contains raw CRLF sequences and forged boundaries:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
evil=benign\r\n--coraza-forged-X--\r\nForgedLine: yes\r\n--coraza-forged-H--\r\n[client "9.9.9.9"] FAKE ATTACK ENTRY
Resulting audit.log:
--heLNtylvjY-C--
evil=benign
--coraza-forged-X--
ForgedLine: yes
--coraza-forged-H--
[client "9.9.9.9"] FAKE ATTACK ENTRY
--heLNtylvjY-F--
The forged --coraza-forged-X-- / --coraza-forged-H-- boundaries and the spoofed [client "9.9.9.9"] line are structurally indistinguishable from the surrounding genuine log content. No rule fires, no error is raised, the attack is invisible to the WAF.
Header vector — reachable via non-net/http integrations only
The same effect applies to Part B (request headers) and Part F (response headers) when a header value contains raw \r\n. Go's net/http rejects such headers at parse time (400 Bad Request), so the stock HTTP wrapper is safe from this path; the vector is reachable when Coraza is called with header values that were not validated by net/http:
coraza-spoa(HAProxy SPOP agent) forwards headers from HAProxy, which has more permissive validation.coraza-proxy-wasm/ Envoy WASM hosts forward header values from the upstream proxy.- Custom FFI/WASM hosts and any embedder calling
tx.AddRequestHeader(k, v)with unvalidated bytes.
Other raw-write sites (Part E response body, Part H error messages, Part K matched-rule data) share the same class of issue and should be fixed together.
Mitigation
Escape \r and \n at every raw-write site in internal/auditlog/formats.go. A single package-level helper is sufficient:
var logEscaper = strings.NewReplacer("\r", "\\r", "\n", "\\n")
// Part B — header values:
res.WriteString(logEscaper.Replace(v))
// Part F — header values: same
// Part H — error messages:
res.WriteString(logEscaper.Replace(alWithErrMsg.ErrorMessage()))
// Part K — matched-rule raw data:
res.WriteString(logEscaper.Replace(alEntry.Data().Raw()))
For Part C / Part E (bodies), the choice is policy-dependent:
- Escape inline (
logEscaper.Replace(body)): keeps the log human-readable for text bodies but loses fidelity for binary. - Base64 / hex-encode the whole part: binary-safe, matches the spirit of ModSecurity v2's binary-log handling, but less human-readable.
Escaping is the minimum; base64 for bodies is the more conservative default and is a reasonable audit-log-default change.
Additional defensive measure
Consider lengthening the boundaryPrefix random suffix from 10 chars to ≥16 chars (line 42). This strictly raises the bar for attackers attempting to fully forge a separate-looking session (not just inject lines into the current one). Low-cost change; narrows future variants of this bug class.
Affected versions
The Native formatter has been present since v3.0.0 (file existed at the first-release commit). All releases >= 3.0.0, <= 3.7.0 are affected when SecAuditLogFormat Native is used with SecAuditLogType Serial or SecAuditLogType Concurrent.
Unaffected:
- Deployments using
SecAuditLogFormat JSON(formats_json.gousesjson.Marshalwhich escapes\r\n). - Deployments using OCSF output.
- Deployments with
SecAuditEngine Off.
References
internal/auditlog/formats.golines 42, 72–80 (Part B), 85–88 (Part C), 93–96 (Part E), 111–118 (Part F), 125 (Part H), 151 (Part K)coraza.conf-recommended— defaultSecAuditLogFormat Native,SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ/ABCFHZvariants- CWE-117 — Improper Output Neutralization for Logs
- CWE-93 — CRLF Injection
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41504"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-117",
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-06T20:37:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Root Cause\n\nFile: `internal/auditlog/formats.go` \u2014 multiple sites write attacker-influenced bytes into the Native audit-log stream without escaping `\\r` or `\\n`:\n\n```go\n// Part B \u2014 request headers (lines 72\u201380)\nfor k, vv := range al.Transaction().Request().Headers() {\n for _, v := range vv {\n res.WriteByte(\u0027\\n\u0027)\n res.WriteString(k)\n res.WriteString(\": \")\n res.WriteString(v) // \u2190 raw\n }\n}\n\n// Part C \u2014 request body (lines 85\u201386)\nif body := al.Transaction().Request().Body(); body != \"\" {\n res.WriteString(body) // \u2190 raw\n res.WriteByte(\u0027\\n\u0027)\n}\n\n// Part E \u2014 response body (lines 93\u201394) raw\n// Part F \u2014 response headers (lines 111\u2013118) raw\n// Part H \u2014 error messages (line 125) raw\n// Part K \u2014 matched-rule raw data (line 151) raw\n```\n\nThe Native format\u0027s section structure is line-based: sections are delimited by lines of the form `--\u003c10-char-random-prefix\u003e-\u003cPart\u003e--`, and line-based log parsers / SIEM rules rely on that structure. Any attacker-controlled bytes containing `\\n` break the structural invariant and allow the attacker to inject lines that look like genuine audit content.\n\nThe other two Native-format implementations in Coraza are not affected: the JSON formatter (`formats_json.go`) and the OCSF formatter both round-trip values through `json.Marshal`, which escapes `\\r` and `\\n`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can land bytes into any of the listed audit-log fields can inject arbitrary lines \u2014 including lines that visually resemble new log entries \u2014 into the audit log file of a defender running the default `SecAuditLogFormat Native` configuration. Realistic consequences:\n\n- **Forging entries to shift attribution.** An injected line such as `[client \"9.9.9.9\"] Coraza: Warning. ...` sits alongside genuine matches in Part H, and a human operator (or simple SIEM rule) reading the log cannot tell them apart.\n- **Confusing SIEM correlation.** Any ingestion pipeline that splits on `--...-[A-Z]--` boundaries or on `[client \"...\"]` patterns without validating the session prefix will treat the forged lines as separate records.\n- **Breaking log-parsing tooling.** Grep/awk pipelines, log tailers, and log-rotation tools with line-based assumptions can be poisoned with crafted binary sequences.\n- **Hiding genuine incidents.** An attacker who can also trigger a rule match on the same transaction (trivial \u2014 send any request that matches *any* audit-logged rule) can bury the real match under noise they control.\n\nThe forged lines cannot trivially impersonate an entire *separate* session: the 10-char random prefix in the real boundaries (`boundaryPrefix := \"--\" + utils.RandomString(10) + \"-\"`, line 42) is not predictable from outside, and each transaction uses a fresh prefix. But the integrity of a *single* record is fully compromised, which is enough for the SIEM-confusion and attribution-shifting attacks.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nServer with `coraza.conf-recommended`-style defaults:\n\n```conf\nSecRuleEngine On\nSecAuditEngine On\nSecAuditLogParts ABCFHZ\nSecAuditLogType Serial\nSecAuditLog /tmp/audit.log\nSecAuditLogFormat Native\nSecRequestBodyAccess On\nSecRule REQUEST_METHOD \"@rx .\" \\\n \"id:1001,phase:1,pass,log,auditlog,msg:\u0027trigger\u0027\"\n```\n\n### Body vector \u2014 reachable via stock `coraza/v3/http` + `net/http`\n\nSend an ordinary urlencoded POST whose body contains raw CRLF sequences and forged boundaries:\n\n```\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nevil=benign\\r\\n--coraza-forged-X--\\r\\nForgedLine: yes\\r\\n--coraza-forged-H--\\r\\n[client \"9.9.9.9\"] FAKE ATTACK ENTRY\n```\n\nResulting audit.log:\n\n```\n--heLNtylvjY-C--\nevil=benign\n--coraza-forged-X--\nForgedLine: yes\n--coraza-forged-H--\n[client \"9.9.9.9\"] FAKE ATTACK ENTRY\n\n--heLNtylvjY-F--\n```\n\nThe forged `--coraza-forged-X--` / `--coraza-forged-H--` boundaries and the spoofed `[client \"9.9.9.9\"]` line are structurally indistinguishable from the surrounding genuine log content. No rule fires, no error is raised, the attack is invisible to the WAF.\n\n### Header vector \u2014 reachable via non-net/http integrations only\n\nThe same effect applies to Part B (request headers) and Part F (response headers) when a header value contains raw `\\r\\n`. Go\u0027s `net/http` rejects such headers at parse time (`400 Bad Request`), so the stock HTTP wrapper is safe from this path; the vector is reachable when Coraza is called with header values that were not validated by `net/http`:\n\n- `coraza-spoa` (HAProxy SPOP agent) forwards headers from HAProxy, which has more permissive validation.\n- `coraza-proxy-wasm` / Envoy WASM hosts forward header values from the upstream proxy.\n- Custom FFI/WASM hosts and any embedder calling `tx.AddRequestHeader(k, v)` with unvalidated bytes.\n\nOther raw-write sites (Part E response body, Part H error messages, Part K matched-rule data) share the same class of issue and should be fixed together.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nEscape `\\r` and `\\n` at every raw-write site in `internal/auditlog/formats.go`. A single package-level helper is sufficient:\n\n```go\nvar logEscaper = strings.NewReplacer(\"\\r\", \"\\\\r\", \"\\n\", \"\\\\n\")\n\n// Part B \u2014 header values:\nres.WriteString(logEscaper.Replace(v))\n\n// Part F \u2014 header values: same\n// Part H \u2014 error messages:\nres.WriteString(logEscaper.Replace(alWithErrMsg.ErrorMessage()))\n// Part K \u2014 matched-rule raw data:\nres.WriteString(logEscaper.Replace(alEntry.Data().Raw()))\n```\n\nFor Part C / Part E (bodies), the choice is policy-dependent:\n\n- **Escape inline** (`logEscaper.Replace(body)`): keeps the log human-readable for text bodies but loses fidelity for binary.\n- **Base64 / hex-encode** the whole part: binary-safe, matches the spirit of ModSecurity v2\u0027s binary-log handling, but less human-readable.\n\nEscaping is the minimum; base64 for bodies is the more conservative default and is a reasonable audit-log-default change.\n\n### Additional defensive measure\n\nConsider lengthening the `boundaryPrefix` random suffix from 10 chars to \u226516 chars (line 42). This strictly raises the bar for attackers attempting to *fully* forge a separate-looking session (not just inject lines into the current one). Low-cost change; narrows future variants of this bug class.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nThe Native formatter has been present since `v3.0.0` (file existed at the first-release commit). All releases `\u003e= 3.0.0, \u003c= 3.7.0` are affected when `SecAuditLogFormat Native` is used with `SecAuditLogType Serial` or `SecAuditLogType Concurrent`.\n\n**Unaffected:**\n\n- Deployments using `SecAuditLogFormat JSON` (`formats_json.go` uses `json.Marshal` which escapes `\\r\\n`).\n- Deployments using OCSF output.\n- Deployments with `SecAuditEngine Off`.\n\n## References\n\n- `internal/auditlog/formats.go` lines 42, 72\u201380 (Part B), 85\u201388 (Part C), 93\u201396 (Part E), 111\u2013118 (Part F), 125 (Part H), 151 (Part K)\n- `coraza.conf-recommended` \u2014 default `SecAuditLogFormat Native`, `SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ` / `ABCFHZ` variants\n- CWE-117 \u2014 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs\n- CWE-93 \u2014 CRLF Injection",
"id": "GHSA-prpw-wwv7-xjjr",
"modified": "2026-10-06T20:37:27Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T20:37:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/security/advisories/GHSA-prpw-wwv7-xjjr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/commit/a3079325547c7c1e08522aed4d6468f25d080e25"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/releases/tag/v3.8.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Coraza: Native audit-log format allows CRLF injection and log forgery via request body and header fields"
}
GHSA-PV9C-9MFH-HVXQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-24 19:13 – Updated: 2026-03-27 22:00Summary
.ics serialization does not properly sanitize URI property values, enabling ICS injection through attacker-controlled input, adding arbitrary calendar lines to the output.
Details
Icalendar::Values::Uri falls back to the raw input string when URI.parse fails and later serializes it with value.to_s without removing or escaping \r or \n characters. That value is embedded directly into the final ICS line by the normal serializer, so a payload containing CRLF can terminate the original property and create a new ICS property or component. (It looks like you can inject via url, source, image, organizer, attach, attendee, conference, tzurl because of this)
Relevant code:
- lib/icalendar/values/uri.rb:16
PoC
Run the following with the library loaded:
require "icalendar/value"
require "icalendar/values/uri"
v = Icalendar::Values::Uri.new("https://a.example/ok\r\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com")
puts v.to_ical(Icalendar::Values::Text)
output:
;VALUE=URI:https://a.example/ok
ATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com
Impact
Applications that generate .ics files from partially untrusted metadata are impacted. As a result, downstream calendar clients or importers may process attacker-supplied content as if it were legitimate event data, such as added attendees, modified URLs, alarms, or other calendar fields.
Fix
Reject raw CR and LF characters in URI-typed values before serialization, or escape/encode them so they cannot terminate the current ICS content line.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "icalendar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33635"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T19:13:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T21:17:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n.ics serialization does not properly sanitize URI property values, enabling ICS injection through attacker-controlled input, adding arbitrary calendar lines to the output.\n\n### Details\n`Icalendar::Values::Uri` falls back to the raw input string when `URI.parse` fails and later serializes it with `value.to_s` without removing or escaping `\\r` or `\\n` characters. That value is embedded directly into the final ICS line by the normal serializer, so a payload containing CRLF can terminate the original property and create a new ICS property or component. (It looks like you can inject via url, source, image, organizer, attach, attendee, conference, tzurl because of this)\n\nRelevant code:\n- `lib/icalendar/values/uri.rb:16`\n\n### PoC\nRun the following with the library loaded:\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"icalendar/value\"\nrequire \"icalendar/values/uri\"\n\nv = Icalendar::Values::Uri.new(\"https://a.example/ok\\r\\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com\")\nputs v.to_ical(Icalendar::Values::Text)\n```\n\noutput:\n\n```text\n;VALUE=URI:https://a.example/ok\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com\n```\n\n### Impact\nApplications that generate `.ics` files from partially untrusted metadata are impacted. As a result, downstream calendar clients or importers may process attacker-supplied content as if it were legitimate event data, such as added attendees, modified URLs, alarms, or other calendar fields.\n\n## Fix\nReject raw CR and LF characters in `URI`-typed values before serialization, or escape/encode them so they cannot terminate the current ICS content line.",
"id": "GHSA-pv9c-9mfh-hvxq",
"modified": "2026-03-27T22:00:24Z",
"published": "2026-03-24T19:13:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/icalendar/icalendar/security/advisories/GHSA-pv9c-9mfh-hvxq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/icalendar/icalendar/commit/b8d23b490363ee5fffaec1d269a8618a912ca265"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/icalendar/icalendar"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/icalendar/CVE-2026-33635.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "iCalendar has ICS injection via unsanitized URI property values"
}
GHSA-PX9F-WHJ3-246M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 15:29 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:29Summary
Req's multipart form encoder interpolates the per-part name, filename, and content_type directly into the part headers without escaping. An attacker who can influence any of those values can inject CRLF-separated header lines, smuggle additional form fields, or prepend a whole extra part into the request the victim service sends downstream.
Details
Req.Utils.encode_form_part/2 in lib/req/utils.ex builds the per-part header iodata by concatenating the three caller-supplied strings verbatim into content-disposition: form-data; name="<name>"; filename="<filename>" and content-type: <content_type>. There is no CRLF stripping, no quote escaping, and no validation. A value containing "\r\n closes the surrounding quoted value and starts a new header line; an additional \r\n--<boundary> terminates the current part and lets the attacker prepend a smuggled part.
The flaw is reachable through every supported way of supplying a part. It is especially easy to hit when value is a %File.Stream{}, because filename then defaults to Path.basename(stream.path) and POSIX filenames may legitimately contain \r and \n. RFC 7578 / WHATWG form-data requires percent-encoding ", CR, and LF in these fields; the fix adopts that behavior.
PoC
- Construct a malicious
filenamesuch asharmless.txt"\r\nX-Smuggled: marker\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="pwned. - Call
Req.post!(url, form_multipart: [upload: {"benign body", filename: <malicious>, content_type: "text/plain"}]). - The emitted multipart body contains a real
X-Smuggled:header line and an extraContent-Dispositionforname="pwned", alongside Req's legitimate headers.
Impact
HTTP request smuggling / multipart parameter smuggling in the HTTP client. Any application using Req to send form_multipart requests where any of name, filename, or content_type can be influenced by an untrusted source is affected, most commonly upload proxies and re-uploaders that derive filename from Path.basename/1 on a user-controlled path.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "req"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.3"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49756"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T15:29:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T16:16:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nReq\u0027s multipart form encoder interpolates the per-part `name`, `filename`, and `content_type` directly into the part headers without escaping. An attacker who can influence any of those values can inject CRLF-separated header lines, smuggle additional form fields, or prepend a whole extra part into the request the victim service sends downstream.\n\n### Details\n\n`Req.Utils.encode_form_part/2` in `lib/req/utils.ex` builds the per-part header iodata by concatenating the three caller-supplied strings verbatim into `content-disposition: form-data; name=\"\u003cname\u003e\"; filename=\"\u003cfilename\u003e\"` and `content-type: \u003ccontent_type\u003e`. There is no CRLF stripping, no quote escaping, and no validation. A value containing `\"\\r\\n` closes the surrounding quoted value and starts a new header line; an additional `\\r\\n--\u003cboundary\u003e` terminates the current part and lets the attacker prepend a smuggled part.\n\nThe flaw is reachable through every supported way of supplying a part. It is especially easy to hit when `value` is a `%File.Stream{}`, because `filename` then defaults to `Path.basename(stream.path)` and POSIX filenames may legitimately contain `\\r` and `\\n`. RFC 7578 / WHATWG form-data requires percent-encoding `\"`, CR, and LF in these fields; the fix adopts that behavior.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Construct a malicious `filename` such as `harmless.txt\"\\r\\nX-Smuggled: marker\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"pwned`.\n2. Call `Req.post!(url, form_multipart: [upload: {\"benign body\", filename: \u003cmalicious\u003e, content_type: \"text/plain\"}])`.\n3. The emitted multipart body contains a real `X-Smuggled:` header line and an extra `Content-Disposition` for `name=\"pwned\"`, alongside Req\u0027s legitimate headers.\n\n### Impact\n\nHTTP request smuggling / multipart parameter smuggling in the HTTP client. Any application using Req to send `form_multipart` requests where any of `name`, `filename`, or `content_type` can be influenced by an untrusted source is affected, most commonly upload proxies and re-uploaders that derive `filename` from `Path.basename/1` on a user-controlled path.",
"id": "GHSA-px9f-whj3-246m",
"modified": "2026-07-29T15:29:15Z",
"published": "2026-07-29T15:29:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/security/advisories/GHSA-px9f-whj3-246m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/commit/74506ff2c5addf74df85d79dc726e9b2e264a8ba"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-49756.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/releases/tag/v0.6.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-49756"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Req vulnerable to multipart form-data header injection via unescaped name/filename/content_type"
}
GHSA-Q768-X9M6-M9QP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-21 20:31 – Updated: 2022-07-21 20:31Impact
Authorization headers are already cleared on cross-origin redirect in https://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/main/lib/handler/redirect.js#L189, based on https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/872.
However, cookie headers which are sensitive headers and are official headers found in the spec, remain uncleared. There also has been active discussion of implementing a cookie store https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/1441, which suggests that there are active users using cookie headers in undici. As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site.
Patches
This was patched in v5.8.0.
Workarounds
By default, this vulnerability is not exploitable.
Do not enable redirections, i.e. maxRedirections: 0 (the default).
References
https://hackerone.com/reports/1635514 https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2018-1000007.html https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27776.html
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in undici repository * To make a report, follow the SECURITY document
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31151"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-601",
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-21T20:31:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-21T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAuthorization headers are already cleared on cross-origin redirect in\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/main/lib/handler/redirect.js#L189, based on https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/872.\n\nHowever, cookie headers which are sensitive headers and are official headers found in the spec, remain uncleared. There also has been active discussion of implementing a cookie store https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/1441, which suggests that there are active users using cookie headers in undici.\nAs such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis was patched in v5.8.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nBy default, this vulnerability is not exploitable.\nDo not enable redirections, i.e. `maxRedirections: 0` (the default). \n\n### References\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1635514\nhttps://curl.se/docs/CVE-2018-1000007.html\nhttps://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27776.html\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [undici repository](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues)\n* To make a report, follow the [SECURITY](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/HEAD/SECURITY.md) document\n",
"id": "GHSA-q768-x9m6-m9qp",
"modified": "2022-07-21T20:31:05Z",
"published": "2022-07-21T20:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-q768-x9m6-m9qp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/872"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/1441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/0a5bee9465e627be36bac88edf7d9bbc9626126d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1635514"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/main/lib/handler/redirect.js#L189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v5.8.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220909-0006"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "undici before v5.8.0 vulnerable to uncleared cookies on cross-host / cross-origin redirect"
}
GHSA-Q7JX-V53G-848W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 00:03 – Updated: 2026-07-10 00:03Summary
Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2 appends caller-supplied strings to the multipart Content-Type header with no validation. A param value containing \r\n splits the header line, allowing an attacker who controls any content-type parameter (charset, boundary parameter, etc.) to inject arbitrary headers into the outbound HTTP request.
Details
add_content_type_param/2 in lib/tesla/multipart.ex stores the supplied string directly in multipart.content_type_params without any CR/LF check. headers/1 then joins all params with "; " and appends the result verbatim to the Content-Type header value. Because HTTP headers are delimited by \r\n, a param containing that sequence breaks out of the header field and introduces new header lines before the adapter writes the request to the socket.
The precondition is that untrusted input reaches add_content_type_param/2, which is the normal pattern for applications that accept user-supplied charset values, file type parameters, or any other content-type extension fields.
PoC
- Call
Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2with a value containing\r\nX-Injected: pwned. - Pass the resulting
Multipartstruct as the request body via any Tesla adapter. - The raw request on the wire contains
X-Injected: pwnedas a standalone header line.
Impact
Low severity (CVSS v4.0: 2.1). Any application using tesla 0.8.0 through 1.18.2 that passes untrusted input into Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2 is affected. Consequences range from forging arbitrary outbound request headers to potential request smuggling against the upstream server. Fixed in tesla 1.18.3.
Workarounds
Validate content-type parameter strings before passing them to Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2, rejecting any value that contains \r or \n.
Reesources
- Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-tesla/tesla/commit/6ebfdb9abe9c6f119408045b933d82462decd351
- Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-tesla/tesla/commit/23601edac5d22ba9407b427967b5bdbda201aec2
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "tesla"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.18.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48596"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-113",
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T00:03:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-02T20:16:38Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2` appends caller-supplied strings to the multipart `Content-Type` header with no validation. A param value containing `\\r\\n` splits the header line, allowing an attacker who controls any content-type parameter (charset, boundary parameter, etc.) to inject arbitrary headers into the outbound HTTP request.\n\n### Details\n\n`add_content_type_param/2` in `lib/tesla/multipart.ex` stores the supplied string directly in `multipart.content_type_params` without any CR/LF check. `headers/1` then joins all params with `\"; \"` and appends the result verbatim to the `Content-Type` header value. Because HTTP headers are delimited by `\\r\\n`, a param containing that sequence breaks out of the header field and introduces new header lines before the adapter writes the request to the socket.\n\nThe precondition is that untrusted input reaches `add_content_type_param/2`, which is the normal pattern for applications that accept user-supplied charset values, file type parameters, or any other content-type extension fields.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Call `Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2` with a value containing `\\r\\nX-Injected: pwned`.\n2. Pass the resulting `Multipart` struct as the request body via any Tesla adapter.\n3. The raw request on the wire contains `X-Injected: pwned` as a standalone header line.\n\n### Impact\n\nLow severity (CVSS v4.0: 2.1). Any application using `tesla` 0.8.0 through 1.18.2 that passes untrusted input into `Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2` is affected. Consequences range from forging arbitrary outbound request headers to potential request smuggling against the upstream server. Fixed in tesla 1.18.3.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nValidate content-type parameter strings before passing them to `Tesla.Multipart.add_content_type_param/2`, rejecting any value that contains `\\r` or `\\n`.\n\n### Reesources\n\n* Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-tesla/tesla/commit/6ebfdb9abe9c6f119408045b933d82462decd351\n* Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-tesla/tesla/commit/23601edac5d22ba9407b427967b5bdbda201aec2",
"id": "GHSA-q7jx-v53g-848w",
"modified": "2026-07-10T00:03:12Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T00:03:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-tesla/tesla/security/advisories/GHSA-q7jx-v53g-848w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48596"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-tesla/tesla/commit/23601edac5d22ba9407b427967b5bdbda201aec2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-48596.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-tesla/tesla"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-48596"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Tesla has CRLF injection in request `Content-Type` header via `add_content_type_param`"
}
GHSA-Q83Q-GHHM-P7G4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-19 18:32Metrics::Any::Adapter::Statsd versions before 0.04 for Perl does not protect against metric injections.
The statsd protocol (and extensions) allow mutiple metrics,separated by newlines, to be sent per packet.
The send method does not validate the contents of the metric names or values. If the names have newlines and statsd control characters (colon, pipe) then metric injections are possible.
Version 0.04 fixed this by modifying the _make method to block metric names with characters below ASCII 32 (which includes the newline), or colons or pipes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50637"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T19:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Metrics::Any::Adapter::Statsd versions before 0.04 for Perl does not protect against metric injections.\n\nThe statsd protocol (and extensions) allow mutiple metrics,separated by newlines, to be sent per packet.\n\nThe send method does not validate the contents of the metric names or values. If the names have newlines and statsd control characters (colon, pipe) then metric injections are possible.\n\nVersion 0.04 fixed this by modifying the _make method to block metric names with characters below ASCII 32 (which includes the newline), or colons or pipes.",
"id": "GHSA-q83q-ghhm-p7g4",
"modified": "2026-06-19T18:32:30Z",
"published": "2026-06-10T21:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/PEVANS/Metrics-Any-Adapter-Statsd-0.04/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46719"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46720"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46739"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-50638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-50639"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q86F-FMQF-QRF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2017-10-24 18:33 – Updated: 2023-09-05 21:08The mail gem before 2.5.5 for Ruby (aka A Really Ruby Mail Library) is vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in a RCPT TO or MAIL FROM command, as demonstrated by CRLF sequences immediately before and after a DATA substring.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "mail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-9097"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:51:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The mail gem before 2.5.5 for Ruby (aka A Really Ruby Mail Library) is vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in a RCPT TO or MAIL FROM command, as demonstrated by CRLF sequences immediately before and after a DATA substring.",
"id": "GHSA-q86f-fmqf-qrf6",
"modified": "2023-09-05T21:08:32Z",
"published": "2017-10-24T18:33:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/issues/215"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail/pull/1097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail/commit/72befdc4dab3e6e288ce226a7da2aa474cf5be83"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/137631"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q86f-fmqf-qrf6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rubysec.com/advisories/mail-OSVDB-131677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/12/11/3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mbsd.jp/Whitepaper/smtpi.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mail Gem CRLF Injection vulnerability"
}
GHSA-Q89X-F52W-6HJ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-25 20:43 – Updated: 2023-06-13 17:39Serializing of headers to the socket did not filter the values for newline bytes (\r or \n), which allowed for header values to split a request or response. People would not likely include newlines in the headers in their own applications, so the way for most people to exploit this is if an application constructs headers based on unsanitized user input.
This issue was fixed by replacing all newline characters with a space during serialization of a header value.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hyper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hyper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-18587"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-19T21:25:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-26T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Serializing of headers to the socket did not filter the values for newline bytes (\\r or \\n), which allowed for header values to split a request or response. People would not likely include newlines in the headers in their own applications, so the way for most people to exploit this is if an application constructs headers based on unsanitized user input.\n\nThis issue was fixed by replacing all newline characters with a space during serialization of a header value.",
"id": "GHSA-q89x-f52w-6hj2",
"modified": "2023-06-13T17:39:45Z",
"published": "2021-08-25T20:43:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18587"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/wiki/Security-001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2017-0002.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Headers containing newline characters can split messages in hyper"
}
Mitigation
Avoid using CRLF as a special sequence.
Mitigation
Appropriately filter or quote CRLF sequences in user-controlled input.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.