Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

6271 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-63W7-2RQX-Q97M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:39 – Updated: 2026-08-24 18:31
VLAI
Details

Adobe Campaign Classic Gold Standard 10 (and earlier), 20.3.1 (and earlier), 20.2.3 (and earlier), 20.1.3 (and earlier), 19.2.3 (and earlier) and 19.1.7 (and earlier) are affected by a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to use the Campaign instance to issue unauthorized requests to internal or external resources.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-21009"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-01-13T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Adobe Campaign Classic Gold Standard 10 (and earlier), 20.3.1 (and earlier), 20.2.3 (and earlier), 20.1.3 (and earlier), 19.2.3 (and earlier) and 19.1.7 (and earlier) are affected by a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to use the Campaign instance to issue unauthorized requests to internal or external resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-63w7-2rqx-q97m",
  "modified": "2026-08-24T18:31:25Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:39:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21009"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/campaign/apsb21-04.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-63W7-6GXR-7JJW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-13 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-17 00:00
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in ProxyServlet.java in the /proxy servlet in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0. The value of the X-Forwarded-Host header overwrites the value of the Host header in proxied requests. The value of X-Forwarded-Host header is not checked against the whitelist of hosts that ZCS is allowed to proxy to (the zimbraProxyAllowedDomains setting).

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37041"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-12T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in ProxyServlet.java in the /proxy servlet in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0. The value of the X-Forwarded-Host header overwrites the value of the Host header in proxied requests. The value of X-Forwarded-Host header is not checked against the whitelist of hosts that ZCS is allowed to proxy to (the zimbraProxyAllowedDomains setting).",
  "id": "GHSA-63w7-6gxr-7jjw",
  "modified": "2022-08-17T00:00:30Z",
  "published": "2022-08-13T00:00:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37041"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Security_Center"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-644R-P44G-R6G9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 12:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 12:32
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in Kira-Pgr PromptShopMCP up to 5bc0cd17358e19a5415d11a531088170d7b81452. Affected is the function download_image of the file server.py of the component Image-Toolkit-MCP-Server. Performing a manipulation of the argument image_url results in server-side request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This product uses a rolling release model to deliver continuous updates. As a result, specific version information for affected or updated releases is not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74842"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-17T11:16:40Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in Kira-Pgr PromptShopMCP up to 5bc0cd17358e19a5415d11a531088170d7b81452. Affected is the function download_image of the file server.py of the component Image-Toolkit-MCP-Server. Performing a manipulation of the argument image_url results in server-side request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This product uses a rolling release model to deliver continuous updates. As a result, specific version information for affected or updated releases is not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
  "id": "GHSA-644r-p44g-r6g9",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T12:32:22Z",
  "published": "2026-08-17T12:32:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74842"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kira-Pgr/PromptShopMCP/issues/4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kira-Pgr/PromptShopMCP"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-74842"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/875276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/391204"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/391204/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-64CV-VXPR-J6VC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 17:51 – Updated: 2026-06-06 00:27
VLAI
Summary
edx-enterprise has SSRF via SAML metadata URL in sync_provider_data endpoint
Details

Summary

The sync_provider_data endpoint in SAMLProviderDataViewSet fetches SAML metadata from a URL stored in SAMLProviderConfig.metadata_source. An authenticated user with the Enterprise Admin role can set this field to an arbitrary URL via the SAMLProviderConfigViewSet PATCH endpoint, then trigger a server-side HTTP request by calling sync_provider_data. The fetch in fetch_metadata_xml() passes the URL directly to requests.get() with no scheme enforcement, IP filtering, or timeout.

This vulnerability was introduced when the SAML admin viewsets were migrated from openedx-platform into edx-enterprise. A related fix for the equivalent fetch path in openedx-platform (the fetch_saml_metadata Celery task) was applied in GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9.

Details

Vulnerable code path:

enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_utils.py:

def fetch_metadata_xml(url):
    log.info("Fetching %s", url)
    if not url.lower().startswith('https'):
        log.warning("This SAML metadata URL is not secure! (%s)", url)
    response = requests.get(url, verify=True)  # No IP/scheme validation
    response.raise_for_status()

enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_provider_data.py:

@action(detail=False, methods=['post'], url_path='sync_provider_data')
def sync_provider_data(self, request):
    ...
    metadata_url = saml_provider.metadata_source  # set via SAMLProviderConfig PATCH
    xml = fetch_metadata_xml(metadata_url)        # triggers the fetch

Missing protections: - No HTTPS enforcement (HTTP is allowed; the warning is not enforced) - No blocking of loopback (127.0.0.0/8) or link-local (169.254.0.0/16) ranges - No blocking of RFC 1918 private ranges - No request timeout

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites: Authenticated user with Enterprise Admin role for any enterprise customer with a configured SAML Identity Provider.

Step 1: Set a malicious metadata URL via the provider config endpoint:

curl -X PATCH 'https://<instance>/auth/saml/v0/provider_config/<pk>/' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <JWT>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"metadata_source": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}'

Step 2: Trigger the server-side fetch:

curl -X POST 'https://<instance>/auth/saml/v0/provider_data/sync_provider_data' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <JWT>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"enterprise_customer_uuid": "<uuid>"}'

The server fetches the AWS metadata endpoint. Even though XML parsing will fail, the HTTP request is made and timing/error differences confirm reachability of internal addresses.

Impact

An Enterprise Admin can use this SSRF to:

  • Steal cloud credentials: Access AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata services to retrieve IAM temporary credentials, potentially enabling full cloud infrastructure compromise.
  • Scan internal networks: Probe internal hosts, ports, and services behind the deployment's firewall.
  • Access internal APIs: Reach databases, admin panels, or microservices not exposed to the internet.

Enterprise Admin is a delegated role typically granted to corporate training managers, not platform operators. It should not grant the ability to make the server issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.

Patches / Mitigations

Call validate_saml_metadata_url() (importable from common.djangoapps.third_party_auth.utils as of the openedx-platform fix in GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9) in fetch_metadata_xml() before calling requests.get(). A request timeout should also be added.

Operators should additionally enforce network-level egress filtering to block outbound connections from the Open edX server to 169.254.0.0/16 and RFC 1918 ranges as a complementary control, particularly to cover hostname-based URLs that cannot be validated at the application layer.

Severity
8.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "edx-enterprise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T17:51:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `sync_provider_data` endpoint in `SAMLProviderDataViewSet` fetches SAML metadata from a URL stored in `SAMLProviderConfig.metadata_source`. An authenticated user with the Enterprise Admin role can set this field to an arbitrary URL via the `SAMLProviderConfigViewSet` PATCH endpoint, then trigger a server-side HTTP request by calling `sync_provider_data`. The fetch in `fetch_metadata_xml()` passes the URL directly to `requests.get()` with no scheme enforcement, IP filtering, or timeout.\n\nThis vulnerability was introduced when the SAML admin viewsets were migrated from `openedx-platform` into `edx-enterprise`. A related fix for the equivalent fetch path in `openedx-platform` (the `fetch_saml_metadata` Celery task) was applied in [GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9](https://github.com/openedx/openedx-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9).\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable code path:**\n\n`enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_utils.py`:\n```python\ndef fetch_metadata_xml(url):\n    log.info(\"Fetching %s\", url)\n    if not url.lower().startswith(\u0027https\u0027):\n        log.warning(\"This SAML metadata URL is not secure! (%s)\", url)\n    response = requests.get(url, verify=True)  # No IP/scheme validation\n    response.raise_for_status()\n```\n\n`enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_provider_data.py`:\n```python\n@action(detail=False, methods=[\u0027post\u0027], url_path=\u0027sync_provider_data\u0027)\ndef sync_provider_data(self, request):\n    ...\n    metadata_url = saml_provider.metadata_source  # set via SAMLProviderConfig PATCH\n    xml = fetch_metadata_xml(metadata_url)        # triggers the fetch\n```\n\n**Missing protections:**\n- No HTTPS enforcement (HTTP is allowed; the warning is not enforced)\n- No blocking of loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`) or link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`) ranges\n- No blocking of RFC 1918 private ranges\n- No request timeout\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Prerequisites:** Authenticated user with `Enterprise Admin` role for any enterprise customer with a configured SAML Identity Provider.\n\n**Step 1:** Set a malicious metadata URL via the provider config endpoint:\n```bash\ncurl -X PATCH \u0027https://\u003cinstance\u003e/auth/saml/v0/provider_config/\u003cpk\u003e/\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"metadata_source\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Trigger the server-side fetch:\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \u0027https://\u003cinstance\u003e/auth/saml/v0/provider_data/sync_provider_data\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"enterprise_customer_uuid\": \"\u003cuuid\u003e\"}\u0027\n```\n\nThe server fetches the AWS metadata endpoint. Even though XML parsing will fail, the HTTP request is made and timing/error differences confirm reachability of internal addresses.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn Enterprise Admin can use this SSRF to:\n\n- **Steal cloud credentials:** Access AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata services to retrieve IAM temporary credentials, potentially enabling full cloud infrastructure compromise.\n- **Scan internal networks:** Probe internal hosts, ports, and services behind the deployment\u0027s firewall.\n- **Access internal APIs:** Reach databases, admin panels, or microservices not exposed to the internet.\n\nEnterprise Admin is a delegated role typically granted to corporate training managers, not platform operators. It should not grant the ability to make the server issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.\n\n## Patches / Mitigations\n\nCall `validate_saml_metadata_url()` (importable from `common.djangoapps.third_party_auth.utils` as of the openedx-platform fix in [GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9](https://github.com/openedx/openedx-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9)) in `fetch_metadata_xml()` before calling `requests.get()`. A request timeout should also be added.\n\nOperators should additionally enforce network-level egress filtering to block outbound connections from the Open edX server to `169.254.0.0/16` and RFC 1918 ranges as a complementary control, particularly to cover hostname-based URLs that cannot be validated at the application layer.",
  "id": "GHSA-64cv-vxpr-j6vc",
  "modified": "2026-06-06T00:27:25Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T17:51:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openedx/edx-enterprise/security/advisories/GHSA-64cv-vxpr-j6vc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42860"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openedx/edx-enterprise"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/edx-enterprise/PYSEC-2026-58.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "edx-enterprise has SSRF via SAML metadata URL in sync_provider_data endpoint"
}

GHSA-64GR-F76R-4FQW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:15 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:15
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in Adobe Connect 9.6.2 and earlier versions. A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists that could be abused to bypass network access controls.

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-11291"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-12-09T06:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Adobe Connect 9.6.2 and earlier versions. A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists that could be abused to bypass network access controls.",
  "id": "GHSA-64gr-f76r-4fqw",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:15:22Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:15:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/connect/apsb17-35.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101838"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039799"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-64JP-4XJJ-PRCW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

Multiple Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified in the significant-gravitas/autogpt repository, specifically in the GitHub Integration and Web Search blocks. These vulnerabilities affect version agpt-platform-beta-v0.1.1. The issues arise when block inputs are controlled by untrusted sources, leading to potential credential leakage, internal network scanning, and unauthorized access to internal services, APIs, or data stores. The affected blocks include GithubListPullRequestsBlock, GithubReadPullRequestBlock, GithubAssignPRReviewerBlock, GithubListPRReviewersBlock, GithubUnassignPRReviewerBlock, GithubCommentBlock, GithubMakeIssueBlock, GithubReadIssueBlock, GithubListIssuesBlock, GithubAddLabelBlock, GithubRemoveLabelBlock, GithubListBranchesBlock, and ExtractWebsiteContentBlock.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10457"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Multiple Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified in the significant-gravitas/autogpt repository, specifically in the GitHub Integration and Web Search blocks. These vulnerabilities affect version agpt-platform-beta-v0.1.1. The issues arise when block inputs are controlled by untrusted sources, leading to potential credential leakage, internal network scanning, and unauthorized access to internal services, APIs, or data stores. The affected blocks include GithubListPullRequestsBlock, GithubReadPullRequestBlock, GithubAssignPRReviewerBlock, GithubListPRReviewersBlock, GithubUnassignPRReviewerBlock, GithubCommentBlock, GithubMakeIssueBlock, GithubReadIssueBlock, GithubListIssuesBlock, GithubAddLabelBlock, GithubRemoveLabelBlock, GithubListBranchesBlock, and ExtractWebsiteContentBlock.",
  "id": "GHSA-64jp-4xjj-prcw",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:39Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10457"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/significant-gravitas/autogpt/commit/bcaf3241dadfc1fca024e91fb8f2e3004105a172"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/1d91e1e1-7d45-4bda-bc27-bfe9052fd975"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-64PM-8V2V-3CX7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03
VLAI
Details

IBM Jazz Foundation and IBM Engineering products are vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 194595.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-20346"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-02T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Jazz Foundation and IBM Engineering products are vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 194595.",
  "id": "GHSA-64pm-8v2v-3cx7",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:50Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:03:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20346"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/194595"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6457739"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-64V6-HR9R-33MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-26 06:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:46
VLAI
Details

The W3C XML Signature Syntax and Processing (XMLDsig) specification, starting with 1.0, was originally published with a "RetrievalMethod is a URI ... that may be used to obtain key and/or certificate information" statement and no accompanying information about SSRF risks, and this may have contributed to vulnerable implementations such as those discussed in CVE-2023-36661 and CVE-2024-21893. NOTE: this was mitigated in 1.1 and 2.0 via a directly referenced Best Practices document that calls on implementers to be wary of SSRF.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-34581"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-26T05:15:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The W3C XML Signature Syntax and Processing (XMLDsig) specification, starting with 1.0, was originally published with a \"RetrievalMethod is a URI ... that may be used to obtain key and/or certificate information\" statement and no accompanying information about SSRF risks, and this may have contributed to vulnerable implementations such as those discussed in CVE-2023-36661 and CVE-2024-21893. NOTE: this was mitigated in 1.1 and 2.0 via a directly referenced Best Practices document that calls on implementers to be wary of SSRF.",
  "id": "GHSA-64v6-hr9r-33mx",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:46:59Z",
  "published": "2024-06-26T06:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34581"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zmanion/Vulnerabilities/blob/main/CVE-2024-21893.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.w3.org/Signature/Drafts/WD-xmldsig-core-200003plc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.w3.org/TR/2013/NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-64WP-JH9P-5CG2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-11 22:04 – Updated: 2023-01-23 22:17
VLAI
Summary
RSSHub SSRF vulnerability
Details

Summary

RSSHub is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. This vulnerability allows an attacker to send arbitrary HTTP requests from the server to other servers or resources on the network.

Description

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a request to the affected routes with a malicious URL. For example, if an attacker controls the ATTACKER.HOST domain, they can send a request to affected routes with the value set to ATTACKER.HOST%2F%23. The %2F and %23 characters are URL-encoded versions of the forward-slash (/) and pound (#) characters, respectively. In this context, an attacker could use those characters to append the base URL (i.e. https://${input}.defined.host) to be modified to https://ATTACKER.HOST/#.defined.host. This will cause the server to send a request to the attacker-controlled domain, allowing the attacker to potentially gain access to sensitive information or perform further attacks on the server.

Impact

An attacker could use this vulnerability to send requests to internal or any other servers or resources on the network, potentially gain access to sensitive information that would not normally be accessible and amplifying the impact of the attack.

Reference

Fixing PR: https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub/pull/11588

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "rsshub"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0-master.a66cbcf"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-22493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-11T22:04:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-01-13T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nRSSHub is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. This vulnerability allows an attacker to send arbitrary HTTP requests from the server to other servers or resources on the network.\n\n## Description\n\nAn attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a request to the affected routes with a malicious URL. For example, if an attacker controls the `ATTACKER.HOST` domain, they can send a request to affected routes with the value set to `ATTACKER.HOST%2F%23`.\nThe `%2F` and `%23` characters are URL-encoded versions of the forward-slash (`/`) and pound (`#`) characters, respectively. In this context, an attacker could use those characters to append the base URL (i.e. `https://${input}.defined.host`) to be modified to `https://ATTACKER.HOST/#.defined.host`. This will cause the server to send a request to the attacker-controlled domain, allowing the attacker to potentially gain access to sensitive information or perform further attacks on the server. \n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could use this vulnerability to send requests to internal or any other servers or resources on the network, potentially gain access to sensitive information that would not normally be accessible and amplifying the impact of the attack.\n\n## Reference\n\nFixing PR: https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub/pull/11588",
  "id": "GHSA-64wp-jh9p-5cg2",
  "modified": "2023-01-23T22:17:31Z",
  "published": "2023-01-11T22:04:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub/security/advisories/GHSA-64wp-jh9p-5cg2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub/pull/11588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub/commit/a66cbcf6eebc700bf97ab097f404f16ab415506a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisory.dw1.io/56"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RSSHub SSRF vulnerability"
}

GHSA-6529-C226-H328

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:35 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:35
VLAI
Summary
MCP Atlassian: SSRF redirect protection missing for basic-auth and OAuth authentication branches
Details

Summary

_make_ssrf_safe_hook() blocks HTTP redirects to private/internal IPs by validating the Location header before the client follows a 3xx response. The problem is that this hook is only attached in one of three authentication branches — the header-PAT path. Basic auth and OAuth branches skip it entirely, so if the connected Atlassian server returns a redirect to something like http://169.254.169.254/, the requests session follows it without complaint.

This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9. The hook works fine when it's there — it just isn't there for most production auth configurations.

Details

In src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py, three branches construct a fetcher and call _create_and_validate(). Only Branch 1 passes attach_ssrf_hook=True:

# Branch 1 (header PAT) — hook attached
return _create_and_validate(request, spec, header_config, "header_pat",
                             attach_ssrf_hook=True)

# Branch 2 (basic auth) — hook missing
return _create_and_validate(request, spec, user_config, "basic",
                             user_email=user_email)

# Branch 3 (OAuth/PAT) — hook missing
return _create_and_validate(request, spec, user_config, "oauth_pat",
                             user_email=user_email)

attach_ssrf_hook defaults to False, so branches 2 and 3 silently skip the protection. The hook itself (_make_ssrf_safe_hook) is straightforward — it checks response.is_redirect, grabs the Location header, and calls validate_url_for_ssrf() to reject private IPs. It works correctly when present.

Typical attack flow:

  1. Attacker controls or compromises an Atlassian instance (Cloud or Server)
  2. MCP server connects using basic auth or OAuth credentials (most production setups)
  3. Atlassian returns 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
  4. The unprotected session follows the redirect
  5. AWS IAM credentials (or other internal service data) are returned to the attacker

PoC

Tested on commit d8bc786 (v0.21.1). No real credentials needed.

from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import requests

from mcp_atlassian.servers.dependencies import _make_ssrf_safe_hook
from mcp_atlassian.utils.urls import validate_url_for_ssrf
from mcp_atlassian.jira import JiraFetcher
from mcp_atlassian.jira.config import JiraConfig

config = JiraConfig(
    url="https://attacker.atlassian.net",
    auth_type="basic",
    username="victim@example.com",
    api_token="victim-token",
)
fetcher = JiraFetcher(config=config)
session = fetcher.jira._session

hooks = session.hooks.get("response", [])
print("hooks on basic-auth session:", [h.__name__ for h in hooks] or "none")

fake_redirect = MagicMock(spec=requests.Response)
fake_redirect.is_redirect = True
fake_redirect.headers = {"Location": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}

blocked = False
for h in hooks:
    try:
        h(fake_redirect)
    except ValueError as e:
        blocked = True
        print("blocked:", e)

if not blocked:
    print("redirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session")

# show header-PAT branch does block it
hook = _make_ssrf_safe_hook(validate_url_for_ssrf)
try:
    hook(fake_redirect)
except ValueError as e:
    print("header-PAT branch blocks:", e)

Output:

image

$ uv run python3 /tmp/test.py
hooks on basic-auth session: none
redirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session
header-PAT branch blocks: Redirect blocked (SSRF): Blocked IP address: 169.254.169.254 (non-global)

Impact

Basic auth and OAuth cover most production Atlassian Cloud deployments, so this affects the majority of HTTP-mode multi-user setups. An attacker with control over the Atlassian server can redirect MCP server requests to internal infrastructure — cloud metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes API, databases, or any service reachable from the MCP server's network.

The fix is one line per affected branch: pass attach_ssrf_hook=True to _create_and_validate() in branches 2 and 3, the same way branch 1 already does.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp-atlassian"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.22.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77261"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:35:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T18:17:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`_make_ssrf_safe_hook()` blocks HTTP redirects to private/internal IPs by validating the `Location` header before the client follows a `3xx` response. The problem is that this hook is only attached in one of three authentication branches \u2014 the header-PAT path. Basic auth and OAuth branches skip it entirely, so if the connected Atlassian server returns a redirect to something like `http://169.254.169.254/`, the `requests` session follows it without complaint.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix for GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9. The hook works fine when it\u0027s there \u2014 it just isn\u0027t there for most production auth configurations.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py`, three branches construct a fetcher and call `_create_and_validate()`. Only Branch 1 passes `attach_ssrf_hook=True`:\n\n```python\n# Branch 1 (header PAT) \u2014 hook attached\nreturn _create_and_validate(request, spec, header_config, \"header_pat\",\n                             attach_ssrf_hook=True)\n\n# Branch 2 (basic auth) \u2014 hook missing\nreturn _create_and_validate(request, spec, user_config, \"basic\",\n                             user_email=user_email)\n\n# Branch 3 (OAuth/PAT) \u2014 hook missing\nreturn _create_and_validate(request, spec, user_config, \"oauth_pat\",\n                             user_email=user_email)\n```\n\n`attach_ssrf_hook` defaults to `False`, so branches 2 and 3 silently skip the protection. The hook itself (`_make_ssrf_safe_hook`) is straightforward \u2014 it checks `response.is_redirect`, grabs the `Location` header, and calls `validate_url_for_ssrf()` to reject private IPs. It works correctly when present.\n\nTypical attack flow:\n\n1. Attacker controls or compromises an Atlassian instance (Cloud or Server)\n2. MCP server connects using basic auth or OAuth credentials (most production setups)\n3. Atlassian returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n4. The unprotected session follows the redirect\n5. AWS IAM credentials (or other internal service data) are returned to the attacker\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on commit `d8bc786` (v0.21.1). No real credentials needed.\n\n```python\nfrom unittest.mock import MagicMock\nimport requests\n\nfrom mcp_atlassian.servers.dependencies import _make_ssrf_safe_hook\nfrom mcp_atlassian.utils.urls import validate_url_for_ssrf\nfrom mcp_atlassian.jira import JiraFetcher\nfrom mcp_atlassian.jira.config import JiraConfig\n\nconfig = JiraConfig(\n    url=\"https://attacker.atlassian.net\",\n    auth_type=\"basic\",\n    username=\"victim@example.com\",\n    api_token=\"victim-token\",\n)\nfetcher = JiraFetcher(config=config)\nsession = fetcher.jira._session\n\nhooks = session.hooks.get(\"response\", [])\nprint(\"hooks on basic-auth session:\", [h.__name__ for h in hooks] or \"none\")\n\nfake_redirect = MagicMock(spec=requests.Response)\nfake_redirect.is_redirect = True\nfake_redirect.headers = {\"Location\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\"}\n\nblocked = False\nfor h in hooks:\n    try:\n        h(fake_redirect)\n    except ValueError as e:\n        blocked = True\n        print(\"blocked:\", e)\n\nif not blocked:\n    print(\"redirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session\")\n\n# show header-PAT branch does block it\nhook = _make_ssrf_safe_hook(validate_url_for_ssrf)\ntry:\n    hook(fake_redirect)\nexcept ValueError as e:\n    print(\"header-PAT branch blocks:\", e)\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2490\" height=\"214\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c7d9d7e2-4c37-4abd-95a3-4ddd9f6bd735\" /\u003e\n\n```\n$ uv run python3 /tmp/test.py\nhooks on basic-auth session: none\nredirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session\nheader-PAT branch blocks: Redirect blocked (SSRF): Blocked IP address: 169.254.169.254 (non-global)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nBasic auth and OAuth cover most production Atlassian Cloud deployments, so this affects the majority of HTTP-mode multi-user setups. An attacker with control over the Atlassian server can redirect MCP server requests to internal infrastructure \u2014 cloud metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes API, databases, or any service reachable from the MCP server\u0027s network.\n\nThe fix is one line per affected branch: pass `attach_ssrf_hook=True` to `_create_and_validate()` in branches 2 and 3, the same way branch 1 already does.",
  "id": "GHSA-6529-c226-h328",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:35:13Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:35:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-6529-c226-h328"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77261"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP Atlassian: SSRF redirect protection missing for basic-auth and OAuth authentication branches"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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