CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
7024 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X8GV-G2G3-65FJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 23:17 – Updated: 2026-10-02 23:17Security Advisory — SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF)
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Disclosed by | joysinleung (joysinleung@gmail.com) |
| Report date | 2026-08-13 |
| Product | SiYuan (思源笔记) — siyuan-note/siyuan |
| Go module | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
| Affected versions | <= 3.8.0 (latest release at report time; dynamically verified on v3.8.0) |
| Patched versions | 3.8.1 |
| Component | kernel/util/httprequest.go (CheckHostSSRF), kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go, kernel/util/webfetch.go, kernel/util/net.go (SSRFSafeDialer) |
| Relationship to prior advisory | Incomplete-fix variant of GHSA-rg26-cg95-gq6p (SSRF main-vector remediation). See §Relationship. |
| EPSS (exploitation probability) | Low–Moderate. Requires the attacker to influence an AI Agent / MCP client into fetching an attacker-controlled domain (prompt-injection scenario documented by the tool itself). |
| KEV (CISA Known Exploited) | No (not listed in CISA KEV at report time). |
| Default-config reachable | Yes — exploitable under both SafeMode on and off; only requires the agent http_request / web_fetch tool to be reachable (default AI tooling). |
Summary
SiYuan's AI Agent tools http_request (util.HTTPRequest) and web_fetch (util.WebFetch) are the only SSRF gate for outbound requests from the kernel. That gate is CheckHostSSRF, which performs a single DNS resolution at guard time and checks whether any returned IP is private/loopback/link-local. The actual connection, however, performs a second, independent DNS resolution through the default net.Dialer — and no connect-time private-IP check is mounted on this path.
Because the two resolutions are not pinned to the same result, an attacker-controlled domain can answer the guard-resolution with a public IP (passing CheckHostSSRF) and the connect-resolution with a private/loopback/metadata IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254). This is a classic DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that bypasses the SSRF defense entirely. It reaches cloud instance metadata and internal services that the guard was specifically added to block.
Relationship to Prior Advisories
- GHSA-rg26-cg95-gq6p remediated the SSRF main vector by adding
CheckHostSSRF(parse-time) andSSRFSafeDialer(connect-time). However, the agent tool paths (http_request/web_fetch) only received the parse-time half: they callCheckHostSSRFbut then connect viahttpclient.NewBrowserRequest(), whose transport does not mountSSRFSafeDialer. Even whereSSRFSafeDialeris mounted, it only blocks private IPs whenSafeMode == true(default false), so it would not help here regardless. The sibling pathopenai.go:generatedImageDialerdoes mount a connect-timeControlhook (blocking private/loopback/link-local/100.64/198.18), proving the project knows the technique — the agent path is a clear omission. We report this as an incomplete-fix variant with a concrete v3.8.0 reproduction. - CVE-2026-32110 (GHSA-56cv-c5p2-j2wg) covered the older
forwardProxyendpoint and is unrelated to the agent tool path.
Affected Version
Dynamically verified on v3.8.0 (tag v3.8.0, commit 251596fc0). A process-level DNS hijack was installed so that the attacker domain rebind.local returns a public IP (203.0.113.1) on odd (guard) resolutions and 127.0.0.1 on even (connect) resolutions; a loopback "victim" service returned F9_REBIND_PROOF=reached-internal-only-service-via-TOCTOU. Both util.HTTPRequest("GET", "http://rebind.local:<port>/secret") and util.WebFetch(...) returned the internal-only proof body, while CheckHostSSRF("127.0.0.1") directly blocked and the legit public domain pub.local passed — confirming the guard passed but the connection hit the internal address. All versions <= 3.8.0 are affected.
Component
kernel/util/httprequest.go:42CheckHostSSRF— singlenet.LookupIP+isPrivateIPat guard time only.kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go:90→util.HTTPRequest;kernel/util/webfetch.go:50→CheckHostSSRF+httpclient.NewBrowserRequest().github.com/siyuan-note/httpclientclient.go:92NewBrowserRequestuses the defaulthttp.Transport→ defaultnet.Dialerwith noSSRFSafeDialer.kernel/util/net.go:151SSRFSafeDialerexists but is (a) not mounted on the agent path and (b) only active underSafeMode.- Correctly-defended sibling:
kernel/util/openai.go:829generatedImageDialermounts a connect-timeControlhook.
Attack Vector
Network + AI Agent. The url of http_request / web_fetch is fully controlled by the agent / MCP client. In SiYuan's documented red-team scenario ("prompt-inject the agent → induce it to visit an attacker domain"), the attacker needs only a rebinding domain (own authoritative DNS, first answer public, later 169.254.169.254 / internal). No auth, no special position beyond prompting the agent. Real targets: cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 (IMDSv1 IAM creds) and same-host/internal unauthenticated services.
Proof of Concept
# Attacker authoritative DNS for rebind.local:
# odd query (guard) -> 203.0.113.1 (public, passes CheckHostSSRF)
# even query (dial) -> 127.0.0.1 (loopback internal victim)
#
# Directly invoke the real agent-tool functions (v3.8.0 code path):
util.HTTPRequest("GET", "http://rebind.local:15353/secret", ...)
util.WebFetch("http://rebind.local:15353/secret", ...)
# Result (evidence):
# body = "F9_REBIND_PROOF=reached-internal-only-service-via-TOCTOU"
# Negative control: CheckHostSSRF("127.0.0.1") -> blocked.
# Positive control: CheckHostSSRF("pub.local") -> 203.0.113.1, allowed.
The loopback victim is a faithful stand-in for 169.254.169.254 / any internal address: the guard allowed a public IP while the connection reached a private one.
Impact
Confidentiality breach via SSRF: an attacker who can steer the agent can read cloud instance metadata (IAM temporary credentials), internal service responses, and anything reachable from the SiYuan kernel's network position. Scope is changed (S:C) because the kernel often runs with cloud-instance privileges. Exploitable under default config (SafeMode on or off).
Scope
Reachable whenever the agent http_request / web_fetch tool is usable (default AI tooling). Independent of Publish/auth configuration. Not gated by SafeMode.
Remediation
- Connect-time enforcement (preferred): mount
SSRFSafeDialer(or a dedicated always-on private-IPControlhook) on the transport used byhttp_request/web_fetch, independent ofSafeMode— matching the already-correctgeneratedImageDialer. - Pin resolution: after
CheckHostSSRFpasses, reuse the same resolved IP for the connection (or short-TTL cache) so guard and dial cannot diverge. - Minimum change: replace
httpclient.NewBrowserRequest()inhttp_request.go/webfetch.gowith a custom client whoseDialContextisutil.SSRFSafeDialer(timeout).DialContext(notSafeMode-gated).
Note: patch authored against v3.8.0 source; regression-tested in the researcher's environment for the PoC path but not compiled into a full SiYuan release build. Provided for the maintainer to validate in CI.
Appendix: Suggested Patch (F9)
diff --git a/kernel/util/httprequest.go b/kernel/util/httprequest.go
index aaa..bbb 100644
--- a/kernel/util/httprequest.go
+++ b/kernel/util/httprequest.go
@@ -40,6 +40,18 @@ func CheckHostSSRF(host string) error {
return nil
}
+// SSRFSafeClient returns an *http.Client whose transport enforces the
+// private/loopback/link-local IP block at CONNECT time (independent of SafeMode),
+// closing the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU left by parse-time-only CheckHostSSRF.
+func SSRFSafeClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
+ return &http.Client{
+ Timeout: timeout,
+ Transport: &http.Transport{
+ DialContext: util.SSRFSafeDialer(timeout).DialContext,
+ },
+ }
+}
+
diff --git a/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go b/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go
index ccc..ddd 100644
--- a/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go
+++ b/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func httpRequest(args map[string]any) (CallToolResult, error) {
if serr := util.CheckHostSSRF(u.Hostname()); serr != nil {
return CallToolResult{}, serr
}
- resp, err := httpclient.NewBrowserRequest().Get(rawURL)
+ resp, err := util.SSRFSafeClient(30 * time.Second).Get(rawURL)
...
}
diff --git a/kernel/util/webfetch.go b/kernel/util/webfetch.go
index eee..fff 100644
--- a/kernel/util/webfetch.go
+++ b/kernel/util/webfetch.go
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func WebFetch(rawURL string, ...) (string, error) {
if serr := util.CheckHostSSRF(u.Hostname()); serr != nil {
return "", serr
}
- resp, err := httpclient.NewBrowserRequest().Get(rawURL)
+ resp, err := util.SSRFSafeClient(30 * time.Second).Get(rawURL)
...
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260813142806-dd2778b70d02"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T23:17:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Security Advisory \u2014 SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of `CheckHostSSRF`)\n\n| Field | Value |\n|---|---|\n| **Disclosed by** | joysinleung (`joysinleung@gmail.com`) |\n| **Report date** | 2026-08-13 |\n| **Product** | SiYuan (\u601d\u6e90\u7b14\u8bb0) \u2014 `siyuan-note/siyuan` |\n| **Go module** | `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel` |\n| **Affected versions** | `\u003c= 3.8.0` (latest release at report time; dynamically verified on v3.8.0) |\n| **Patched versions** | 3.8.1 |\n| **Component** | `kernel/util/httprequest.go` (`CheckHostSSRF`), `kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go`, `kernel/util/webfetch.go`, `kernel/util/net.go` (`SSRFSafeDialer`) |\n| **Relationship to prior advisory** | **Incomplete-fix variant of GHSA-rg26-cg95-gq6p** (SSRF main-vector remediation). See \u00a7Relationship. |\n| **EPSS (exploitation probability)** | Low\u2013Moderate. Requires the attacker to influence an AI Agent / MCP client into fetching an attacker-controlled domain (prompt-injection scenario documented by the tool itself). |\n| **KEV (CISA Known Exploited)** | No (not listed in CISA KEV at report time). |\n| **Default-config reachable** | **Yes** \u2014 exploitable under *both* `SafeMode` on and off; only requires the agent `http_request` / `web_fetch` tool to be reachable (default AI tooling). |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nSiYuan\u0027s AI Agent tools `http_request` (`util.HTTPRequest`) and `web_fetch` (`util.WebFetch`) are the only SSRF gate for outbound requests from the kernel. That gate is `CheckHostSSRF`, which performs a **single DNS resolution at guard time** and checks whether any returned IP is private/loopback/link-local. The actual connection, however, performs a **second, independent DNS resolution** through the default `net.Dialer` \u2014 and **no connect-time private-IP check is mounted** on this path.\n\nBecause the two resolutions are not pinned to the same result, an attacker-controlled domain can answer the guard-resolution with a **public IP** (passing `CheckHostSSRF`) and the connect-resolution with a **private/loopback/metadata IP** (e.g. `169.254.169.254`). This is a classic **DNS-rebinding TOCTOU** that bypasses the SSRF defense entirely. It reaches cloud instance metadata and internal services that the guard was specifically added to block.\n\n## Relationship to Prior Advisories\n\n- **GHSA-rg26-cg95-gq6p** remediated the SSRF *main vector* by adding `CheckHostSSRF` (parse-time) **and** `SSRFSafeDialer` (connect-time). However, **the agent tool paths (`http_request` / `web_fetch`) only received the parse-time half**: they call `CheckHostSSRF` but then connect via `httpclient.NewBrowserRequest()`, whose transport does **not** mount `SSRFSafeDialer`. Even where `SSRFSafeDialer` *is* mounted, it only blocks private IPs when `SafeMode == true` (default false), so it would not help here regardless. The sibling path `openai.go:generatedImageDialer` *does* mount a connect-time `Control` hook (blocking private/loopback/link-local/100.64/198.18), proving the project knows the technique \u2014 the agent path is a clear omission. We report this as an **incomplete-fix variant** with a concrete v3.8.0 reproduction.\n- **CVE-2026-32110** (GHSA-56cv-c5p2-j2wg) covered the older `forwardProxy` endpoint and is unrelated to the agent tool path.\n\n## Affected Version\n\n**Dynamically verified on v3.8.0** (tag `v3.8.0`, commit `251596fc0`). A process-level DNS hijack was installed so that the attacker domain `rebind.local` returns a public IP (`203.0.113.1`) on odd (guard) resolutions and `127.0.0.1` on even (connect) resolutions; a loopback \"victim\" service returned `F9_REBIND_PROOF=reached-internal-only-service-via-TOCTOU`. Both `util.HTTPRequest(\"GET\", \"http://rebind.local:\u003cport\u003e/secret\")` and `util.WebFetch(...)` returned the internal-only proof body, while `CheckHostSSRF(\"127.0.0.1\")` directly blocked and the legit public domain `pub.local` passed \u2014 confirming the guard passed but the connection hit the internal address. All versions `\u003c= 3.8.0` are affected.\n\n## Component\n\n- `kernel/util/httprequest.go:42` `CheckHostSSRF` \u2014 single `net.LookupIP` + `isPrivateIP` at guard time only.\n- `kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go:90` \u2192 `util.HTTPRequest`; `kernel/util/webfetch.go:50` \u2192 `CheckHostSSRF` + `httpclient.NewBrowserRequest()`.\n- `github.com/siyuan-note/httpclient` `client.go:92` `NewBrowserRequest` uses the default `http.Transport` \u2192 default `net.Dialer` with **no `SSRFSafeDialer`**.\n- `kernel/util/net.go:151` `SSRFSafeDialer` exists but is (a) not mounted on the agent path and (b) only active under `SafeMode`.\n- Correctly-defended sibling: `kernel/util/openai.go:829` `generatedImageDialer` mounts a connect-time `Control` hook.\n\n\n## Attack Vector\n\n**Network + AI Agent.** The `url` of `http_request` / `web_fetch` is fully controlled by the agent / MCP client. In SiYuan\u0027s documented red-team scenario (\"prompt-inject the agent \u2192 induce it to visit an attacker domain\"), the attacker needs only a rebinding domain (own authoritative DNS, first answer public, later `169.254.169.254` / internal). No auth, no special position beyond prompting the agent. Real targets: cloud metadata `169.254.169.254` (IMDSv1 IAM creds) and same-host/internal unauthenticated services.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```\n# Attacker authoritative DNS for rebind.local:\n# odd query (guard) -\u003e 203.0.113.1 (public, passes CheckHostSSRF)\n# even query (dial) -\u003e 127.0.0.1 (loopback internal victim)\n#\n# Directly invoke the real agent-tool functions (v3.8.0 code path):\nutil.HTTPRequest(\"GET\", \"http://rebind.local:15353/secret\", ...)\nutil.WebFetch(\"http://rebind.local:15353/secret\", ...)\n\n# Result (evidence):\n# body = \"F9_REBIND_PROOF=reached-internal-only-service-via-TOCTOU\"\n# Negative control: CheckHostSSRF(\"127.0.0.1\") -\u003e blocked.\n# Positive control: CheckHostSSRF(\"pub.local\") -\u003e 203.0.113.1, allowed.\n```\n\nThe loopback victim is a faithful stand-in for `169.254.169.254` / any internal address: the guard allowed a public IP while the connection reached a private one.\n\n## Impact\n\nConfidentiality breach via SSRF: an attacker who can steer the agent can read cloud instance metadata (IAM temporary credentials), internal service responses, and anything reachable from the SiYuan kernel\u0027s network position. Scope is changed (`S:C`) because the kernel often runs with cloud-instance privileges. Exploitable under default config (SafeMode on or off).\n\n## Scope\n\nReachable whenever the agent `http_request` / `web_fetch` tool is usable (default AI tooling). Independent of Publish/auth configuration. Not gated by `SafeMode`.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. **Connect-time enforcement (preferred)**: mount `SSRFSafeDialer` (or a dedicated always-on private-IP `Control` hook) on the transport used by `http_request` / `web_fetch`, independent of `SafeMode` \u2014 matching the already-correct `generatedImageDialer`.\n2. **Pin resolution**: after `CheckHostSSRF` passes, reuse the *same* resolved IP for the connection (or short-TTL cache) so guard and dial cannot diverge.\n3. **Minimum change**: replace `httpclient.NewBrowserRequest()` in `http_request.go` / `webfetch.go` with a custom client whose `DialContext` is `util.SSRFSafeDialer(timeout).DialContext` (not `SafeMode`-gated).\n\n\u003e Note: patch authored against v3.8.0 source; regression-tested in the researcher\u0027s environment for the PoC path but not compiled into a full SiYuan release build. Provided for the maintainer to validate in CI.\n\n---\n\n## Appendix: Suggested Patch (F9)\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/kernel/util/httprequest.go b/kernel/util/httprequest.go\nindex aaa..bbb 100644\n--- a/kernel/util/httprequest.go\n+++ b/kernel/util/httprequest.go\n@@ -40,6 +40,18 @@ func CheckHostSSRF(host string) error {\n \treturn nil\n }\n \n+// SSRFSafeClient returns an *http.Client whose transport enforces the\n+// private/loopback/link-local IP block at CONNECT time (independent of SafeMode),\n+// closing the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU left by parse-time-only CheckHostSSRF.\n+func SSRFSafeClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {\n+\treturn \u0026http.Client{\n+\t\tTimeout: timeout,\n+\t\tTransport: \u0026http.Transport{\n+\t\t\tDialContext: util.SSRFSafeDialer(timeout).DialContext,\n+\t\t},\n+\t}\n+}\n+\n diff --git a/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go b/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go\n index ccc..ddd 100644\n--- a/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go\n+++ b/kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go\n@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func httpRequest(args map[string]any) (CallToolResult, error) {\n \tif serr := util.CheckHostSSRF(u.Hostname()); serr != nil {\n \t\treturn CallToolResult{}, serr\n \t}\n-\tresp, err := httpclient.NewBrowserRequest().Get(rawURL)\n+\tresp, err := util.SSRFSafeClient(30 * time.Second).Get(rawURL)\n \t...\n }\n diff --git a/kernel/util/webfetch.go b/kernel/util/webfetch.go\n index eee..fff 100644\n--- a/kernel/util/webfetch.go\n+++ b/kernel/util/webfetch.go\n@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func WebFetch(rawURL string, ...) (string, error) {\n \tif serr := util.CheckHostSSRF(u.Hostname()); serr != nil {\n \t\treturn \"\", serr\n \t}\n-\tresp, err := httpclient.NewBrowserRequest().Get(rawURL)\n+\tresp, err := util.SSRFSafeClient(30 * time.Second).Get(rawURL)\n \t...\n }\n```",
"id": "GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj",
"modified": "2026-10-02T23:17:16Z",
"published": "2026-10-02T23:17:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/dd2778b70d020b15491ef7418f5f63214583cd63"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.8.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF)"
}
GHSA-X8H5-CPR3-H43M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-11 12:30 – Updated: 2026-08-11 12:30A server-side request forgery vulnerability in Pinry through 2.1.13 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to make the server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or external hosts via the pin-from-URL feature. The feature passes the user-supplied URL directly to requests.get() without host or IP validation, and ALLOW_NEW_REGISTRATIONS defaults to true enabling anonymous triggering. An attacker can reach internal services or cloud metadata endpoints from the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72606"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T12:17:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A server-side request forgery vulnerability in Pinry through 2.1.13 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to make the server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or external hosts via the pin-from-URL feature. The feature passes the user-supplied URL directly to requests.get() without host or IP validation, and ALLOW_NEW_REGISTRATIONS defaults to true enabling anonymous triggering. An attacker can reach internal services or cloud metadata endpoints from the server.",
"id": "GHSA-x8h5-cpr3-h43m",
"modified": "2026-08-11T12:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-08-11T12:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72606"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pinry/pinry"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X8HW-99FP-GMH6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:05 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:45Halo before 1.2.0-beta.1 allows Server Side Template Injection (SSTI) because TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER is not used in the FreeMarker configuration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-19999"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-12-26T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Halo before 1.2.0-beta.1 allows Server Side Template Injection (SSTI) because TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER is not used in the FreeMarker configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-x8hw-99fp-gmh6",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:45:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:05:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/419"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/issues/440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/compare/v1.1.3-beta.2...v1.2.0-beta.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X8R7-G3FV-CF37
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 03:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 03:31BentoML's outbound connection safeguard (make_safe_connect in _internal/utils/uri.py) blocks private, loopback, and link-local IP addresses but fails to reject the RFC 6598 shared address space (100.64.0.0/10, CGNAT). In versions 1.4.19 through 1.4.39, an unauthenticated attacker can supply URLs pointing to that range via multipart file handling (MultipartSerde.ensure_file) or JSON request parsing (JSONSerde.parse_request), causing the server to make outbound requests to internal hosts on CGNAT networks (Server-Side Request Forgery). This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-54381.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-78205"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T01:16:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "BentoML\u0027s outbound connection safeguard (make_safe_connect in _internal/utils/uri.py) blocks private, loopback, and link-local IP addresses but fails to reject the RFC 6598 shared address space (100.64.0.0/10, CGNAT). In versions 1.4.19 through 1.4.39, an unauthenticated attacker can supply URLs pointing to that range via multipart file handling (MultipartSerde.ensure_file) or JSON request parsing (JSONSerde.parse_request), causing the server to make outbound requests to internal hosts on CGNAT networks (Server-Side Request Forgery). This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-54381.",
"id": "GHSA-x8r7-g3fv-cf37",
"modified": "2026-08-24T03:31:05Z",
"published": "2026-08-24T03:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78205"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/issues/5644"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/v1.4.39/src/bentoml/_internal/utils/uri.py#L89-L96"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/bentoml-through-server-side-request-forgery-via-unfiltered-rfc-6598-shared-address-space"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X8RQ-RC7X-5FG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-06 22:24 – Updated: 2025-12-22 17:42uppy's companion module is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@uppy/companion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0086"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-06T19:48:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-04T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "uppy\u0027s companion module is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.",
"id": "GHSA-x8rq-rc7x-5fg5",
"modified": "2025-12-22T17:42:04Z",
"published": "2022-01-06T22:24:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0086"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/transloadit/uppy/pull/3403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/transloadit/uppy/commit/fc137e30a2a3102eb191141f280d5de20dacdf8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/transloadit/uppy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/transloadit/uppy/releases/tag/uppy%402.3.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/c1c03ef6-3f18-4976-a9ad-08c251279122"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "uppy\u0027s companion module is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
}
GHSA-X8XM-HQH8-G7PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:46 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:42WPO WebPageTest 19.04 allows SSRF because ValidateURL in www/runtest.php does not consider octal encoding of IP addresses (such as 0300.0250 as a replacement for 192.168).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-12161"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-05-17T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "WPO WebPageTest 19.04 allows SSRF because ValidateURL in www/runtest.php does not consider octal encoding of IP addresses (such as 0300.0250 as a replacement for 192.168).",
"id": "GHSA-x8xm-hqh8-g7pw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:42:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:46:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12161"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1550366"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X8XQ-5829-HC86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-14 06:30 – Updated: 2025-09-14 06:30A flaw has been found in miurla morphic up to 0.4.5. This impacts the function fetchHtml of the file /api/advanced-search of the component HTTP Status Code 3xx Handler. This manipulation causes server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10393"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-14T06:15:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw has been found in miurla morphic up to 0.4.5. This impacts the function fetchHtml of the file /api/advanced-search of the component HTTP Status Code 3xx Handler. This manipulation causes server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-x8xq-5829-hc86",
"modified": "2025-09-14T06:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-09-14T06:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/miurla/morphic/issues/670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.323828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.323828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.645509"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X8XR-Q2J9-GFC2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-27 06:30 – Updated: 2026-09-28 03:30The WPeMatico RSS Feed Fetcher WordPress plugin before 2.8.27 does not perform a capability check or validate the destination of a user-supplied feed URL before fetching it server-side, allowing users with contributor-level access and above to make the server issue requests to internal-only resources and read the responses back.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89000"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-27T06:17:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WPeMatico RSS Feed Fetcher WordPress plugin before 2.8.27 does not perform a capability check or validate the destination of a user-supplied feed URL before fetching it server-side, allowing users with contributor-level access and above to make the server issue requests to internal-only resources and read the responses back.",
"id": "GHSA-x8xr-q2j9-gfc2",
"modified": "2026-09-28T03:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-27T06:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89000"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/2622b685-d2a9-4bb5-aeef-3aa4ca7adcc4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X9CC-G7V6-8MC3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-04 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Md Yeasin Ul Haider URL Shortener allows Server Side Request Forgery. This issue affects URL Shortener: from n/a through 3.0.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-28963"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T09:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Md Yeasin Ul Haider URL Shortener allows Server Side Request Forgery. This issue affects URL Shortener: from n/a through 3.0.7.",
"id": "GHSA-x9cc-g7v6-8mc3",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:41Z",
"published": "2025-07-04T09:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-28963"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/exact-links/vulnerability/wordpress-url-shortener-plugin-3-0-7-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X9CC-HF3V-Q44R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:26 – Updated: 2025-05-08 12:34Cellopoint Cellos v4.1.10 Build 20190922 does not validate URL inputted properly. With cookie of an authenticated user, attackers can temper with the URL parameter and access arbitrary file on system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-17386"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-25T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cellopoint Cellos v4.1.10 Build 20190922 does not validate URL inputted properly. With cookie of an authenticated user, attackers can temper with the URL parameter and access arbitrary file on system.",
"id": "GHSA-x9cc-hf3v-q44r",
"modified": "2025-05-08T12:34:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:26:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-3847-c62ca-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.